Morrissey v. State Ballot Law Commission
| Citation | 43 N.E.2d 385,312 Mass. 121 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
| Decision Date | 10 August 1942 |
| Parties | NICHOLAS P. MORRISSEY & others v. STATE BALLOT LAW COMMISSION. |
July 21, 1942.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, QUA DOLAN, & RONAN, JJ.
Constitutional Law Initiative, Due process of law, Public rights and interests. State Ballot Law Commission. Certiorari. Pleading, Civil Demurrer.
A demurrer in a certiorari proceeding on the ground that the petition and a return filed by the respondents did "not set forth any cause or matter . . . entitling the petitioners to relief" raised no question not presented by the petition and the return.
Even if certain grounds of objections to an initiative petition referred to the State ballot law commission by the Secretary of the Commonwealth set forth matters beyond the jurisdiction of the commission, the inclusion of such grounds in the objections did not affect the power of the commission to act upon other grounds stated in the objections that were within its jurisdiction.
At a hearing in certiorari proceedings against a commission upon the petition and return, averments in the petition with respect to the state of the evidence before the commission at public hearings, to rulings of law by the commission at such public hearings and to requests made by the petitioners to the commission that certain specific findings be incorporated in the record of the commission must be disregarded.
In a certiorari proceeding where the respondents filed both a return and a demurrer on the ground that the petition and the return did not set forth any cause entitling the petitioners to relief the return could not be considered as amended or extended by any allegation in the petition.
The ultimate question for decision by the State ballot law commission upon objections referred to it under Section 22A of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, as amended, namely, whether for reasons set forth in that section an initiative petition should be rejected because it failed to have the required number of signatures of qualified voters, relates to a matter in which there is a public right, but not a private right.
The signers of an initiative petition do not have, either individually or collectively, a private right in the determination of questions before the State ballot law commission on objections filed with it under
Section 22A of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, as amended, and consequently neither the statute nor action of the commission thereunder is rendered unconstitutional by reason of lack of provisions for notice to them of and an opportunity for them to be heard in the proceeding before the commission, or of provision for judicial review of action of the commission.
That portion of Section 22A of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, as amended, which purports to confer upon the State ballot law commission power to determine whether signatures appearing on an initiative petition were
"placed thereon by fraud" was within the scope of the power granted to the Legislature by art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution.
Even if it be assumed that in acting under Section 22A of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, as amended, the State ballot law commission was required to base its findings only on evidence introduced before it, the validity of a decision, stated by it to have been "upon the evidence introduced at the hearings," was not affected by the fact that, in a "supplementary statement," filed after such determination, the commission described an
"unhealthy background" disclosed at the hearing and stated that it passed on the issue on "evidence presented at the hearing and . . . facts that the commission uncovered itself during its own investigation."
The validity of a determination by the State ballot law commission in proceedings under Section 22A of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, as amended, that an initiative petition contained certain signatures placed on it by fraud was not shown to have been based on a finding of a violation of
Section 22B nor was its validity affected by a statement of the commission in a "supplementary statement" following the filing of such determination, in substance that the petition might have been found to be insufficient because of noncompliance with Section 22B.
PETITION, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on June 24, 1942, for a writ of certiorari.
The case was heard by Lummus, J.
F. B. Wallis, (R.
E. Goodwin with him,) for the petitioners.
R. Clapp, Assistant Attorney General, & C.
B. Rugg, appearing with the consent of the respondents and of the Attorney General by permission of the court, for the respondents.
The ultimate issue involved in this case is whether a measure proposed as a law by initiative petition relating to a State fund for workmen's compensation (see Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. 571) shall be submitted to the voters at the State election to be held in 1942. The constitutional requirements for the passage of a law by the initiative process are fixed by art. 48 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, The Initiative, II Sections 3, 4; V, Section 1; General Provisions, III. These requirements are stated in outline in Compton v. State Ballot Law Commission, 311 Mass. 643 , 645-646. The only question with respect to compliance with these constitutional requirements involved in the present case is whether the initiative petition had been signed by the required number of qualified voters -- "not less than twenty thousand" -- when it was filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth and by him transmitted to the clerk of the House of Representatives so that the proposed law was then "deemed to be introduced and pending." The Initiative, II, Sections 3, 4; V, Section 1. No contention is made that if the initiative petition was so signed by the required number of voters the proposed law should not be submitted to the people at the State election, nor, on the other hand, is it contended that if the initiative petition was not so signed the proposed law should be submitted to the people.
The present proceeding is a petition for a writ of certiorari (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 249, Section 4) brought in the Supreme Judicial Court by ten citizens and registered voters of the Commonwealth -- constituting the first ten signers of the petition -- against the commissioners constituting the State ballot law commission -- hereinafter referred to as the commission -- for the purpose of quashing the proceedings before the commission in which it decided that it "rejects the petition, and the same shall not appear on the official ballot." See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, Section 22A, as appearing in St. 1938, c. 192. [1] The commissioners filed a return to the petition embodying therein the original decision of the commission and also a "supplementary statement" of the commission. And the Attorney General in behalf of the commissioners filed a demurrer to the petition in which the reason for demurrer stated was "that the petition and return do not set forth any cause or matter whatsoever entitling the petitioners to relief by way of a writ of certiorari against the respondents." The case was heard by a single justice of this court. As appears from the bill of exceptions, he "sustained the demurrer and ruled as a matter of law that the petition be dismissed," and the petitioners "duly excepted to the ruling sustaining the demurrer and to the ruling as a matter of law that the petition should be dismissed."
First. Procedure.
No contention is made that a petition for a writ of certiorari is not an appropriate proceeding to review the action of the commission, or that the petitioners are not proper parties to institute the proceeding. See Locke v. Selectmen of Lexington, 122 Mass. 290; Horton v. Attorney General, 269 Mass. 503 , 508-509; Compton v. State Ballot Law Commission, 311 Mass. 643 .
The case was heard by the single justice, in accordance with the usual practice, upon the petition and the return of the commissioners thereto (Farmington River Water Power Co. v. County Commissioners, 112 Mass. 206 , 214; Tewksbury v. County Commissioners of Middlesex, 117 Mass. 563 , 564; Worcester & Nashua Railroad v. Railroad Commissioners, 118 Mass. 561 , 563-564; Haven v. County Commissioners of Essex, 155 Mass. 467 , 468; Warren v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 183 Mass. 119 , 120; Webster v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 295 Mass. 572 , 573), except that, as has been said to be permissible practice (Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of the First District Court of Eastern Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477 , 481; Webster v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 295 Mass. 572 , 573; see also Worcester & Nashua Railroad v. Railroad Commissioners, 118 Mass. 561 , 564; Irwin v. Municipal Court of the Brighton District, 298 Mass. 158 , 159), a demurrer of the commissioners was filed with the return. We do not discuss the function, in general, of a demurrer in a certiorari proceeding, but since the ground of this demurrer is "that the petition and return do not set forth any cause or matter whatsoever entitling the petitioners to relief," such demurrer raised no question of law not presented for decision by the petition and the return thereto.
The Marcus v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 252 Mass. 331 , 333. See also Compton v. State Ballot Law Commission, 311 Mass. 643 , 646. This statement, however, necessarily implies that "a petitioner may attack the jurisdiction of the inferior ...
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