Mosley v. Lancaster

• Decision Date: 27 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. S14A1914.,S14A1914.
• Citation: 770 S.E.2d 873,296 Ga. 862
• Parties: MOSLEY v. LANCASTER et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

296 Ga. 862

770 S.E.2d 873

MOSLEY

v.LANCASTER et al.

No. S14A1914.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 27, 2015.

Howard C. Kaufold, Jr., Kaufold & Everett, Vidalia, James F. Nelson, Jr., Nelson, Nelson & Dixon, LLC, Dublin, Geremy Walden Gregory, Malissa Anne Kaufold–Wiggins, Balch & Bingham, LLP, Atlanta, for appellant.

Robert R. Cook, Hendrix, Nelson & Cook, Ray Chandlar Smith, Richmond Hill, for appellees.

Opinion

NAHMIAS, Justice.

This case involves a dispute among the grandchildren of Mildred Warnock Hilton (“Decedent”) concerning the distribution of her estate. The probate court denied probate of Decedent's purported 1988 will, which meant that her estate would be distributed according to the rules of intestate succession. On de novo appeal to the superior court, the parties stipulated to a bench trial, after which the superior court affirmed the probate court's decision, ruling that Decedent had revoked her 1988 will and it was not validated by the doctrine of “dependent relative revocation.” The grandchild who offered the 1988 will for probate now appeals to this Court, arguing that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to deny probate of the will without impaneling a jury and also challenging the court's judgment on the merits. We affirm.

1. This case has a long and complicated factual and procedural history, which we recount to put our later discussion of the legal issues in context. Viewed in the light most favorable to the superior court's judgment, see Thomas v. Sands, 284 Ga. 529, 530, 668 S.E.2d 731 (2008), the facts are as follows. Decedent died on July 23, 2004, at the age of 95. She and her husband, Chester Hilton, had two children, Joe and James. Joe had three children: Joe Hilton, Jr. and appellees Teresa Hilton Lancaster and Donna Hilton Swinson. James had two children: appellant Jamie Hilton Mosley and appellee Jimmy Hilton.

Prior to her death, Decedent executed two documents purporting to be her last will and testament, the first dated June 23, 1988 (the “1988 Will”), and the second dated June 28, 2004 (the “2004 Will”). When the 1988 Will was executed, Decedent's son Joe and her grandson Joe, Jr. were already deceased. The 1988 Will left Decedent's son James a 150–acre parcel of land and a smaller tract outright, as well as a life estate in a second 150–acre parcel and a 100–acre parcel with the remainder of each to his children Jamie and Jimmy in equal shares on his death. The 1988 Will directed the sale of the merchantable timber on the second 150–acre parcel within 12 months after Decedent's death, with the proceeds to be distributed one-third to Decedent's son James and one-third each to Teresa and Donna, Decedent's two living grandchildren through her son Joe. That will also gave Donna a conditional life estate in a half-acre tract of land with the remainder on Donna's death to her living children, if any, and otherwise to Decedent's son James. The residue of Decedent's estate was left to her husband Chester. The 1988 Will nominated Chester and James to be the co-executors of Decedent's estate.

Several events bearing on the distribution and administration of Decedent's estate occurred between the execution of the 1988 Will and the 2004 Will. Decedent's son James died in October 1999, and her husband Chester died in December 2000. In January 2001, Decedent's estranged granddaughter Teresa sent her a letter stating that Teresa had consulted with an attorney and that she wanted to disclaim any interest in Decedent's estate. And on February 13, 2004, James's widow, Joy Hilton, died, after which Decedent expressed unhappiness with the way Joy's will distributed her estate between her children Jamie and Jimmy, who is disabled.¹

Over the next few months, Decedent declined physically and mentally. In June 2004, Decedent's brother, J'Mon Warnock, set up a meeting between Decedent and attorney Tom Everett to discuss the preparation of a new will. Warnock drove Decedent to the meeting, at which Decedent gave Everett the original of her 1988 Will, which had X's marking out some provisions and comments written in the margins and between lines in ink. Decedent told Everett that she wanted to change her 1988 Will. Everett went over the marked-up will with Decedent, but he could not determine from that document and the markings alone what Decedent wanted, so he asked Decedent how she wished her estate to be distributed. Everett then prepared the 2004 Will based on the marked-up original of the 1988 Will, his conversation with Decedent, and his meeting notes.

