Morton v. Ivacic
Decision Date | 11 December 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 71S03-0812-CV-638.,71S03-0812-CV-638. |
Citation | 898 N.E.2d 1196 |
Parties | Ky MORTON, Appellant (Defendant below), v. Jerome P. IVACIC, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
The informality of litigating in small claims court promotes doing substantial justice in a relatively efficient way, conferring benefits on plaintiffs and defendants alike. In this case, the court effectively declined to hear evidence on a tenant's affirmative defenses to eviction and ordered immediate possession for the landlord. We conclude that the tenant was not given a sufficient opportunity to present a defense, and therefore reverse.
For nearly five years, appellant Ky Morton leased an apartment in South Bend, Indiana from Jerome P. Ivacic. Morton was a good tenant and remained in satisfactory standing throughout the tenancy until a dispute arose with about four and a half months remaining on the lease. Morton apparently fell behind on his rent payments, and the parties entered into an agreement under which Morton was able to satisfy his delinquent rent payments. In addition to the rent question, Morton may have also breached the terms of his lease by allowing a third-party female companion to reside on the property in the months leading up to the expiration of the lease.
In March 2007, Ivacic filed an action in the Small Claims Division of the St. Joseph Superior Court to evict Morton and recover damages.
On May 17, 2007, the court conducted a hearing on Ivacic's application for immediate possession of the property. After the parties were properly sworn, Ivacic described the basis of his application. He testified that his relations with Morton had become turbulent due to "unpaid rent, disruptive behavior, and other people living in the unit." (Appellant's App. at 7-8.) Ivacic then proposed that he and Morton should mutually agree on a move-out date. The judge asked Morton if he understood what Ivacic was saying, and the following exchange took place:
And he claims that these lease violations that I've made, like a tenant living with me, and I have a notarized letter from her stating that she doesn't live with me, that she has her own place.
(Id. at 9.)
The judge then attempted to explain to Morton that all issues addressing Ivacic's claims for damage to the property and other lease violations would be addressed at a future hearing, scheduled for June 15, 2007. The judge further explained that the hearing on possession does not determine damages and other issues concerning violations of the lease.
THE COURT: But the hearing of this kind normally is that with unpaid rent, then the—or other violations, other violations can cause an Order of Immediate Possession.
What [Ivacic] proposes is that he pick a date, or between you[,] you pick a date for you to move.
(Id. at 10.)
Ivacic proposed a move out date of June 15, 2007, and the parties agreed to it. Morton then expressed his concerns about losing his place after being a good tenant for the substantial duration of the lease and contended that he paid Ivacic all of the money owed to date. The following exchange then occurred:
(Id. at 11.)
The court again informed Morton of the two possible options resulting from the preliminary possession hearing: the parties could agree on a move-out date, or the court would issue an order granting Ivacic immediate possession. (Id. at 12.) Morton continued to explain to the judge that Ivacic's claims were unfounded. Morton claimed that he paid all of his late fees after making a payment arrangement with Ivacic and that he completed all that Ivacic asked of him, and Morton felt that he did not owe Ivacic anything further. (Id. at 11-12.) The following discussion resulted:
(Id. at 13.)
The court then ordered immediate possession of the property to Ivacic. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Morton was given a sufficient opportunity to present a defense and his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were not violated. Morton v. Ivacic, No. 71A03-0708-CV-386, 880 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. Ct.App. Feb. 8, 2008). We grant transfer.
We review the facts determined in a bench trial with due regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess witness credibility under the clearly erroneous standard. Ind. T.R. 52(A); Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind.2006). This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are informal, "with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice" between parties according to the rules of substantive law. City of Dunkirk Water & Sewage Dep't v. Hall, 657 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind.1995) (quoting Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A)). The only issue in this case turns on whether Morton was provided a sufficient opportunity to present a defense to Ivacic's ejectment claim—a question of law. Accordingly, we review de novo. See, e.g., Harrison v. Thomas, 761 N.E.2d 816 (Ind.2002) ( ).
As a preliminary matter, we observe that Ivacic has not filed a brief. Under that circumstance, we do not undertake to develop an argument on the appellee's behalf, but rather may reverse upon an appellant's prima facie showing of reversible error. Trinity Homes, LLC, 848 N.E.2d at 1068. Prima facie error in this context is defined as, "at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face it." Id.
Morton argues that the court denied him a sufficient opportunity to present a defense to Ivacic's ejectment claim and therefore violated his due process rights.1 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "Generally stated, due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to confront witnesses." Ind. State Bd. of Educ. v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 842 N.E.2d 885, 889 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). The "opportunity to be heard" is a fundamental requirement of due process. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S....
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