State v. Chase

• Citation: 490 S.W.3d 771
• Decision Date: 19 April 2016
• Docket Number: WD 78595
• Parties: State of Missouri, Appellant, v. Aryanna F. Chase, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

490 S.W.3d 771

State of Missouri, Appellant,
v.
Aryanna F. Chase, Respondent.

WD 78595

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: April 19, 2016
Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied May 31, 2016

Karen L. Kramer, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.

John M. Tomberlin and S. Kate Webber, Kansas City, MO, for respondent.

Before Division One: Lisa White Hardwick, Presiding Judge, Thomas H. Newton, Judge and Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

The State of Missouri appeals a judgment granting Aryanna F. Chase's (“Chase”) motion to dismiss a charge against her for unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of section 571.070.¹ The State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the charge against Chase because she was a fugitive from justice under the plain meaning of that phrase. Finding no error, we affirm.

490 S.W.3d 773

Factual and Procedural Background²

On March 10, 2015, Kansas City police officers responded to 2601 E. Euclid Avenue after receiving a call that a stolen car was parked at that location. While driving to the location, officers learned that Chase was registered to that address and had an outstanding warrant for failing to appear in court for felony possession of a controlled substance.

When officers arrived, they found the stolen car parked behind the residence. Chase's mother, the homeowner, allowed officers to enter the residence and to contact Chase about the stolen car. After Chase exited her bedroom, she was taken into custody on the outstanding warrant. While in custody, Chase asked an officer to go back into her bedroom and get her black pants, suggesting that they might be on the bed. The officer lifted a bed comforter to look for the pants and found a closed rifle case protruding from between the comforter and a Styrofoam bed pad. A Daisy .22 caliber bolt action rifle, loaded with eleven live rounds, was located inside the case. Officers seized the gun, and Chase was placed on a 24–hour hold in the detention unit for unlawful use of a weapon.

On March 11, 2015, Chase was read, and waived, her Miranda³ rights. Chase said that she knew she had an outstanding warrant for failing to appear in the drug possession case and that she had known about the warrant since February 2015. Chase said she owned the rifle found in her bedroom and that she had it for about two weeks. The Jackson County prosecuting attorney filed a complaint charging Chase with unlawful possession of a firearm, a class C felony, under section 571.070. The complaint alleged that Chase was in possession of a Daisy .22 caliber bolt-action rifle, that on August 20, 2014, Chase was charged in Jackson County with felony possession of a controlled substance, and that Chase was a fugitive from justice because she failed to appear for a court hearing on February 18, 2015. An information was subsequently filed.

On April 6, 2015, Chase filed a motion to dismiss the unlawful possession of a firearm charge. Chase argued that the phrase “fugitive from justice” was ambiguous and that the charge against her must be dismissed. The State responded that Chase was a “fugitive from justice” under the plain meaning of that phrase. The trial court dismissed the unlawful possession of a firearm charge against Chase in a judgment on April 24, 2015.

The State timely appealed.

Standard of Review

Generally, we “review the circuit court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Clinch, 335 S.W.3d 579, 583 (Mo.App.W.D.2011). But “[w]hen the facts are uncontested and the only issue is a matter of statutory construction, we review the circuit court's dismissal of a felony complaint under a de novo standard.” State v. Smothers, 297 S.W.3d 626, 632 (Mo.App.W.D.2009). “The interpretation of a statute is a pure question of law, and therefore we give the circuit court's interpretation no deference.” Id.

490 S.W.3d 774

Analysis

In its sole point on appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the unlawful possession of a firearm charge against Chase because she was a “fugitive from justice” under the plain meaning of that phrase in section 571.070.1(2). We disagree.

Section 571.070.1 provides:

1. A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and:

(1) Such person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or of a crime under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony; or

(2) Such person is a fugitive from justice, is habitually in an intoxicated or drugged condition, or is currently adjudged mentally incompetent.

(Emphasis added). “When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute.” Morse v. Dir. of Revenue, 353 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing State v. Salazar, 236 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Mo. banc 2007) ). “If statutory language is not defined expressly, it is given its plain and ordinary meaning, as typically found in the dictionary.” Morse, 353 S.W.3d at 645 (citing Derousse v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Mo. banc 2009) ).

Our prior decision in State v. Rodgers, 396 S.W.3d 398 (Mo.App.W.D.2013) compels the resolution of this case in favor of Chase. “Under the stare decisis doctrine, a court follows earlier judicial decisions when the same point arises again in litigation.” State v. Banks, 457 S.W.3d 898, 903 n. 5 (Mo.App.W.D.2015) (internal quotations omitted). “Where the same or an analogous issue was decided in an earlier case, such case stands as authoritative precedent unless and until it is overruled.” Id.

In Rodgers, a defendant was contacted by a plain clothes police officer about an outstanding warrant for leaving the scene...