Mosley v. Bartle
| Docket Number | Civil Action 23-CV-4169 |
| Decision Date | 07 November 2023 |
| Parties | JAMES MOSLEY, Plaintiff, v. HARVEY BARTLE, III, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
James Mosley has filed a civil rights Complaint naming as Defendants United States District Judge Harvey Bartle, III current United States Circuit Judge L. Felipe Restrepo former Assistant United States Attorney Floyd J. Miller, the Department of Justice, and the Bureau of Prisons. Mosley also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Mosley in forma pauperis status, and dismiss the Complaint.
Mosley alleges that on or about September 18, 2002 while in federal pretrial custody at the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center, Judge Bartle issued a decision granting in part and denying in part a defense motion in his pending criminal case to suppress physical evidence of statements regarding possession of a firearm permit. (Compl. at 3.) Judge Restrepo, at that time in private practice, acted as Mosley's criminal defense attorney in the case and allegedly knew that Judge Bartle acted with racist intent in making the ruling against Mosley, who is Black.
(Id.) AUSA Miller also allegedly knew that Judge Bartle violated Mosley's self-incrimination rights but chose not to dismiss the indictment against him. (Id. at 4.) He asserts that the Defendants' racist acts caused him to be imprisoned on a firearms violation. (Id.) Mosley brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981[2]seeking “to correct the injustice and harm,” as well as money damages. (Id.)
Public records from this Court[3]indicate that Mosley was charged on October 30, 2001 with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). United States v. Mosley, No. 01-664 (E.D. Pa.). Judge Bartle presided over the case, Judge Restrepo represented Mosely, and Floyd J. Miller was the AUSA assigned to the case. Id. In a Memorandum and Order filed September 18, 2002, Judge Bartle granted in part and denied in part a defense motion to suppress physical evidence and statements attributed to Mosley. United States v. Mosley, No. 01-664, 2002 WL 32351168, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2002). Mosely's motion to suppress the statement that he did not have a gun permit was granted, and the motion to suppress the firearm, determined by Judge Bartle to be admissible because it was observed by the arresting officers in plain view, was denied. Id. at *3.
Following the decision on the motion to suppress, a jury found Mosley guilty of the charges on October 3, 2002. Mosley, No. 01-664 (ECF No. 37.) After post-trial motions were denied, Mosely was sentenced on March 7, 2003 to a term of 180 months imprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release. Id. (ECF No. 49.) His conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on May 17, 2004. Id. (ECF No. 57.)
The Court grants Mosley leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). “At this early stage of the litigation,' ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,' ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor,' and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.'” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Mosley is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
Section 1915 also requires the dismissal of claims for monetary relief brought against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); Rauso v. Giambrone, 782 Fed.Appx. 99, 101 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curium) ( that § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) “explicitly states that a court shall dismiss a case ‘at any time' where the action seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief”).
Mosley asserts that the actions that allegedly violated § 1981 occurred in 2002 when Judge Bartle acted on his motion to suppress evidence. The claims are untimely. Section 1981 does not contain its own limitation period. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267 (1985) (). In Wilson, the United States Supreme Court held that the need for national uniformity did not warrant the displacement of state statutes of limitations for civil rights actions. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions should control the timeliness of § 1981 claims and has applied Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to § 1981 actions. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.1985); see also 42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 5524 (). Since Mosley filed this case on October 24, 2023, well after the two-year limitation period expired, it must be dismissed with prejudice on this ground.
Even if Mosley's Complaint had been timely presented, there are additional reasons why his claims cannot proceed. Specifically, Judge Bartle and former AUSA Miller are immune from suit under § 1981.
Mosley's claim against Judge Bartle under § 1981 is not plausible because judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims that are based on acts or omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as they do not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 Fed.Appx. 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act is taken in a judge's judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.'” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)). Because judges must feel free to act without fear of incurring personal liability for their actions in court, judicial immunity remains in force even if the actions are alleged to be legally incorrect, in bad faith, malicious, or corrupt, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991), or are taken as a result of a conspiracy with others. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Judge Bartle's decision in Mosley's criminal case was a judicial act taken in a case in which he undoubtedly had jurisdiction to act. Accordingly, the claim for money damages against Judge Bartle is dismissed with prejudice.
To the extent that Mosley's request “to correct the injustice and harm,” can be interpreted as a request to receive injunctive or declaratory relief, that claim is also dismissed against Judge Bartle. Although judicial immunity previously applied only to damages claims, “[i]n 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that ‘injunctive relief shall not be granted' in an action brought against ‘a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.'” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting § 1983); Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2000) (). In the context of judicial defendants, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that “a judge who acts as a neutral and impartial arbiter of a statute is not a proper defendant to a Section 1983 suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute.” Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433, 440 (3d Cir. 2017). “However, a judge who acts as an enforcer or administrator of a statute can be sued under Section 1983 for declaratory or (if declaratory relief is unavailable) injunctive relief.” Id. Since Judge Bartle acted as a neutral and impartial arbiter in Mosley's criminal case, he is also absolutely immune from a claim for injunctive relief.
Mosley's claims against AUSA Miller are also not plausible. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for civil rights claims for acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and . . presenting the State's case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial