Motes v. State, 1D12–1097.

• Citation: 129 So.3d 446
• Decision Date: 31 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1D12–1097.,1D12–1097.
• Parties: Michael Kenneth MOTES Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

129 So.3d 446

Michael Kenneth MOTES Jr., Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D12–1097.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Dec. 31, 2013.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

CLARK, J.

In this appeal, Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. SeeFla. R.Crim. P. 3.170( l ). Appellant moved to withdraw his plea after sentencing. Therefore, he must show one of the grounds enumerated in Rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(a)-(e) as well as a “manifest injustice.” Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(b)-(c); Griffin v. State, 114 So.3d 890, 897 (Fla.2013). We review the trial court's denial for abuse of discretion. Griffin, 114 So.3d at 897. We find the present circumstances constitute a manifest injustice and reverse the trial court's denial.

Appellant's plea form stated he was reserving the right to appeal the court's pre-trial ruling he was competent to stand trial. However, his trial counsel was manifestly incorrect that Appellant could do so-this is not a dispositive ruling subject to reservation. During the plea colloquy, the court confirmed, “you are reserving your right to appeal the [c]ourt's pretrial ruling.” Consequently, counsel included a clause in a binding agreement, Appellant signed an agreement with that clause, and the trial court confirmed the clause's existence and accepted the agreement which included it. The clause, however, was patently erroneous.

Plea bargains are contracts and are subject to the rules of contract law. Kingry v. State, 28 So.3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Appellant was thus entitled to rely upon the written agreement, his counsel, and the court's confirmation. See Carlisle v. State, 687 So.2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal; motion was, in fact, not dispositive and “appellant was entitled to rely on the court's statement”); see also State v. Cowart, 761 So.2d 1100, 1100–01 (Fla.2000) (reversing with instructions to permit defendant to withdraw his plea where trial court erroneously indicated defendant could not be sentenced pursuant to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act). “When a negotiated plea agreement cannot be honored by the trial judge, the defendant may withdraw his plea and the trial court has an affirmative duty to so advise him.” Johnson v. State, 547 So.2d 238, 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (citing Goldberg v. State, 536 So.2d 364, 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)).

While the dissent addresses Appellant's possible subjective expectations or intentions in the addition of the erroneous reservation, these are of no import against a valid, written agreement. See Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So.2d 604, 608 (Fla.1957) (“The writing itself is the evidence of what [the parties] meant or intended by signing it. The test of the meaning and intention of the parties is the content of the written document.”); Bowen v. Taylor–Christensen, 98 So.3d 136, 140–41 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (“[C]ontracts are formed by objective acts, not subjective beliefs.”).

Therefore, when the court confirmed and accepted the agreement with an erroneous reservation as a part, it could not honor that agreement and Appellant was entitled to withdraw his plea. The trial court consequently abused its

discretion and should have permitted Appellant to withdraw his plea. We REVERSE.

SWANSON, J., concurs.

ROWE, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Because Appellant failed to demonstrate that a manifest injustice occurred, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea after sentencing.

Appellant argues that he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea because his plea agreement was conditioned on his ability to challenge the trial court's competency ruling, which he later learned was a non-appealable issue. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170( l ) allows for the withdrawal of a plea after sentencing only on the grounds specified in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii). A violation of the plea agreement is one of those enumerated grounds. Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(b). However, a defendant who moves to withdraw his plea on grounds that the plea agreement was violated must also demonstrate that a manifest injustice occurred. State v. Partlow, 840 So.2d 1040, 1042 (Fla.2003). Appellant failed to meet that burden here.

Appellant was charged with sexual battery with a firearm, burglary of dwelling with assault or battery, aggravated assault by threat, felony battery, violation of a domestic violence injunction, aggravated stalking, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Appellant's counsel filed a notice of incompetency after an expert declared Appellant to be incompetent to stand trial. The trial court appointed two experts, who both determined that Appellant was competent to proceed. Based on these expert opinions, the trial court found that Appellant was competent to stand trial.

However, Appellant chose not to proceed to trial. Instead, Appellant entered into a plea agreement with the State where the State agreed to drop the firearm portions of Appellant's charges in exchange for Appellant entering a straight-up plea to the court. On the plea form, defense counsel wrote “Defendant reserves the right to appeal Court's pre-trial ruling as to the Defendant's competency.” During the plea colloquy, Appellant indicated that he understood the charges against him and the maximum penalties for those charges. Without further comment, the court noted that Appellant was reserving the right to appeal the court's competency ruling. The court found that Appellant's pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Appellant was sentenced to a total of forty-five years' imprisonment.

Following sentencing, Appellant moved to withdraw his plea. At the evidentiary hearing, Appellant testified that counsel told him that he would have the right to appeal the court's competency ruling in the event that he did not obtain a favorable ruling from the court. Appellant admitted that he told his doctors during the competency evaluations that he did not “want to be labeled a nut.”

Appellant's trial counsel testified that Appellant agreed to pursue the plea agreement because Appellant...