Stinchcomb v. State
Decision Date | 30 January 2006 |
Docket Number | No. S05A2003.,S05A2003. |
Citation | 280 Ga. 170,626 S.E.2d 88 |
Parties | STINCHCOMB v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Charles H. Frier, Atlanta, for Appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Christopher Michael Quinn, Asst. Dist. Atty., Bettieanne C. Hart, Deputy Dist. Atty.; Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Julie Amanda Adams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for Appellee.
Following his conviction by a jury for felony murder and aggravated assault,1 Mario Stinchcomb appeals, contending among other things that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that Jakesha Young was working as a prostitute in Fulton County. On November 6, 2002, she was called to a second-floor apartment by Stinchcomb. Michael Woolfolk,2 Max Stevens, and Randy Harris were also at the apartment. Shortly after Young arrived, she and Stinchcomb began to argue over the value of her services. Thereafter, Stinchcomb refused Young's request for money, and instructed her to leave. Angered, Young left the apartment and retrieved a gun from her car3 as Stinchcomb and Harris watched from the outside stairwell. Young then fired a shot in the air above the onlookers' heads. At that moment, Stinchcomb ran back to the upstairs apartment to get his gun. During this time, Young got into her car and began to drive away. When Stinchcomb reentered the apartment, he and Woolfolk began firing their guns at Young from the window. Woolfolk fired once before his gun jammed, and Stinchcomb fired three times. A bullet from Woolfolk's gun hit Young in the head and killed her while she was seated inside the car.
This evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict against Stinchcomb for felony murder and aggravated assault, and, as such, the trial court did not err by denying Stinchcomb's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 255(1), 403 S.E.2d 813 (1991).
Nonetheless, Stinchcomb contends that he could not be guilty of felony murder as a party to Woolfolk's crime of aggravated assault against Young, as he did not directly cause Young's death and there was no evidence that he acted in concert with or encouraged Woolfolk. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, shows otherwise. Woolfolk and Stinchcomb were seen firing at Young at the same time from the same window, clearly with the same goal in mind. Based on the unique facts of this case, the jury was authorized to find that Stinchcomb and Woolfolk were acting in concert to shoot Young, and, due to the nature of their actions, each was encouraging the other to do so. See Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 372, 375(5), 477 S.E.2d 827 (1996) ( ). Therefore, Stinchcomb was, in fact, a party to the crime of Woolfolk's murdering Young during the commission of aggravated assault, irrespective of his contention that he had not reached a prior verbal agreement with Woolfolk to commit the crime.
Stinchcomb also argues that his conviction was unwarranted because he was justified in shooting Young. At the time that she was fatally shot, however, Young was already in her car attempting to leave the scene. Therefore, by the time that Woolfolk and Stinchcomb began shooting, there was no longer an imminent threat to them justifying the use of deadly force, and the jury did not err by rejecting Stinchcomb's arguments that his actions were justified pursuant to the doctrine of self-defense. Broussard v. State, 276 Ga. 216(2), 576 S.E.2d 883 (2003).
2. Stinchcomb contends that the trial court erred by mistakenly stating to the jury pool that "the fact that the grand jury has returned an indictment is an implication of guilt." Viewed as a whole, the record makes it clear that the trial court's statement was merely a slip of the tongue, made prior to the time that the jury was picked.
As an initial matter, Stinchcomb has waived his right to raise this contention on appeal, as he did not object to the trial court's misstatement in the proceedings below. Moreover, even if he had preserved his argument, he has failed to show that he was harmed, as the trial court properly instructed the jury both before any evidence was received in the case and again in its final charge, thereby making any confusion regarding the nature of the indictment highly unlikely. Perry v. State, 276 Ga. 836, 837-838(2), 585 S.E.2d 614 (2003). The trial court properly charged the jury regarding the nature of the indictment both before and after its mistake. Most importantly, the trial court clearly and properly instructed the jury regarding the indictment in its initial charge to the jury after it had been picked and before any evidence was presented in the case. Later, in its final instructions to the jury prior to deliberations, the trial court once again gave a proper instruction, explaining to the jury that the indictment should not be considered as evidence or an implication of guilt. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that none of its comments during the trial were intended to express any opinion on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
3. Stinchcomb further argues that the trial court erred by failing to clarify in its instructions to the jury that the charges and defenses relating to each co-defendant being tried were different. Stinchcomb, however, has failed to show that he ever...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Woolfolk v. State
...murder and aggravated assault of Jakesha Young.1 Woolfolk's case arises from the same set of facts considered in Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170, 626 S.E.2d 88 (2006), where we affirmed the conviction of Woolfolk's co-defendant, Mario Stinchcomb. There we set forth the relevant facts as Vi......
-
Spears v. State
...Therefore, Spears has waived his right to complain on appeal regarding the admissibility of the statements. See Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170, 173(4), 626 S.E.2d 88 (2006) (“A party cannot complain [on appeal] about errors he helped induce.”). Furthermore, even if this issue had been pre......
-
Davenport v. State
...the absence of a specific request to charge, it is not error for the trial court to not give a charge. [Cit.] Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170, 172-173(3), 626 S.E.2d 88 (2006). Moreover, the trial court fully explained the concept of justification, including self-defense, defense of others......
-
Walker v. State
...unindicted charges. Accordingly, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request improper charges. See Stinchcomb v. State , 280 Ga. 170, 174 (5), 626 S.E.2d 88 (2006) ; Madge v. State , 245 Ga. App. 848, 851 (3), 538 S.E.2d 907 (2000). Walker also alleges error in failing to request......
-
Legal Ethics - Patrick Emery Longan
...726-27, 620 S.E.2d at 827-28. 249. Id. 250. 280 Ga. 174, 626 S.E.2d 86 (2006). 251. Id. at 174-76, 626 S.E.2d at 87-88. 252. Id. at 176, 626 S.E.2d at 88. 253. 279 Ga. 805, 621 S.E.2d 419 (2005). 254. Id. at 805-06, 621 S.E.2d at 420-21. 255. Id. at 806, 621 S.E.2d at 421. 256. 278 Ga. App.......