Motes v. Gila Valley, Globe & Northern Railway Co.

Decision Date22 March 1907
Docket NumberCivil 961
Citation11 Ariz. 39,89 P. 410
PartiesPRESLEY D. MOTES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GILA VALLEY, GLOBE & NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant and Appellee
CourtArizona Supreme Court

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, in and for the County of Graham. Eugene A. Tucker Judge.

On March 6, 1900, Presley D. Motes filed an action in the district court of Graham county against the Gila Valley Globe & Northern Railway Company, seeking to recover damages in the sum of $3,000 for injuries alleged to have been sustained by his minor son, Presley L. Motes, by reason of the negligence of the servants of the railway company. The defendant company demurred to the complaint on the following grounds: "(1) Because the said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (2) Because of a misjoinder of causes of action, in this: That two separate and independent actions of tort are alleged in the same complaint. (3) That one of the parties plaintiff Presley L. Motes, an alleged minor, has not the legal capacity to sue. (4) That there is a defect of parties plaintiff, in this: There is no allegation in the said complaint alleging the joint wrong, or showing the right of plaintiffs to jointly prosecute this action."

On April 3, 1900, the demurrer was argued and the court ordered "that the demurrer herein be, and the same is, hereby sustained." Leave was given the plaintiff to amend his complaint, and on April 5, 1900, he filed an amended complaint wherein he sought to recover for moneys expended for medical attendance to his son, and for the loss of his son's services. To the amended complaint the defendant demurred on several grounds, among others, that it sets up a new and independent cause of action, which is barred by the statute of limitations. On October 2, 1900, the demurrer to the amended complaint was heard, and the court ordered "that the demurrer raising the statute of limitations be, and the same is, hereby sustained." Thereafter, upon motion of the defendant, the court ordered that judgment be entered against the plaintiff, dismissing his complaint. Plaintiff appealed to this court, where the judgment was affirmed. 68 P. 532. Presley L. Motes, having attained his majority, brought this action in his own right to recover from the defendant company damages for the injuries claimed to have been sustained by him by reason of the same acts of negligence on the part of defendant's servants. The defendant company pleaded in bar the judgments sustaining the demurrers to the complaints filed by the plaintiff's father. Plaintiff demurred to defendant's plea in bar and said demurrer was heard by the court on October 14, 1904, and was sustained. On May 1, 1905, the defendant filed an amended answer containing the same plea in bar. No new demurrer was interposed to this amended answer, but the case went to trial before the court and a jury upon the complaint and the amended answer. The plaintiff introduced testimony tending to support the allegations of his complaint, and made a prima facie case for damages. The defendant offered the record in the former case, which was admitted over the objection of plaintiff, and thereupon the court, upon motion of the defendant, directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. Judgment was entered upon the verdict so returned, and a new trial denied. The case is here by writ of error.

W. K. Dial, for Appellant.

The question presented here is, whether the right of Presley L. Motes to recover judgment against the Gila Valley, Globe and Northern Railway Company for injuries inflicted upon him on the seventh day of March, 1899, has been judicially determined. For the judgment in the case of the father of plaintiff against said railway company to be a bar to this action, it must be res adjudicata, which an examination of that case will show was not the fact. Before a judgment can be plead in bar and will operate as an estoppel, it must appear that the parties to the action in which the plea is interposed are the same, and the subject matter of the action is the same, and that the precise question was raised and determined in the former suit. In other words, the parties must be the same, the subject matter the same, and the cause of action the same. If all these things do not concur, then the judgment in the former case, although it be between the same parties and concerning the same subject matter, will be no bar. Davis v. Brown, 94 U.S. 423, 24 L.Ed. 204; Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 24 L.Ed. 214; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195.

Frank W. Burnett, for Appellee.

If the first complaint in which the demurrer was sustained and final judgment thereafter...

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1 cases
  • Griffith v. State
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • 21 Marzo 1933
    ...it will be presumed that the demurrer was sustained on the technical ground set up by the defendant. . . ." Defendants urge that in the Motes case no judgment of dismissal rendered upon the order sustaining the first demurrers, and that the case is not in point. We think, however, that the ......

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