Crutchfield v. Lawson

Decision Date21 January 2014
Docket NumberNo. S13A1611.,S13A1611.
Citation754 S.E.2d 50,294 Ga. 407
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court
PartiesCRUTCHFIELD v. LAWSON.

294 Ga. 407
754 S.E.2d 50

CRUTCHFIELD
v.
LAWSON.

No. S13A1611.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 21, 2014.


[754 S.E.2d 51]


Edwin Jay Schklar, Magdalena Maria Heim, Schklar & Heim, LLC, Atlanta, for appellant.

Blake Robert Carl, Dupree & Kimbrough, LLP, Stacy Armstrong Ingle, Syrop & Ingle, Marietta, for appellee.


MELTON, Justice.

Following the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a ruling finding him to be in contempt of a divorce decree, Alvah Matthew Crutchfield (Husband) appeals, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case. For the reasons set forth below, we find that Husband challenges venue, not subject matter jurisdiction, and that Husband affirmatively waived any objections on the face of the record. Accordingly, we affirm.

The record shows that Husband and Julie Gravitt Lawson (Wife) were granted a final divorce by the Superior Court of Paulding County on April 17, 2008. On September 9, 2011, Wife filed an application for contempt against Husband in the Superior Court of Cobb County. On October 18, 2011, Husband answered Wife's action in Cobb County, and, in addition, he filed a cross-application for contempt in which he challenged the Cobb County court's jurisdiction. A hearing on the matter was held on May 3, 2012, and any jurisdictional defects were discussed by the parties. At that time, counsel for both sides consulted at length with their clients and reached an agreement, announced and accepted in open court under oath, consenting to jurisdiction in the Cobb County court, among other things.1 Thereafter, the Cobb County court conducted hearings and ultimately found Husband in contempt.

After obtaining new counsel, Husband then filed a motion to set aside the contempt judgment, arguing that the Cobb County court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, which could not be waived, and that the Cobb County court's rulings were void. Specifically, Husband argued that only the court issuing the original order, in this case the Superior Court of Paulding County, had the subject matter jurisdiction to enforce that order through a contempt action. The Cobb County court denied the motion to set aside,

[754 S.E.2d 52]

finding that Husband, who had participated freely in the Cobb proceedings, was equitably estopped from challenging subject matter jurisdiction.2 This direct appeal ensued.

We must first determine whether a trial court's entitlement to enforce its own orders is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction or venue.

It has long been the rule in this state, as in other jurisdictions, that an application for contempt must be filed in the court which rendered the order or judgment in question. In divorce cases, this means that, generally speaking, a contempt application must be filed in the superior court which entered the divorce decree. The reason for this rule has been set forth succinctly as follows: “The theory upon which the right of a court to punish for contempt is, that ‘[e]very court has power to compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and processes.’ It necessarily follows that ‘[o]nly the court offended has power to punish for the contempt or to entertain proceedings to that end.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Goodrum v. Goodrum, 202 Ga. 135(4), 42 S.E.2d 450 (1947).

(Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Jacob v. Koslow, 282 Ga. 51, 52, 644 S.E.2d 857 (2007).


This does not mean, however, that the superior court in which the original order was entered has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to enforce its original order.

The phrase...

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5 cases
  • Sullivan v. Bunnell
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 21, 2017
    ...... [appellant's] claims were in actuality properly dismissed for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction[.]").24 Crutchfield v. Lawson, 294 Ga. 407, 409, 754 S.E.2d 50 (2014).25 Id. (punctuation omitted); accord Melton v. Jenkins, 50 Ga.App. 615, 615 (1), 178 S.E. 754 (1935).26 Crutchfield, ......
  • GS Cleantech Corp. v. Cantor Colburn, LLP.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 16, 2022
    ...regarding certain obligations was unenforceable due to lack of mutuality).23 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Crutchfield v. Lawson , 294 Ga. 407, 409, 754 S.E.2d 50 (2014), quoting Hopkins v. Hopkins , 237 Ga. 845, 846 (1), 229 S.E.2d 751 (1976).24 (Emphasis supplied.)25 Bobick v. Comm......
  • Jessie v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • January 21, 2014
  • Mosley v. Lancaster
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 27, 2015
    ...the attention of the court, but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which that particular case belongs.Crutchfield v. Lawson, 294 Ga. 407, 409, 754 S.E.2d 50 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). Article VI, Section IV, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 establishes the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Domestic Relations
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 66-1, September 2014
    • Invalid date
    ...survey period, see Barry B. McGough & Elinor H. Hitt, Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 mercer L. Rev. 107 (2013).2. 294 Ga. 407, 754 S.E.2d 50 (2014). 3. Id. at 407-08, 754 S.E.2d at 51.4. Id. at 409, 754 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting Robinson v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 55 Ga. App.......

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