Morrison v. State

• Decision Date: 23 January 2017
• Docket Number: S16A1426
• Citation: 796 S.E.2d 293,300 Ga. 426
• Parties: MORRISON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

300 Ga. 426

796 S.E.2d 293

MORRISON

v.The STATE.

S16A1426

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided January 23, 2017

Genevieve Holmes, for Appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Paige Reese Whitaker, Sheila E. Gallow, Asst. Dist. Attys., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Vanessa T. Meyerhoefer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

Blackwell, Justice.

Kiro Dewayne Morrison was tried by a Fulton County jury, and he was convicted of the murder of Vonyell Byrd, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Morrison appeals, contending that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Upon our review of the record and briefs, we see no error, and we affirm.¹

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Morrison and Byrd were involved romantically and lived together in an apartment in southwest Atlanta. In the early morning hours of July 10, 2008, they went to a nightclub, where they argued. Their argument escalated to a physical struggle, security personnel intervened, and Morrison was escorted out of the nightclub. Byrd told security personnel—who described Byrd as "upset" and "emotional"— that she did not want to go home with Morrison. If she did, she explained, the fighting would "start all over again." Byrd nevertheless returned to their apartment at some point on the morning of July 10, and around 4:30 a.m., a neighbor called 911 to report a shooting. When law enforcement officers arrived, they found Byrd's body on the bed. She had been shot in the back of her head with a shotgun at close range.

Morrison gave a statement to officers in which he claimed that he informed Byrd at the club that he was ending their relationship, and he said that Byrd became angry. He claimed that Byrd was awaiting him with a shotgun when he returned to their apartment, that she repeatedly pulled the trigger (apparently unaware that the safety was engaged), that he attempted to gain control of the shotgun, and that the gun accidentally discharged while it was "solely in her hand."

Morrison now claims that no rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing of Byrd was murder, not an accident. But "questions as to the reasonableness of hypotheses other than the guilt of the defendant are generally for the jury to decide." Lowe v. State , 295 Ga. 623, 625 (1), 759 S.E.2d 841 (2014). Here, especially considering that Morrison's own self-serving statement was the only evidence that Byrd's death was accidental, and considering as well that his hypothesis of accidental death was not consistent with the forensic evidence,² we conclude that the evidence authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Morrison was guilty of murder and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Morrison claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to pursue an alternative defense of justification and because the lawyer failed to object when the State offered hearsay evidence. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, Morrison must prove both that the performance of his lawyer was deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance.

Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prove that the performance of his lawyer was deficient, Morrison must show that the lawyer performed his duties at trial in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances, and in the light of prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687–688 (III) (A), 104 S.Ct. 2052. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U.S. 365, 381 (II) (C), 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). And to prove that he was prejudiced by the performance of his lawyer, Morrison must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (B), 104 S.Ct. 2052. See also Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 391 (III), 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). This burden is a heavy one, see Kimmelman , 477 U.S. at 382 (II) (C), 106 S.Ct. 2574, and we conclude that Morrison has failed to carry it.

First, Morrison asserts that his trial lawyer should have pursued a defense of justification as an alternative to accident. See Turner v. State , 262 Ga. 359, 360 (2) (b), 418 S.E.2d 52 (1992) ("the facts of a case will, at times, present a situation where a party who is armed with a weapon contends that while he was defending himself from another party, his weapon accidentally discharged and killed that other party") (footnote omitted). But in his statement to investigating officers, Morrison never said that he accidentally shot Byrd while he was in the process of defending himself. Instead, he claimed that he did not shoot Byrd at all (whether accidentally or intentionally), and he asserted that she accidentally shot herself while he was trying to get the gun away from her (but while the gun remained "solely in her hand"). Morrison's lawyer made a strategic decision to argue to the jury that the statement was truthful and that Morrison did not shoot Byrd in self-defense or otherwise. Morrison's statement to the police did not support a justification defense, and the decision to instead pursue only an accident defense does not establish deficient performance. See Stinchcomb v. State , 280 Ga. 170, 174 (5), 626 S.E.2d 88 (2006) (trial counsel's...