Watkins v. State

• Decision Date: 28 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. S94A0685,S94A0685
• Parties: WATKINS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 834

449 S.E.2d 834

264 Ga. 657

WATKINS v. The STATE.

No. S94A0685.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 28, 1994.

Robert S. Reeves, Swainsboro, for Watkins.

Richard A. Malone, Dist. Atty., Swainsboro, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Rachelle L. Strausner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for the State.

BENHAM, Presiding Justice.

Appellant was convicted of malice murder in connection with the death of Cedric Wynn. ¹ Appellant admitted that he fired the shotgun blast of birdshot that struck and killed the victim at a Swainsboro carwash, but contended he did so in fear of the victim. The State presented evidence that appellant, while riding with friends, spotted the victim in the carwash and had the driver of his vehicle turn around and enter the carwash parking area. Appellant, armed with the shotgun, then exited the car and approached the victim, who raised his arms in the air and turned away from appellant as if to enter the truck he had been drying. At that point, appellant fired the shot that fatally struck the victim. Appellant returned to his companions' car and left the scene. Several of appellant's companions testified that appellant was angry with the victim for having "beaten up" appellant several times, the most recent beating having occurred the evening before the fatal shooting. After being rescued from that encounter with the victim, appellant had unsuccessfully sought from his brother a gun in order to "get" the victim because he was tired of the victim's continual assaults. The next day (the day of the shooting), appellant sought companions to go to Statesboro to purchase a gun. Later that day, a friend loaned him an unloaded 20-gauge shotgun, and appellant, accompanied by others, purchased birdshot at a local convenience store. Appellant and his companions proceeded from the convenience store to Swainsboro, where appellant shot the victim. The State also played two post-arrest videotaped interviews with appellant in which he admitted the facts summarized above. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, with malice aforethought, fatally shot the victim. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

1. While cross-examining the first of three of appellant's companions who testified on behalf of the State, defense counsel queried, "[Y]ou have a deal with the district attorney, have you not ...," to which the district attorney immediately interposed an objection. After listening to argument outside the presence of the jury, wherein the district attorney repeatedly insisted that no deal had been made with the witnesses in exchange for their testimony, the trial court sustained the objection. Upon their return, the jury was instructed to disregard the question because it was improper. Appellant complains on appeal that the trial court erred when it refused to permit counsel to cross-examine the witnesses about their understanding of a promise of leniency from the district attorney.

Two issues of constitutional import are intertwined when a criminal defendant asserts that he was precluded from probing on cross- examination a witness' belief that he will receive a benefit for his testimony: the Due Process Clause and the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

a) Due process requires that evidence of any understanding or agreement, informal or formal, as to future prosecution of a witness on whose testimony the State's case almost entirely depends be disclosed by the prosecutor and be made known to the jury assessing the credibility of the witness. Allen v. State, 128 Ga.App. 361, 363-64, 196 S.E.2d 660 (1973), citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 764-65, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). See also Owens v. State, 251 Ga. 313(1), 305 S.E.2d 102 (1983). ² A new trial is in order where evidence affecting the credibility of a witness whose reliability may be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the defendant existed before trial and was not disclosed. Howell v. State, 163 Ga.App. 445, 295 S.E.2d 329 (1982).

The district attorney assured the trial court that the State had made no deals with the witnesses, and appellant produced no evidence of the existence of an undisclosed "deal" between the State and any of the three witnesses/companions. Williams v. State, 161 Ga.App. 62(2), 288 S.E.2d 861 (1982). As there was no evidence of a bargain between the State and any of the witnesses, we cannot say that a due process violation occurred. Owens v. State supra. In addition, in light of appellant's incriminating statements, the State's case was not "almost entirely dependent" upon the testimony of the witness/companions, making a Giglio/ Allen objection inapplicable. Echols v. State, 231 Ga. 633(1), 203 S.E.2d 165 (1974). Finally, through the testimony of defense witnesses, the jury was made aware that two of the three witnesses had been told by third parties that they faced the possibility of prosecution until completion of appellant's trial. In light of the above, the trial court did not deprive appellant of due process when it ruled that appellant's questions were improper. See Morris v. State, 173 Ga.App. 663(3), 327 S.E.2d 792 (1985).

b) In addressing the scope of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, this court has recognized that "the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination [,] [cits.]," and acknowledged the importance of permitting a defendant to search for an agreement between the witness and the prosecution where the witness might have substantial reason to cooperate. Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257(2), 290 S.E.2d 911 (1982). We noted in Hines that a witness may form a subconscious desire to assist the State which " ' "may cloud perception [,]" [cits.],' " and we determined that defense counsel was entitled to a reasonable cross-examination on the subject, as "[t]he relevant issue was whether the witness entertained any belief of personal benefit from testifying favorably for the prosecution. [Cits.]" Baptiste v. State, 190 Ga.App. 451(3), 379 S.E.2d 165 (1989). In the case at bar, the trial court did not prevent appellant from cross-examining the witnesses about their hopes of personal benefit; the trial court ruled improper a question that presupposed the existence of an unproven "deal" between the State and the witness. There was no error as the trial court did not preclude all inquiry on a subject with respect to which appellant was entitled to a reasonable cross-examination. Compare Hines, supra, and Owens v. State, supra. See Glaze v. State, 261 Ga. 171(4), 402 S.E.2d 729 (1991).

2. Appellant contends it was error to admit into evidence the weapon he surrendered and statements he made to law enforcement officers at the time of arrest because he had not then been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He also contends that his subsequent videotaped statements, each of which was preceded by a recitation of Miranda rights, should have been suppressed as fruit of his initial statement. The arresting officers testified at the hearing held pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), that while they were not sure which one of them had recited the warnings to appellant prior to the production of the shotgun and appellant's post-arrest statements, one of them had so informed appellant. Appellant testified that he had not been read his rights until after he had produced the shotgun and made incriminating statements. The trial court determined that appellant was informed of his rights and freely, willingly, and voluntarily made the statements to law enforcement officers without the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury. A trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Berry v. State, 254 Ga. 101(1), 326 S.E.2d 748 (1985). As appellant has not established that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's decision.

3. At trial, appellant testified he was frustrated and confused during the videotaped interviews and, as a result, the interrogating officers "convinced [him] to twist everything around and go along with what they were saying." (T-329). Subsequently, defense counsel sought to introduce testimony of appellant's educational level and mental capacity, which evidence, he contended, was relevant to the issue of the voluntariness of appellant's confession. ³ The trial court refused to allow the evidence, ruling that appellant's counsel had failed to comply with the notice requirements of Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.4 regarding the intent to raise the defense of insanity, mental illness, or mental incompetency. ⁴

USCR 31.4 requires the defense to give written notice ten days before trial of its intent to raise the issue that the defendant was insane, mentally incompetent, or mentally ill at the time of the criminal acts with which he is charged, or at the time of trial. Even if we were to assume that evidence of a defendant's educational background and IQ test results constituted evidence of insanity, mental incompetence, or mental illness, appellant was not seeking to raise the issue of his mental status at the time of the crime or at the time of trial, but at the time he gave a confession to law enforcement officers. Thus, the rule was not applicable and the evidence should not have been excluded on this ground. While the erroneously excluded evidence went to the voluntariness of appellant's statement, an issue for the jury, the exclusion of the evidence was not reversible error in light of the overwhelming evidence...