State ex rel. Linde v. Packard

• Decision Date: 14 November 1916
• Citation: 160 N.W. 150,35 N.D. 298
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

160 N.W. 150

35 N.D. 298

STATE EX REL. HENRY J. LINDE, Attorney General, and Enoch Lodge of Perfection A. A. S. R. No. 1, Fargo Council Knights Kadosh A. A. S. R. No. 1, Pelican Chapter of Rose Croix A. A. S. R. No. 1, and Dakota Consistory A. A. S. R. No. 1, Fraternal Corporations known as the Scottish Rite Bodies of Fargo, North Dakota, and H. C. Plumley, Relators, v. FRANK E. PACKARD, George E. Wallace, H. H. Steele, State Tax Commission of the State of North Dakota, and as Members of such State Tax Commission, W. R. Tucker, County Auditor of the County of Cass, and as such County Auditor of the County of Cass, and John Wetz, City Assessor of the City of Fargo, County of Cass, and as such City Assessor

Supreme Court of North Dakota

November 14, 1916

Original proceedings by the State, on the relation of Henry J. Linde, Attorney General, and Enoch Lodge of Perfection A A. S. R. No. 1, Fargo Council Knights Kadosh A. A. S. R. No 1, Pelican Chapter of Rose Croix A. A. S. R. No. 1, and Dakota Consistory A. A. S. R. No. 1, fraternal corporations known as the Scottish Rite Bodies of Fargo, North Dakota, and H. C. Plumley, for the issuance of a writ prohibiting and enjoining the state tax commission and others from assessing and listing for taxation certain property used exclusively for Masonic purposes.

Writ issued.

Writ issued.

Lawrence & Murphy, for relators.

The relators are corporations purely and solely for lodge purposes, and for charitable, benevolent, and fraternal objects, and not for profit. They hold and exclusively use their properties for such purposes and objects. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 5025, 5030, 5032, 5038, 5039, 5042.

All such property, so held and exclusively used, is exempt from assessment and taxation. Laws 1913, chap. 280; Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 2078, 5025-5042.

Every reasonable presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of a statute enacted by the legislature. 8 Cyc. 801; O'Laughlin v. Carlson, 30 N.D. 213, 152 N.W 675; State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 N.D. 76 L.R.A. , , 156 N.W. 561; Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 242.

The general rule is that when private property is claimed as exempt from taxation, the law under which the exemption is claimed will be strictly construed. Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 P. 1097; State ex rel. Richards v. Armstrong, 17 Utah 171, 41 L.R.A. 407, 53 P. 981.

There is, however, an exception to this rule, and statutes exempting property used for educational and charitable purposes, or for public worship, should receive a broad and more liberal construction. Salt Lake Lodge v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah 1, 120 P. 194, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 940; Widows' & Orphans' Home v. Com. 126 Ky. 386, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 829, 103 S.W. 354; People ex rel. Young Men's Asso. v. Sayles, 23 Misc. 1, 50 N.Y.S. 8; Phillips Academy v. Andover, 175 Mass. 118, 48 L.R.A. 550, 55 N.E. 841; Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 43 L.R.A. 490, 42 A. 87; St. Mary's Church v. Tripp, 14 R. I. 307; Curtis v. Androscoggin Lodge, 99 Me. 356, 59 A. 518; Massachusetts General Hospital v. Somerville, 101 Mass. 319; People ex rel. Church of St. Mary v. Feitner, 168 N.Y. 494, 61 N.E. 762; Academy of Sacred Heart v. Irey, 51 Neb. 755, 71 N.W. 752; Cassiano v. Ursuline Academy, 64 Tex. 673; Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. 306; Warde v. Manchester, 56 N.H. 508, 22 Am. Rep. 504; Wesleyan Academy v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass. 599.

"A constitutional provision merely authorizing the legislature to exempt certain kinds of property does not by itself grant any exemption." 37 Cyc. 885 and cases cited in note 95, 887.

Under the Constitution the legislature was not prevented from exercising its inherent power of exempting such property as they might deem necessary, and as they deemed for the best public policy, so that the people of the state, by an amendment to the Constitution, eliminated the requirement that all property should be taxed; there then remained the power to exempt the property of these relators as it has been exempted by the existing statute. Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 42, 8 N.W. 833; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black. 510, 17 L.Ed. 305; Cooley, Taxn. 145; 1 Desty, Taxn. 124; Farris v. Vannier, 6 Dak. 191, 3 L.R.A. 713, 42 N.W. 31; Sumner County v. Wellington, 66 Kan. 590, 60 L.R.A. 855, 97 Am. St. Rep. 396, 72 P. 216; Francis v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 19 Kan. 311; Ottawa County v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 237, 27 Am. Rep. 101; Wheeler v. Weightman, 96 Kan. 50, L.R.A. 1916A, 846, 149 P. 982.

The clause of the Constitution is clearly not self-executing. These various terms look forward to and require action upon the part of the lawmaking branch of the government. Engstad v. Grand Forks County, 10 N.D. 54, 84 N.W. 577.

Where the means are not satisfying, any means may be resorted to which are fairly and properly adapted to accomplish the object of the grant of power. Black, Const. Law, p. 71; 1 Kent, Com. 404; Sutherland, Stat. Constr. § 343.

