Moseley v. Hearrell

Decision Date12 May 1943
Docket NumberNo. 8072.,8072.
Citation171 S.W.2d 337
PartiesMOSELEY v. HEARRELL et al.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Bramlette, Levy & Bolton and Frank C. Bolton, Jr., all of Longview, for petitioner.

Hurst, Leak, & Burke, of Longview, for respondents.

ALEXANDER, Chief Justice.

This suit was brought by J. A. R. Moseley, Jr., against Mrs. Lola Hearrell and others for partition of the mineral interest in a one-acre tract of land. The trial court found that the mineral interest was incapable of partition in kind, and ordered it sold by a receiver and the proceeds divided. The judgment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 168 S.W.2d 317.

R. N. Wood originally owned the mineral interest in the tract of land in question. His interest was encumbered with a covenant that no more than one oil well would ever be drilled on the land. A firm of attorneys held an overriding royalty of 14/128 interest in the minerals. Wood conveyed to Mrs. Lola Hearrell an undivided 49/128 interest in the minerals. Afterwards a well was drilled and brought in as an oil producer. Wood and Mrs. Hearrell then entered into an oral understanding, by the terms of which Mrs. Hearrell was allowed to operate the well during the joint ownership of herself and Wood. Such understanding was not to extend beyond the period of such joint ownership. Thereafter Wood conveyed all of his remaining interest to the plaintiff J. A. R. Moseley, Jr. Moseley had knowledge of the previously existing oral operating agreement between Wood and Mrs. Hearrell at the time he purchased Wood's remaining interest in the property.

In this connection, it is proper to state that it was alleged by Mrs. Hearrell that Moseley, in seeking the partition of the property, was endeavoring to acquire her interest therein; that she would be financially unable to buy in the property at a receiver's sale; and that if her interest should be sold by the receiver it would not bring its full value, and in addition she would be compelled to pay a large Federal income tax out of her receipts from the sale. These allegations were made for the purpose of showing that it would be inequitable to Mrs. Hearrell to compel partition of the property.

The Court of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that the joint ownership of the property and the parol operating agreement between Wood and Mrs. Hearrell created a mining partnership, and that when Moseley purchased Wood's interest he thereby became a partner in the venture. The court was further of the opinion that Moseley, as a member of the firm, was not entitled to dissolve the partnership and compel partition of the property without showing equitable grounds therefor. We are not in accord with this view.

In our opinion, it is not material whether the relationship between the parties created a mining partnership, nor whether the plaintiff showed equitable grounds for the partition. Our statutes relating to partition read as follows:

"Art. 6082. Any joint owner or claimant of any real estate or of any interest therein or of any mineral, coal, petroleum, or gas lands, whether held in fee or by lease or otherwise, may compel a partition thereof between the other joint owners or claimants thereof in the manner provided in this chapter."

"Art. 6096. Should the court be of the opinion that a fair and equitable division of the real estate, or any part thereof, can not be made, it shall order a sale of so much as is incapable of partition, which sale shall be for cash, or upon such other terms as the court may direct, and shall...

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16 cases
  • Thomas v. McNair
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 28, 1994
    ...against it by contract, he may expect his cotenant to exercise his statutory right of partition at will. Moseley v. Hearrell, 141 Tex. 280, 171 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex.1943). A court applies the rules of equity in determining how property is to be partitioned. Id. at 338-39. We conclude that t......
  • Hopkins v. Hopkins, No. 03-03-00629-CV (TX 4/27/2006)
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • April 27, 2006
    ...or claimants," Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 23.001 (West 2000), and that right to partition is generally absolute. See Moseley v. Hearrell, 171 S.W.2d 337, 338 (Tex. 1943);Dierschke v. Central Nat'l Branch of First Nat'l Bank, 876 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ). However, the rig......
  • Yturria v. Kimbro
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 29, 1996
    ...thus applies the rules of equity in determining the broad question of how property is to be partitioned. See Moseley v. Hearrell, 141 Tex. 280, 171 S.W.2d 337, 338-39 (1943); Cleveland v. Milner, 141 Tex. 120, 170 S.W.2d 472, 476 (Tex.Comm'n App.1943, opinion adopted); Thomas, 882 S.W.2d at......
  • Wood v. Wiggins
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 16, 2021
    ...Rules of Civil Procedure." TEX. PROP. CODE § 23.001. This right to partition is considered absolute. Moseley v. Hearrell , 141 Tex. 280, 171 S.W.2d 337, 338 (1943) ; Bowman , 569 S.W.3d at 223. Rule 770 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the judicially ordered sale of land held b......
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