Morris v. State

• Decision Date: 21 January 1915
• Docket Number: 536
• Citation: 68 So. 1003,193 Ala. 1
• Parties: MORRIS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

68 So. 1003

193 Ala. 1

MORRIS v. STATE.

No. 536

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 21, 1915

Rehearing Denied May 13, 1915

Appeal from Circuit Court, Tallapoosa County; S.L. Brewer, Judge.

Early Morris was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

Bulger & Rylance, of Dadeville, for appellant.

R.C Brickell, Atty. Gen., and W.L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

MAYFIELD J.

The defendant was indicted for murder (uxorcide), convicted, and given the death penalty.

It appears that he was arrested on the afternoon of October 8 1913, and was indicted by a special grand jury that night and arraigned and required to plead a few minutes after the indictment was returned, and was put on trial within less than 48 hours after indictment found. Whatever else may be said of this proceeding, it was certainly speedy. The bill of exceptions contained the following recitals--and nothing more--as to this speedy action:

"Be it remembered, that at the fall term, 1913, of the circuit court of Tallapoosa county, at Dadeville, on the 10th day of October, the following proceedings were had not otherwise appearing of record: In open court Wednesday night October 8, 1913, defendant was arraigned and case set for trial October 10, 1913. The defendant objected to being required to plead at this time, because the indictment was not returned until about 8:15 p.m. October 8th, and the defendant was not arrested until the afternoon of October 8th, and had not had an opportunity to confer with counsel and prepare his plea. Also upon the further ground that the short time intervening between the time of his arraignment and the time of his trial was not sufficient to authorize him to prepare for trial properly. The court overruled the objections and the defendant then and there duly excepted to such ruling of the court."

The question presented is: Can this court say, as matter of law that the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's motion? Is it thereby made to appear that the accused was deprived of any of his constitutional rights secured to him by the Bill of Rights? Can this court say, from this record, that the accused was denied "due process of law"? One of the express constitutional guaranties to accused persons in criminal cases is the right to be heard in the courts by self and counsel; another is the right to compulsory process for their witnesses. To put a defendant on trial for a grave crime, without an opportunity to obtain or confer with counsel, and without opportunity for obtaining his witnesses, in effect might be to deny him the two express constitutional rights above mentioned. It is possible that, to put a defendant on trial immediately after his arrest or accusation, or to deny to him any continuance or postponement of the trial, would be to deny him these rights.

On the subject of allowing the accused to be heard by counsel, this court, in Peagler's Case, 110 Ala. 11, 14, 20 So. 363, said:

"The Constitution does not specify the time nor the number of counsel, to which a person accused by a criminal prosecution is entitled. It provides that 'he has a right to be heard by himself and counsel or either.' This provision guarantees him the right to be heard on all questions of law and fact which may arise at any time during the prosecution, and it implies that he shall have full opportunity and time as justice and the necessities of the case may require. Necessarily the trial court is invested with a large and very responsible discretion in determining and affording to the accused the full measure of his constitutional right. Like any other adjudication by the trial court, involving the rights of a party on trial, its judgment is revisable by this court. When the question is presented here, we determine whether the discretion has been abused, whether the party has been deprived of his right to be fully heard, as provided. Where the right has been wholly denied, or action taken in the absence of the accused, the duty of this court is plain. But where the question depends upon the manner in which a discretion has been exercised, the duty of this court in reviewing the conclusion of the trial court is often difficult."

In Yeldell's Case, 100 Ala. 26, 29, 14 So. 570, 46 Am.St.Rep. 20, the court, after reviewing the authorities on this subject--one line holding that the discretion of the trial court is reviewable, and the other, that it is not--said:

"These two cases present the extremes of the doctrine, and neither meets our approval. The correct and just principle, sanctioned by reason and authority, lies between these extremes. Courts are established for the administration and promotion of justice. If time and patience are not accorded a defendant, proceeded against in a cause in which his life or liberty is endangered, this high end and aim of the court would be subverted. If time is valuable and is pressing, if patience has been sorely taxed, any just judge will be careful, yet, to allow full and fair opportunity to counsel to present his client's defense. This much is guaranteed in the Constitution, and no more; and this guaranty is not inconsistent with the existence of power in the court to regulate the exercise of the right of argument by reasonable rules and regulations. Counsel have no more right, from whatever motive, unnecessarily to waste the time of the court, in improper and unnecessary speech, than the court has to deprive them of reasonable opportunity to make defense for their clients. Should they abuse their privilege in this regard, it is the right and duty of the court to restrain them within proper and legal bounds."

In Walker's Case, 117 Ala. 85, 88, 23 So. 670, where the court had refused to postpone or continue the trial of a criminal case, and it was insisted that the accused was denied his constitutional right, the court said:

"The rule of practice as to continuances cannot be so applied as to contravene the seventh section of the Bill of Rights, art. I, of the Constitution, sec. 7, which declares that in criminal prosecutions

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