In liquor matters the legislature has defined intoxicating liquors. It has said that "malt liquor" is intoxicating. Thus it has been held that where a party has been arrested, charged with selling malt liquors, proof offered by him that the liquors sold were not intoxicating was held inadmissible, for the reason that the legislature had defined it. State v. Ely, 22 S.D. 487, 118 N.W. 687, 18 Ann. Cas. 92; State v. Fargo Bottling Works Co. 19 N.D. 396, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 872, 124 N.W. 387; State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 76 Iowa 243, 2 L.R. A. 408, 41 N.W. 6; State v. Colvin, 127 Iowa 632, 103 N.W. 968; Com. v. Brelsford, 161 Mass. 61, 36 N.E. 677; Black, Intoxicating Liquors, § 2; State v. Frederickson, 101 Me. 37, 6 L.R.A.(N.S.) 186, 115 Am. St. Rep. 295, 63 A. 535, 8 Ann. Cas. 48.

In the case at bar, the property is exempt from taxation if for no other reason than that the legislature has said so. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 6 L.Ed. 537.

"The legislature is master of its own discretion," and is the sole judge of the means that are necessary to accomplish its purpose, in the exercise of its power over the subject-matter. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457-561, 20 L.Ed. 287-315; Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 6 L.R.A. 576, 16 Am. St. Rep. 396, 23 N.E. 253; State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 467, 7 L.R.A. 240, 23 N.E. 946; Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 28 L.Ed. 204, 4 S.Ct. 122; Cooley, Const. Lim. 4th ed. 129; State ex rel. Terre Haute v. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 434, 14 L.R.A. 570, 29 N.E. 595.

The contemporaneous exposition of a statute is always important, and sometimes a controlling guide, in its interpretation. 8 Cyc. 736, 737, and cases cited in notes; Chestnut v. Shane, 16 Ohio 599, 47 Am. Dec. 387; Com. v. Grant, 2 Woodw. Dec. 379; 36 Cyc. 1135, 1153; 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 640; Cooley, Const. Lim. 255; Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 534; Jackson v. Washington County, 34 Neb. 680, 52 N.W. 169; Hedgecock v. Davis, 64 N.C. 650; United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 24 L.Ed. 588; Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 386, 21 N.E. 890; Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252; McPherson v. Blacker, 92 Mich. 377, 16 L.R.A. 475, 31 Am. St. Rep. 587, 52 N.W. 469; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439, 33 L.R.A. 313, 44 N.E. 469; Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396, Gil. 347; Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa. 199.

Where a statute, by the acts of the government and by adjudications, has been treated as constitutional, the courts will not inquire into its constitutionality. Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal. 175; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376, 74 Am. Dec. 572; Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658; Carson v. Smith, 5 Minn. 78, Gil. 58, 77 Am. Dec. 539; Railroad Comrs. v. Market Street R. Co. 132 Cal. 677, 64 P. 1065; Frost v. Pfeiffer, 26 Colo. 338, 58 P. 147.

While not conclusive, legislative construction is quite persuasive. Denver v. Adams County, 33 Colo. 1, 77 P. 858; Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 386, 21 N.E. 890; State ex rel. Barber v. Parler, 52 S.C. 207, 29 S.E. 651, 28 S.E. 1023.

The same is true of construction given and acted upon by the state officers and people for a long time. State v. New Orleans R. & Light Co. 116 La. 144, 40 So. 597, 7 Ann. Cas. 724; Gaar, S. & Co. v. Sorum, 11 N.D. 174, 90 N.W. 799; 1 Kent, Com. 465; Cooley, Const. Lim. 81; Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 28 L.Ed. 482, 4 S.Ct. 437; Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 49 L.Ed. 409, 25 S.Ct. 211; Com. v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323, 12 Am. Rep. 699; People ex rel. Lynch v. La Salle County, 100 Ill. 495; Re Washington Street Asylum R. Co. 115 N.Y. 442, 22 N.E. 356; Atty. Gen. v. Preston, 56 Mich. 177, 22 N.W. 261; Scanlan v. Childs, 33 Wis. 663; Lick v. Faulkner, 25 Cal. 405.

The Masonic order is a charitable institution, and its property is used exclusively for charitable purposes. Const. § 175; Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 2078, 5025, 5030, 5038; Philadelphia v. Masonic Home, 160 Pa. 572, 23 L.R.A. 545, 40 Am. St. Rep. 736, 28 A. 954; Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 68 Tex. 698, 5 S.W. 519; Morning Star Lodge, v. Hayslip, 23 Ohio St. 144; Massenburg v. Grand Lodge, F. & A. M. 81 Ga. 212, 7 S.E. 636; Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445, 22 S.W. 29; People ex rel. Huck v. Western Seaman's Friend Soc. 87 Ill. 246; Montana Catholic Missions v. Lewis & Clarke County, 13 Mont. 559, 22 L.R.A. 634, 35 P. 2; Hennepin County v. Brotherhood of Gethsemane, 27 Minn. 460, 38 Am. Rep. 298, 8 N.W. 595; Delaware County v. Sisters of St. Francis, 2 Del. Co. Rep. 149; New Port v. Masonic Temple Asso. 108 Ky. 333, 49 L.R.A. 252, 56 S.W. 405; Bangor v. Rising Virtue Lodge, 73 Me. 428, 40 Am. Rep. 369; Green Bay Lodge v. Green Bay, 122 Wis. 452, 106 Am. St. Rep. 984, 100 N.W. 837; State ex rel. Hibernian Soc. v. Addison, 2 S.C. 499; Salt Lake Lodge v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah 1, 120 P. 194, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 940.

Charity is not confined exclusively to the...