Morrow v. Shotwell
Decision Date | 16 February 1972 |
Docket Number | No. B--2568,B--2568 |
Citation | 477 S.W.2d 538 |
Parties | John A. MORROW, Petitioner, v. E. F. SHOTWELL, Respondent. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Brooks, Jones & Gordon, Tom Gordon and George Jones, Abilene, for petitioner.
Wagstaff, Alvis, Alvis & Leonard, George W. Leonard Jr., and David G. Stubbeman, Abilene, for respondent.
In this suit by John A. Morrow, purchaser, against E. F. Shotwell, seller, for specific performance of a contract for the sale of two tracts of land, the case was submitted to a jury on two special issues which were answered favorably to Morrow. However, the jury's verdict is not important to our decision of the case. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Morrow. The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment as to one tract; but as to the other, the court reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment. 461 S.W.2d 527. We reverse and remand to the trial court.
The property which is the subject of the contract of sale and purchase is described in the contract as follows:
'. . . lying and situated in Jones County, Texas:
The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court's judgment as to Second Tract because the description was insufficient to meet the requirements of Sec. 26.01, Business and Commerce Code, Vernon's Texas Codes Annotated, the Statute of Frauds (formerly Art. 3995). Neither party complains of that part of the judgment of the courts below which orders specific performance as to First Tract. Only Morrow filed an application for writ of error, and by his application he challenges only the holding of the court of civil appeals that the description of Second Tract is insufficient.
The rule by which to test the sufficiency of the description is so well settled at this point in our judicial history, and by such a long series of decisions by this court, as almost to compel repetition by rote: To be sufficient, the writing must furnish within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty. See Norris v. Hunt, 51 Tex. 609 (1879); Osborne v. Moore, 112 Tex. 361, 247 S.W. 498 (1923); Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 87 S.W.2d 703 (1935); Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945); Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W.2d 222 (1949); Hoover v. Wukasch, 152 Tex. 111, 254 S.W.2d 507 (1953); Broaddus v. Grout, 152 Tex. 398, 258 S.W.2d 308 (1953); Rowson v. Rowson, 154 Tex. 216, 275 S.W.2d 468 (1955). The quoted description of Second Tract does not refer to any other existing writing. Our problem, then, is to analyze the description to see if it furnishes, within itself, the means or data by which the tract may be identified with reasonable certainty.
If we look only to the metes and bounds description of the tract, we find no means or data by which the tract may be identified. We are told only that it is acreage which lies north of a line running on a course of north 75 east from the northeast corner of First Tract to the west boundary line of public highway no. 277. A surveyor would have no difficulty locating this line since the contract gives him adequate means for locating the northeast corner of First Tract, but there are no means or data in the description to tell a surveyor on what courses or for what distances he will run after intersecting the west boundary of highway no. 277. The description is just as deficient if we assume that the entire tract lies west of the highway. Assuming that the east line of the tract is coincident with the west boundary line of the highway and runs northerly or northwesterly along that line, there is yet no distance call. Neither are we told the course and distance of the north or west lines of the tract, nor the acreage contained in the tract. Quite obviously, the metes and bounds description, standing alone, is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. There is, however, additional descriptive language.
The acreage is said to be, 'The north acreage . . . out of 145.8 acre tract of the Jefferson McGrew Survey No. 245' in Jones County, Texas. We are unable to see how this additional language furnishes the means or data by which the tract may be identified with reasonable certainty. No doubt a surveyor could locate the Jefferson McGrew Survey No. 245, but there is nothing in the added language to assist one in locating the 145.8 acre tract. Describing land to be conveyed in this manner has often been held to be insufficient to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. See Norris v. Hunt, 51 Tex. 609 (1879) ( ); Pfeiffer v. Lindsay, 66 Tex. 123, 1 S.W. 264 (1886) (); Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 87 S.W.2d 703 (1935) (); Greer v. Greer, 144 Tex. 528, 191 S.W.2d 848 (1946) (); Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980 (1948) (). The number of such decisions could be multiplied many times over. If descriptions of the type shown are insufficient to identify lands to be conveyed, they necessarily must also be insufficient to identify land out of which an unidentified part is to be conveyed.
The record leaves little doubt that the parties knew and understood what property was intended to be conveyed as Second Tract. Moreover, a surveyor, by a search of abstract records and on directions given by an attorney, located the property on the ground and made a plat which was introduced in evidence and shows its location and boundaries. However, the knowledge and intent of the parties will not give validity to the contract, Rowson v. Rowson, 154 Tex. 216, 275 S.W.2d 468, 470 (1955); and neither will a plat made from extrinsic evidence. Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980, 984 (1948). The correct rule relating to admissibility of parol evidence to aid descriptions in contracts for the conveyance of land is thus stated in Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1945):
(Emphasis ours.)
Petitioner Morrow points to one other provision in the contract which he suggests refers to a writing giving data for adequately describing the tract. The contract states: '. . . the conveyance herein shall be...
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