Morris v. State, 69639

• Decision Date: 05 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 69639,69639
• Citation: 173 Ga.App. 663,327 S.E.2d 792
• Parties: MORRIS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 792

327 S.E.2d 792

173 Ga.App. 663

MORRIS v. The STATE.

No. 69639.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 5, 1985.

Harold N. Wollstein, Rome, for appellant.

F. Larry Salmon, Dist. Atty., T. Russell McClelland III, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

POPE, Judge.

After a trial by jury, appellant was convicted of the offense of armed robbery.

1. Appellant contends that his character was improperly placed in evidence through a State's witness' testimony referring to appellant's probation officer. However, such objection was not raised at trial and this is acknowledged by brief of appellate counsel. This enumeration, thus, presents nothing for review on appeal. See Edwards v. State, 171 Ga.App. 264(2), 319 S.E.2d 101 (1984); Jennings v. State, 169 Ga.App. 421, 312 S.E.2d 877 (1984).

2. Appellant contends that his wife, Mollie Elaine Morris, was compelled to testify against him at trial in violation of OCGA § 24-9-23. In connection with the incident giving rise to the charge upon which appellant was tried and convicted, Mrs. Morris plead guilty and received a probated sentence. One condition of her probation was that she testify truthfully at the trial of this case. We note that the record shows that Mrs. Morris was informed by the trial court of her right not to testify against her husband, appellant herein, and that she was also advised of this by her own attorney who was present at trial with her. With knowledge of her privilege to refuse to testify either for or against her husband, Mrs. Morris chose to testify. A more exhaustive examination of this issue is, however, unnecessary as it is pretermitted by the fact that the privilege urged by appellant under OCGA § 24-9-23 "belongs to the spouse whose testimony is sought to be elicited, rather than the spouse who is on trial. [Cits.] The policy of [OCGA § 24-9-23] is not to offer protection to the defendant, but to give regard to feelings of family harmony and promote marital unity." Young v. State, 232 Ga. 285, 287, 206 S.E.2d 439 (1974). Appellant, therefore, lacks standing to raise the issue complained of in this enumeration. See Stanley v. State, 240 Ga. 341(6), 241 S.E.2d 173 (1977); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 565 (11th Cir.1983). See also Ballard v. State, 252 Ga. 53(2), 311 S.E.2d 453 (1984).

3. Appellant enumerates as error the State's failure to disclose to the jury that it had made a deal with a witness, Mrs. Morris. By this, appellant refers to Mrs. Morris' negotiated plea of guilty to the offenses of hindering the apprehension of a criminal and theft by receiving stolen property for which she received a six-year probated sentence. As stated previously, a condition of her probation was to testify truthfully at the trial of appellant's case.

In support of this enumeration, appellant relies upon the holding in Allen v. State, 128 Ga.App. 361, 196 S.E.2d 660 (1973), which interpreted Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) to mean that "evidence of any understanding or agreement as to future prosecution of an accomplice, on whose testimony the [S]tate's case almost entirely depends, is relevant to his credibility; the jury is entitled to know of it; the prosecutor has a duty to disclose it; and the failure to make this disclosure violates due process and requires the reversal of the conviction and a remand for a new trial." Allen v. State, supra, 128 Ga.App. at 363-364, 196 S.E.2d 660. The State argues that Mrs. Morris' previously negotiated plea was not a future prosecution within the meaning of Allen and Giglio and that the condition of her probation requiring her truthful testimony in appellant's case was not a part of the negotiations, but was added by the trial court following the negotiations. Notwithstanding these assertions, under the facts of this case and in keeping with the spirit of Allen, the better practice would have been the State's disclosure to the jury. However, no grounds for reversal of appellant's conviction are presented by the State's failure to do so. First, the State's case did not "almost entirely depend" upon Mrs. Morris' testimony. See generally Echols v. State, 231 Ga. 633(1), 203 S.E.2d 165 (1974). Moreover, "[i]n order for there to be a reversal, ... there must be evidence that such information existed at or before trial, and that such information was actually withheld." (Emphasis supplied.) Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 70, 243 S.E.2d 510 (1978). Here, although the disclosure to the jury was not fully effected by the State, counsel for appellant thoroughly completely cross-examined Mrs. Morris on the circumstances of her negotiated plea and resulting probation. The entire issue was presented to the jury for use as a factor in the determination of her credibility. Since the jury was made aware of Mrs. Morris' negotiated plea and the circumstances surrounding it, we refuse to say that the requirements of due process have not been satisfied. Williams v. State, 151 Ga.App. 683(5), 261 S.E.2d 430 (1979). See also Harbin v. State, 165 Ga.App. 631(2), 302 S.E.2d 386 (1983); Cauley v. State, 130 Ga.App. 278(2g), 203 S.E.2d 239 (1973). Cf. Price v. State, 141 Ga.App. 335(2), 233 S.E.2d 462 (1977).

4. Appellant's final enumeration of error alleges the State's improper attempts to impeach its witness, Mrs. Morris, by introducing prior contradictory statements made in response to questioning by investigating Detective Smith of the Rome Police Department. Appellant argues on appeal that the State did not produce any writing to show that Mrs. Morris made any of the statements, nor was any testimony presented to prove the statements were made. The issue raised herein is essentially that raised in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862(4), 302 S.E.2d 347 (1983), to wit: "whether the witness may be questioned concerning the prior statement without any necessity for introducing the statement into evidence or eliciting testimony from a second witness as to the substance of the inconsistent statement or at least its existence." Testimony produced before Mrs. Morris testified established that on the day after the armed robbery, Mrs. Morris was arrested and transported to the police station. Once there, she was interviewed by a number of officers. As a result of this interview, appellant was found in a room in a nearby motel and arrested pursuant to a warrant. At trial, Mrs. Morris stated that she did not...