Mosley v. Jones
Decision Date | 02 May 2017 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:15cv31/WS/CJK |
Parties | REYNARD MOSLEY, Petitioner, v. JULIE JONES, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Before the court is an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 9). Respondent filed an answer, submitting relevant portions of the state court record. (Doc. 26). Petitioner replied. (Doc. 28). The matter is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B). After careful consideration of all issues raised by petitioner, the undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter. Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The undersigned further concludes that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief, and that the amended petition should be denied.
Petitioner was charged by information filed in Alachua County Circuit Court Case No. 09-CF-4735, with four counts of robbery with a firearm (Count I-IV) and four counts of kidnapping (Counts V-VIII). . 1 The charges involved four victims: Stephen Wyatt, Jeremy Fisher, Kenneth Wyatt and Dayna Nichols. Petitioner went to trial and was found guilty of all counts as charged. (Ex. C (jury verdict); Ex. F (trial transcript)). Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to concurrent terms of 40 years in prison followed by 10 years on probation for each count. (Ex. D). The Florida First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) affirmed the judgment on October 10, 2011, per curiam and without a written opinion. Mosley v. State, 71 So. 3d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Table) (copy at Ex. J).
On December 3, 2012, petitioner filed a counseled motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Ex. L, pp. 1-28). The state circuit court summarily denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. (Ex. L,pp. 31-316). The First DCA affirmed, per curiam and without a written opinion. Mosley v. State, 156 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (Table) (copy at Ex. N). The mandate issued February 18, 2015. (Ex. O).
Petitioner filed his original federal habeas petition on February 19, 2015, (doc. 1, p. 1), which he later amended (doc. 9). The amended petition raises two grounds for relief: a double jeopardy claim and an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Respondent asserts that petitioner's claims fail for one or more of the following reasons: (1) the claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review, (2) the claim is procedurally defaulted, (3) the claim is without merit. (Doc. 26).
Federal habeas relief is available to correct only federal constitutional injury. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219, 131 S. Ct. 859, 178 L. Ed. 2d 732 (2011) ; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991) ( ).
Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all available state court remedies for challenging his conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1971) (citation omitted)). The petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999); Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78. A claim that was not presented to the state court and can no longer be litigated under state procedural rules is considered procedurally defaulted, i.e., procedurally barred from federal review. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 839-40, 848; Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1260 n.56 (11th Cir. 2014) ; Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1998) ( ).
A petitioner seeking to overcome a procedural default must "demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 210 (11th Cir. 1993). "For cause to exist, an external impediment, whether it be governmental interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for the claim, must have prevented petitioner from raising the claim." McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986)). The miscarriage of justice exception requires the petitioner to show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S. Ct. 85, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995). This standard is very difficult to meet:
[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. To be credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence - that was not presented at trial.
513 U.S. at 327. "To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Id.
Federal courts may issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19. Section 2254(d) provides, in relevant part:
The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).2 The appropriate test was described by Justice O'Connor as follows:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Employing the Williams framework, on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a state court proceeding, the federal court must first ascertain the "clearly established Federallaw," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The law is "clearly established" only when a Supreme Court holding at the time of the state court decision embodies the legal principle at issue. Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (2010); Woods v. Donald, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376, 191 L. Ed. 2d 464 (2015) .
After identifying the governing legal principle(s), the federal court determines whether the state court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law. The adjudication is not contrary to Supreme Court precedent merely because it fails to cite to that precedent....
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