Morse v. Dir. of Revenue
| Decision Date | 15 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 91777.,SC 91777. |
| Citation | 353 S.W.3d 643 |
| Parties | Ashley E. MORSE, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John W. Grantham, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for the director.
Morse, who did not submit a brief or argue this case, did not have an attorney.
The director of revenue appeals from a judgment ordering her to stay the suspension and reinstate the driving privileges of Ashley Morse. The judgment is reversed.
Ashley Morse was 19 years old when she was arrested for driving while intoxicated in violation of section 577.010, RSMo 2000.1 The director administratively suspended Morse's license for 90 days pursuant to section 302.505.2.2 Morse completed the ninety-day suspension. Morse also completed the other requirements for reinstatement of her license by completing a substance abuse traffic offender program, showing proof of liability insurance coverage and paying reinstatement fees.
In addition to the administrative license suspension, the state filed criminal driving while intoxicated (DWI) charges against Morse. Morse received a suspended imposition of sentence. Morse violated the conditions of her probation and, in April 2008, was convicted of DWI.
Following Morse's DWI conviction, the director assessed eight points on Morse's driver's license. The director sent Morse a letter informing her that her driving privileges would be suspended for 30 days pursuant to section 302.304. The letter also informed Morse that, in addition to the 30–day suspension, she once again had to complete the substance abuse traffic offender program, show proof of liability insurance coverage and pay reinstatement fees. Morse filed a petition for de novo review pursuant to section 302.311.
Morse argued that, pursuant to section 302.525.4, her first administrative suspension had to be credited against the second administrative suspension because both suspensions arose from the same DWI arrest. The director conceded that section 302.525.4 did require her to credit the first suspension against the second, which in Morse's case meant that the entire 30–day second suspension was to be treated as already served. However, the director maintained that Morse had not completed the other statutory requirements for reinstatement and so was not entitled to reinstatement of her driving privileges until she completed the substance abuse traffic offender program, showed proof of liability insurance coverage and paid reinstatement fees.
The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Morse. The court concluded that requiring Morse to complete the treatment program, show proof of insurance and pay reinstatement fees again would violate section 302.525 by not giving her credit for her previous “period of suspension.” The director appeals.
Section 302.525.4 requires the director to credit Morse's first “period of suspension” to her second suspension because both suspensions arise from the same occurrence.3 On appeal, the director concedes that Morse does not again have to complete the substance abuse traffic offender program because section 302.540 provides that completion of the treatment program must be credited if, as in this case, two suspensions arise out of the same occurrence. The director asserts that the phrase “period of suspension” refers only to the time Morse's license was suspended and that Morse still has to show proof of insurance and pay reinstatement fees. The trial court held that the “period of suspension” refers both to the time Morse's license was suspended and the additional requirements for reinstatement such as proof of insurance and the payment of reinstatement fees. The trial court's interpretation is correct.
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