On June 28, 2004, Decedent returned to Everett's office with Warnock and their sister Florence Overstreet, and Decedent executed the 2004 Will before Everett and two disinterested witnesses. In Decedent's presence and at her direction, Everett then tore up the original of the 1988 Will and threw it into the trash. The primary beneficiaries of the 2004 Will were Warnock and Overstreet, and the 2004 Will nominated them to be the co-executors of Decedent's estate. Donna was left a life estate in a half-acre tract of land along with $50,000 and some personal property; Jamie was left only some personal property; Decedent's disabled grandson Jimmy was left $150,000 in trust; and Teresa was left nothing.

Decedent died less than a month later on July 23, 2004. In August 2004, Warnock and Overstreet filed a petition to probate the 2004 Will in solemn form, and Jamie filed a caveat. In December 2004, the probate court admitted the 2004 Will to probate. Jamie then appealed to the superior court and demanded a jury trial. In February 2006, the jury returned a verdict finding that Decedent lacked the mental capacity to make a valid will on June 28, 2004; the jury made no finding as to undue influence. Warnock and Overstreet then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, alternatively, a new trial.

In May 2006, Jamie filed a petition in the probate court to admit the 1988 Will to probate in solemn form, and Teresa filed a caveat, as she would benefit more if Decedent died intestate. Meanwhile, proceedings continued in the superior court on the 2004 Will. In January 2007, the superior court entered a JNOV admitting the 2004 Will to probate and granting a new trial in the event that the JNOV was overturned on appeal, on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. See OCGA § 9–11–50(c)(1). Jamie appealed, and this Court reversed the JNOV but affirmed the grant of a new trial. See Mosley v. Warnock, 282 Ga. 488, 488–490, 651 S.E.2d 696 (2007). At the second trial on the 2004 Will, which was held in February 2008, the jury returned a verdict on special interrogatories finding that Decedent had the mental capacity to make a valid will on June 28, 2004, but the 2004 Will was invalid because it was the product of undue influence. The superior court entered judgment on that verdict, and that judgment was not appealed.

Attention then turned back to the probate court proceedings on the 1988 Will. In September 2008, Teresa, Donna, and Appellant Jamie's brother Jimmy (collectively, “Appellees”) filed a caveat to the 1988 Will. The probate court held a hearing and in January 2010 entered an order denying probate of the 1988 Will. Appellant appealed to the superior court. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, which the superior court denied in April 2012, on the ground that disputed issues of material fact remained regarding Decedent's intent to revoke the 1988 Will and the relationship between the making of the 2004 Will and the destruction of the 1988 Will. The parties stipulated to a bench trial on all issues, which was held on February 8, 2013. On June 2, 2014, the superior court entered an order affirming the probate court's denial of probate of the 1988 Will, ruling that it was Decedent's intent to revoke the 1988 Will and the will was not validated by the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

2. Appellant contends first that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to deny probate of the 1988 Will without impaneling a jury, even though the parties stipulated to a bench trial. Appellant cites OCGA § 15–6–8(4)(E), which gives the superior courts

authority ... (4) ... to review and correct, in the manner prescribed by law, the judgments of ... (E) Judges of the probate courts, except in cases touching the probate of wills and the granting of letters of administration, in which a jury must be impaneled....

According to Appellant, this statute requires a jury trial in all cases “touching the probate of wills” regardless of the parties' wishes, and the failure to hold a jury trial therefore deprives the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction to review and correct a probate court judgment on the probate of a will.

Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that a court's subject matter jurisdiction depends on whether a jury trial or a bench trial is held. To the contrary, Appellant's notion that the fact-finding process used to decide a particular case determines the court's jurisdiction to decide the case conflicts with this Court's description of subject matter jurisdiction:

The phrase jurisdiction of the subject matter refers to subject matter alone, i.e., conferring jurisdiction in specified kinds of cases. It is the power to deal with the general abstract question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating to this question. Jurisdiction of the subject matter does not mean simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying the attention of the court, but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which that particular case belongs.

Crutchfield v. Lawson, 294 Ga. 407, 409, 754 S.E.2d 50 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). Article VI, Section IV, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 establishes the superior courts as courts of general jurisdiction with original and appellate jurisdiction as...