Griffith v. State
Decision Date | 21 March 1933 |
Docket Number | Civil 3217 |
Citation | 20 P.2d 289,41 Ariz. 517 |
Parties | VIC S. GRIFFITH and FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, a Corporation, Appellants, v. STATE OF ARIZONA, Acting for Itself and on Behalf of Pima County, Arizona, Appellee |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Pima. Dave W. Ling, Judge. Judgment reversed and case remanded.
Messrs Richey & Richey, Messrs. Alexander, Silverthorne & Van Spanckeren, Mr. Robert McMurchie and Mr. W. L. Barnum, for Appellants.
Mr Arthur T. LaPrade, Attorney General, Mr. Clarence E. Houston and Mr. Wm. G. Hall, for Appellee.
This is an action by the state of Arizona, acting for itself and on behalf of Pima county, against Vic S. Griffith and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, a corporation, as defendants. There were three other suits of the same general nature filed by the state at the same time which have also been appealed, and it is agreed by the parties that the legal points involved in each of these appeals are identical, and that the judgment in the present case shall control that in the other three referred to.
We state the facts necessary for a determination of the issues as follows: Defendant Griffith during the years 1921 to 1928, inclusive, was the county assessor of Pima county, one John Pfeiffer being his deputy, while the corporations involved in all the actions were the sureties on Griffith's official bonds. On the 4th of August, 1928 Pima county brought a suit in the superior court, being cause No. 11471, against Griffith, Pfeiffer, Maryland Casualty Company of Baltimore, and the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, to recover from Griffith and Pfeiffer some $36,000 of money belonging to Pima county, which it was alleged they had received in their official capacities and fraudulently converted to their own use, and from the Maryland Casualty Company some $11,000 and the Fidelity and Deposit Company $5,000, on the penalties of their respective bonds. To this complaint the defendants demurred on four grounds: First, that there was a misjoinder of the parties, second, a misjoinder of causes of action, third, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and, fourth, that it showed affirmatively on its face that it was barred by the statute of limitations. On the twenty-seventh day of April, 1929, the court entered an order sustaining the demurrers generally without indicating any particular one, and granted plaintiff thirty days within which to amend its complaint, and, the plaintiff having failed to amend, the following judgment was entered on July 2d:
A short time thereafter this action was brought by the state. The defendants demurred on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and then set up three defenses in bar of the action: First, a general denial, second, that the action was barred by the judgment of dismissal above set forth, and, third, that the money involved, if any was converted, was the property of Pima county, and that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Demands for a bill of particulars were made, and in response thereto it was furnished. The general demurrer was overruled, and the case proceeded to trial before the court sitting without a jury, evidence being introduced on behalf of plaintiff and defendant. The court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, but failed to make any findings on the pleas of res judicata and statute of limitations raised by the answer, and defendants thereafter requested additional findings on those points, which were refused by the court. Judgment was later rendered in favor of plaintiff, and, after the usual motions for new trial had been overruled this appeal was taken.
There are some eight assignments of error, one containing many subdivisions, but we shall consider them in accordance with the legal propositions raised thereby. The first is that the present action was barred by the judgment rendered in cause No. 11471 above referred to. It is a generally accepted doctrine that, if a demurrer which goes to the merits of a case be sustained, and the action be then dismissed by the court, it is a bar to a subsequent similar action between the same parties. Wilson v. Lowry, 5 Ariz. 335, 52 P. 777; 34 C.J. 798, and note. There is, however, an exception to this rule. If the demurrer goes to the form of the action, to a defect of pleading, or to the jurisdiction of the court, a judgment of dismissal thereon will not preclude further litigation on the merits of the controversy in a proper case. Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, 124 U.S. 225, 8 S.Ct. 495, 31 L.Ed. 411; Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. (71 U.S. 236, 18 L.Ed. 303; Motes v. Gila Valley etc. Ry. Co., 11 Ariz. 39, 89 P. 410.
It has also been held that, where a demurrer goes both to defenses of form and to the merits, an order sustaining the demurrer generally and a judgment thereon which does not designate between the two grounds will be presumed to rest on that of form rather than the merits. Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, supra; Motes v. Gila Valley etc. Ry. Co., supra; Chrisman's Admx. v. Harman, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 494, 26 Am. Rep. 387; Griffin v. Seymour, 15 Iowa 30, 83 Am. Dec. 396.
Defendants apparently rely chiefly upon the case of Coates v. Santa Fe, P. & P.R.R., 15 Ariz. 25, 135 P. 717. In that case plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that he had received certain personal injuries while in the employ of defendant and sought damages therefor. Defendant pleaded in bar that plaintiff had for a good and valuable consideration acknowledged full satisfaction of the cause of action, and, the attorney for plaintiff confessing the truth of the plea in bar, the court ordered that the cause be dismissed with prejudice. Notwithstanding this, plaintiff later commenced another cause of action based on the same facts, to which defendant pleaded the judgment of dismissal in the former action in bar. In discussing the question we said:
"
It is claimed that, since the judgment in case No. 11471 does not contain the words "without prejudice" or others carrying the same meaning, the presumption is that the ruling was on the merits. It will be seen that the facts in the Coates case are quite different from those in No. 11471, and that there was no question of a defect in pleading, parties, or jurisdiction. We think the case not in point on the precise question involved.
Plaintiff urges that the rule laid down in Motes v. Gila Valley R. Co., supra, governs. Motes brought suit against defendant railroad for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by his minor son. Defendant demurred on four grounds, the first that the complaint did not state a cause of action, and the other three raising the questions of misjoinder, defect of parties, and legal capacity to sue. The demurrer was sustained generally without indicating on what grounds, and leave granted to amend. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint seeking to recover in his own behalf for medical attendance and loss of his son's services. A demurrer was interposed to the second complaint on the ground that it set up a new cause of action which was barred by the statute of limitations. This demurrer was sustained, and judgment entered for a dismissal of the complaint. The case was appealed to this court which affirmed the judgment. Later, the minor son, having become of age, brought suit in his own right for injuries arising out of the same acts involved in the first case. Defendant pleaded in bar the judgment sustaining the demurrer to the complaint filed by the plaintiff's father in the first case. When the matter came before us, we said that the issue was whether the sustaining of the demurrer to that complaint, which, as we have stated, was an entirely different cause of action from that contained in the amended complaint was a bar to the later action, and continued:
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