Morris v. State

Decision Date25 April 2012
Docket NumberNo. 1705,Sept. Term, 2010.,1705
PartiesMark Charles MORRIS v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Martha Gillespie (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Cathleen C. Brockmeyer (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: MATRICCIANI, HOTTEN, RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

HOTTEN, J.

Appellant, Mark Charles Morris, was charged with first and second degree assault in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Following a jury trial on July 26 and 27, 2010, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges. On August 9, 2010, the circuit court consolidated appellant's sentencing with a burglary charge to which he had already pleaded guilty, and imposed a twelve year sentence, with a three year sentence for the burglary conviction to run concurrently. Appellant timely appealed, presenting the following questions, which we quote:

1. Did the trial judge err in asking the prospective jurors during voir dire a “CSI” question directed at dispelling any juror's belief that scientific evidence was necessary in order to prove the State's case?

2. Was the evidence insufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony regarding the identity of the person who committed the assault?

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court.

I. VOIR DIRE QUESTIONA. Facts

Before the voir dire of the jury, the circuit court inquired whether appellant had objections to the State's proposed voir dire questions, and the following colloquy took place:

[THE COURT]: While we're waiting for the jury both counsel have submitted a proposed voir dire. Does either side have any objection to any particular questions in either of the other[']s voir dire?

[THE STATE]: None from the State your honor.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your honor, I just have one objection to that C.S.I. question.

[THE COURT]: Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just think that's an improper question. It[']s almost like the State's Attorney is trying to convey to the jury that she should not have a strong burden to present evidence in the case, and that certain evidence is in, presented that should be excused. And I just think it [']s, it[']s prejudicial to my client.

[THE COURT]: All right. Yes ma'am?

[THE STATE]: I disagree your honor. I think that because of the prevalence of popularity of those kinds of shows that jurors come in thinking that that is the kind of evidence that they're going to receive and put a[n] ... unfair burden on the State to produce that kind of evidence where in a case like this [,] that evidence is not going to be present. So, I do think that the instruction is or that the question is a fair question to ask.

[THE COURT]: All right. I'm going to, I'm going to overrule the objection. I think that is a fair question in light of the proliferance (phonetic.) of those types of shows and media coverage of [s]cientific and other types of evidence which is not typically brought in court proceedings. I think it [']s not overly prejudicial. So, I will allow that, I will ask that question....

Therefore, during voir dire, the circuit court asked the following question:

Ladies and gentlemen, televisions shows such as C.S.I., Crossing Jordan and some of the like are fiction. They are not true. Many of the scientific methods used in those kinds of television shows are exaggerated or do not even exist. If you are selected as a juror in this case[,] you will be required to base your decisions solely on the evidence presented in court. Would any potential juror be unable to ignore the so called crime dramas they have been seeing on television, the movies and Internet or such and putting that aside in making your decision based solely on the evidence that you hear in court and not through some expectation of something that you've seen through the media or television? Is there anyone who would be so persuaded by such a show that they would not be able to judge this case fairly and impartially? Please rise if that applies to you. Let the record reflect that there is no such response.

B. Discussion

In Stringfellow v. State, 199 Md.App. 141, 147, 20 A.3d 825 (2011), rev'd, State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 461, 464–65, 42 A.3d 27 (2012), we recently reiterated the importance of voir dire as follows:

“Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.” White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 240 (2003) (quoting Rosales–Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 [101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22] (1981)) (italics omitted), cert. denied,540 U.S. 904 [124 S.Ct. 262, 157 L.Ed.2d 189] (2003). [T]he ‘overarching purpose of voir dire in a criminal case is to ensure a fair and impartial jury.’ Wright v. State, 411 Md. 503, 508 (2009) (quoting Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9 (2000)). “Indeed, the only purpose of voir dire in Maryland is to illuminate to the trial court any cause for juror disqualification.” Id. See White, 374 Md. at 240 (“Without adequate voir dire, the trial judge is unable to fulfill his or her responsibility to eliminate those prospectivejurors who will be unable to perform their duty impartially.”) (Italics omitted).

(Parallel citations omitted). The manner of voir dire is governed by Maryland Rule 4–312, and the Court of Appeals has held that [i]n the absence of a statute or rule prescribing the questions to be asked of the venire persons during the examination[,] the subject is left largely to the sound discretion of the court in each particular case.” Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 644, 989 A.2d 1150 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court's discretion “extends to both the form and the substance of questions posed to the venire.” Wright, 411 Md. at 508, 983 A.2d 519. The Court of Appeals has explained that the abuse of discretion standard

is one of those very general, amorphous terms that appellate courts use and apply with great frequency but which they have defined in many different ways. It has been said to occur “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,” or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” It has also been said to exist when the ruling under consideration “appears to have been made on untenable grounds,” when the ruling is “clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court,” when the ruling is “clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result,” when the ruling is “violative of fact and logic,” or when it constitutes an “ untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.”

There is a certain commonality in all these definitions, to the extent that a ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling. The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.

King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697, 967 A.2d 790 (2009) (quoting North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 13–14, 648 A.2d 1025 (1994)) (internal citations omitted).

Based on this standard, Maryland appellate courts have held that though “it is impermissible to commit prospectivejurors to a decision in advance,” a trial court may question potential jurors “about their attitudes concerning key issues to be raised at trial[.] Stringfellow, 199 Md.App. at 148–49, 20 A.3d 825 (citing Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 989 A.2d 1150 (2010) (whether a prospective juror may give more weight to a State's witness's testimony); Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1, 9–10, 806 A.2d 265 (2002) (whether sexual abuse charges stir up strong emotional feelings); State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 798 A.2d 566 (2002) (whether a prospective juror has strong feelings regarding violations of narcotic laws); Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 378 A.2d 1338 (1977) (whether a prospective juror may give more weight to a police officer's testimony)).

Relying on Charles and Drake v. State, 414 Md. 726, 997 A.2d 154 (2010) and Stringfellow v. State, 199 Md.App. 141, 20 A.3d 825 (2011), appellant contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by asking the prospective jurors the “CSI” question.1 In Charles and Drake, over defense counsel's objection, the trial court propounded the following “CSI-type” question during voir dire:

I'm going to assume that many of you, from having done a few of these, watch way too much TV, including the so-called realistic crime shows like CSI and Law and Order. I trust that you understand that these crime shows are fiction and fantasy and are done for dramatic effect and for this dramatic effect they purport to rely upon, “scientific evidence,” to convict guilty persons. While this is certainly acceptable as entertainment[,] you must not allow this entertainment experience to interfere with your duties as a juror. Therefore, if you are currently of the opinion or belief that you cannot convict a defendant without “scientific evidence,” regardless of the other evidence in the case and regardless of the instructions that I will give you as to the law, please rise....

Charles and Drake, 414 Md. at 730, 997 A.2d 154. Six members of the potential juror pool responded affirmatively and were stricken for cause for other reasons. Id. at 730 n. 5, 997 A.2d 154. The Court of Appeals focused on “whether the [trial] [c]ourt erred in propounding a voir dire question concerning whether prospective jurors could not ‘convict’ Drake and Charles in the absence of ‘CSI-type’ scientific evidence.” Id. at 731, 997 A.2d 154. In doing so, the Court recognized that [t]here is a significant debate about whether there truly is a ‘CSI effect,’ namely, the impact that viewing forensic crime dramas has upon juror...

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