Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia

• Citation: 972 F.Supp. 355
• Decision Date: 07 July 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 94-0025-C.
• Parties: Fortis MORSE, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, and Kimberly J. Enderson, Plaintiffs, v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA, and Albemarle County Republican Committee, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

972 F.Supp. 355

Fortis MORSE, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, and Kimberly J. Enderson, Plaintiffs, v. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VIRGINIA, and Albemarle County Republican Committee, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 94-0025-C.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division.

July 7, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

George Alfred Rutherglen, Charlottesville, VA, Daniel R. Ortiz, University School of Law, Charlottesville, VA, Pamela S. Karlan, Charlottesville, VA, Eben Moglen, New York City, for Fortis Morse, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, Kimberly J. Enderson.

Joseph Robert Brame, III, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, LLP, Charlottesville, VA, Earle Duncan Getchell, Jr., McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Richmond, VA, Donald W. Lemons, Durrette, Irvin, Lemons & Fenderson, P.C., Richmond, VA, Patrick M. McSweeney, Richmond, VA, Daniel A. Carrell, Carrell & Rice, Richmond, VA, for Republican Party of Virginia, Albemarle County republican Committee.

Before WIDENER, Circuit Judge, SPENCER, District Judge, and MICHAEL, Senior District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Currently before the court is plaintiffs' November 25, 1996 Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Defendants challenge the awarding of attorneys' fees, contending that (1) the legislative history of § 1988 demonstrates that Congress did not intend for attorneys' fees to be awarded against individual actors, and (2) special circumstances justify denying plaintiff any award of attorneys' fees. In the alternative, defendants argue that the claimed fees and costs should be reduced substantially. We hold that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs, with some modification to the amounts demanded by plaintiffs.

I. Congressional Intent and Special Circumstances

Plaintiffs seek an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973l (e) of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975. Section § 1973l (e) states that "in any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Because the standards governing the award of attorneys' fees in cases proceeding under § 1973l (e) are identical to those proceeding under § 1988, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 n. 7, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (noting that the standards set forth in Hensley "are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a `prevailing plaintiff'"); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1989 n. 4, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (noting that "the provision for counsel fees in § 1988 was patterned upon the attorney's fee provision contained in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) and 2000e-5(k), and § 402 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e)"), cases decided under § 1988 are instructive in determining whether fees should be awarded pursuant to § 1973l (e).

1. Congressional Intent

Initially, we dispense with defendants' argument that Congress did not intend to permit the awarding of fees against political parties. Defendants argue that "the legislative history of § 1988 demonstrates that Congress intended the act to allow awards against governmental units, and not agents who act on its behalf." Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs at 26, Morse v. Republican Party of Va., (W.D.Va. Jan. 15, 1997) (No. 94-0025-C) hereinafter Defendant's Response (citing Wisconsin Socialist Workers 1976 Campaign Comm. v. McCann, 460 F.Supp. 1054, 1057 (D.Wis.1978)). In effect, defendants argue that they should not be liable for attorneys' fees because political parties are akin to state officials. The legislative history of § 1988 recognizes that Congress "intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of costs, will be collected either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or local government." S.Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913 (footnotes omitted). The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act Amendments contains similar language. See S.Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.S.C.A.N. 774, 808. The Republican Party of Virginia and the Albemarle County Republican Committee are analogous to state agencies rather than individual state actors: Plaintiffs seek fees from the political parties, not the party officials in their individual capacities. As such, defendants may be held liable for a prevailing plaintiff's attorneys' fees under § 1973l (e) barring special circumstances that would make such an award unjust.

2. Special Circumstances

Although the awarding of attorneys' fees under § 1973l (e) is discretionary, "a party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Voting Rights Act, if successful, `should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" S.Rep. No. 295 at 40, reprinted in 1975 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 807 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966-67, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968)); see also Maloney v. City of Marietta, 822 F.2d 1023, 1025 (11th Cir.1987) (noting that under § 1973l(e), "a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is entitled to a fee award `as a matter of course' absent special circumstances that would render such an award unjust"); Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 245 (D.C.Cir.1982) (finding that "the legislative history of 1973l (e) makes clear that a prevailing party usually should recover fees"); cf. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 89 n. 1, 109 S.Ct. 939, 942 n. 1, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (noting that a prevailing party in a § 1988 suit is ordinarily entitled to attorneys' fees); Spell v. McDaniel, 852 F.2d 762, 765 (4th Cir.1988) (same). Defendants urge this court to deny plaintiffs an award of attorneys' fees because special circumstances exist to make such an award unjust.

"The special circumstances exception is a judicially created concept, not mentioned in any of the fee award statutes, and therefore `should be narrowly construed so as not to interfere with the congressional purpose in passing such statutes.'" Maloney, 822 F.2d at 1027 (quoting Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1149-50 (11th Cir. 1985)). In determining whether special circumstances exist, a court may consider the totality of circumstances so that even though each justification for the denial of fees may not, on its own, support a finding of special circumstances, the sum total of the justifications may warrant a denial of fees. See Thorsted v. Munro, 75 F.3d 454, 456 (9th Cir.1996). Defendants argue that special circumstances justifying the denial of attorneys' fees exist because (1) defendants acted in good faith; (2) an award of fees will not promote access to the courts; and (3) an award of fees will not serve to deter future constitutional violations. That notwithstanding, the factors identified by defendants in the instant case, even when considered together, do not rise to the level of special circumstances such that plaintiffs should be denied an award of attorneys' fees.

This court begins from the premise that "good faith is not a special circumstance that would render the award of fees unjust." Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1147 (4th Cir. 1975)) (claim for fees under § 1988); see also Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99, 104 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting Harrington v. DeVito, 656 F.2d 264, 268 (7th Cir.1981)) (same); O'Sullivan v. Brier (In re Kansas Congressional Dists. Reapportionment Cases), 745 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir.1984) (citing Love v. Mayor of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235, 236 (10th Cir.1980)) (same); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir.1978) (same). But see Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1250 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1981) (noting that "good faith is one factor of several that a court may consider" in determining whether an award of fees is appropriate, but recognizing that six other circuits — including the Fourth Circuit — have held otherwise).¹ As the Fifth Circuit noted, the recognition that good faith is not a controlling factor

conforms to the policy underlying the award of attorney's fees in civil rights cases. Attorney's fees are not designed merely to penalized defendants, but to encourage injured individuals to seek judicial relief. From this latter policy perspective it makes no difference whether plaintiff's suit yields favorable out of court results because a good faith defendant is brought to understand the illegality of his conduct and alters his behavior or because an unrepentant defendant grudgingly signs a consent decree to avoid continued litigation expenses in a lost cause. The key issue is the provocative role of the plaintiff's lawsuit, not the motivations of the defendant.

Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 280 (citations omitted). For these reasons, we find that defendants' good faith is not at issue in a determination of special circumstances.

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs should not be awarded attorneys' fees because an award of fees will not promote access to the courts. "The principal congressional purpose behind the enactment of the attorneys' fees provision of §§ 1973l (e) and 1988 is reflected in Congress' observation that `in many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer.'" Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 794 F.Supp. 254, 260 (N.D.Ill.1992) (quoting S. Rep. 1011 at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Hastert v. Illinois State Bd. of...