Morris v. Randall
| Citation | 129 Ky. 720,112 S.W. 856 |
| Parties | MORRIS v. RANDALL et al. |
| Decision Date | 09 October 1908 |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Campbell County.
"To be officially reported."
Prohibition by Cora Randall and another against J. R. Morris, police judge of the district of Clifton, to prevent defendant from executing a judgment against Cora Randall. From a judgment granting the writ, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
C. L Raison, Jr., for appellant.
Aubrey Barbour, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Campbell circuit court granting a writ of prohibition to prevent appellant, J. R Morris, claiming to be police judge of the district of Clifton, from executing a judgment against appellee Cora Randall, rendered in his court, for a small fine and costs imposed on account of a misdemeanor, for which she was tried and convicted under a warrant. The petition for the writ was filed by the appellee Cora Randall and her husband. The answer of appellant sets forth his election and qualification as police judge of the district of Clifton, and averred that the office of which he is the incumbent was created, and is yet existing, by virtue of sections 3 and 5 of an act of the General Assembly, entitled "An act to incorporate the district of Clifton, in Campbell county, approved February 1 1888" (Laws 1888, pp. 256, 257, c. 158), and further averred that appellant, as such alleged police judge, had jurisdiction of the person of appellee Cora Randall, and of the offense of which she was charged, and that her trial and conviction were legally had and effected. A demurrer was sustained to the answer by the circuit court, and, the appellant failing to plead further, the writ of prohibition was granted upon the ground that the office and court of which appellant claims to be the incumbent and judge have no legal existence, the provisions of the act establishing them having been repealed by the present state Constitution. Is it true that the present Constitution has repealed these provisions of the act incorporating the district of Clifton, whereby a police court of that district was established? This is the principal question presented by the appeal, and its solution involves careful consideration of the several provisions of the Constitution bearing upon the subject.
Section 109 of the Constitution declares:
"The judicial power of the commonwealth, both as to matters of law and equity, shall be vested in the Senate when sitting as a court of impeachment and one Supreme Court (to be styled the Court of Appeals) and the courts established by this Constitution."
Section 135 provides: 'F'No courts save those provided for in this Constitution, shall be established."
The Constitution then proceeds to provide for the establishment of the Court of Appeals, circuit courts, quarterly courts, justice's courts, fiscal courts, and police courts. The provisions of the Constitution, with respect to the establishment of police courts are to be found in section 143, which is as follows:
It is patent that the Constitution makes no provision for creating police courts, except in cities or towns, as specified in section 143. If, therefore, the district of Clifton cannot be held to be a city or town within the meaning of that section, no constitutional provision is made for the establishment of a police court in that district, nor for the retention or continuation of one therein already established. Obviously, the words "city and town," as used in section 143, do not embrace a district or quasi municipality, such as the district of Clifton, unless their meaning as used in section 143 differs from that given the same words appearing in section 156 of the Constitution, providing for the classification of cities and towns. The words "city and town" found in section 143, refer to the cities and towns classified by the Constitution. This we know, not only from the general rule of construction "that like expressions used in the same instrument are given the same interpretation, unless the contrary is manifest from the entire context," but also from the reference, in the latter provision of that section, to cities and towns of the fourth, fifth, and sixth classes.
While the district of Clifton is one of the "other municipalities" mentioned in various provisions of the Constitution, relating to taxation,...
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Goodenough v. Kentucky Purchasing Co.
...court to it is acting, or about to act, in a matter not within its jurisdiction. Some of the cases so holding are: Morris v. Randall, 129 Ky. 720, 112 S.W. 856; Schobarg v. Manson, 110 Ky. 483, 61 S.W. 999, 22 Law Rep. 1892; Commonwealth v. Weissinger, 143 Ky. 368, 136 S.W. 875; Chiles v. S......
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Goodenough, Judge Police Ct., v. Ky. Purchasing Co.
...court to it is acting, or about to act, in a matter not within its jurisdiction. Some of the cases so holding are: Morris v. Randall, 129 Ky. 720, 112 S.W. 856; Schobarg v. Manson, 110 Ky. 483, 61 S.W. 999, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1892; Commonwealth v. Weissinger, 143 Ky. 268, 136 S.W. 875; Chiles ......
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Rush v. Childers
... ... adequate remedy. Gilman v. Doak, 194 Ky. 21, 237 ... S.W. 1069; Jenkins v. Berry, 122 Ky. 311, 92 S.W ... 10, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1224; Morris v. Randall, 129 Ky ... 720, 112 S.W. 856; White v. Kirby, Judge, 147 Ky ... 496, 144 S.W. 369; Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, ... Judge, 170 ... ...
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Gleason v. Weber
...the district without a special tribunal such as is common to cities and towns. This was the conclusion reached in Morris v. Randall et al., 129 Ky. 720, 112 S.W. 856, in which we held that as the Constitution (sections 109, and 143) vests the judicial power in certain designated courts, and......