Motiejaitis v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 08 December 1933
• Citation: 169 A. 606,117 Conn. 631
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MOTIEJAITIS v. JOHNSON et al.

169 A. 606

117 Conn. 631

MOTIEJAITIS v. JOHNSON et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 8, 1933

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Miles F McNiff, Judge.

Action by Agnes Motiejaitis against Joseph C. Johnson and others, to recover damages for injuries claimed to have been received by the plaintiff by the falling of an electric light globe. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Theodore V. Meyer and Michael J. Galullo, both of Waterbury for appellants.

Michael V. Blansfield and Herman B. Engelman, both of Waterbury, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.

AVERY Judge.

In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, while walking on Bank street in Waterbury in front of the premises owned by the defendant, a large electric light globe fell from the top of a standard on which it was supported, striking her upon the head and injuring her. She alleged that the apparatus was under the complete control of and owned by the defendant; and that it was negligent in failing to securely fasten the globe or in allowing the fastening to become defective or out of repair whereby it became loose or fell away from the standard. At the trial to the jury, she claimed to have proved from her evidence that the electric light standard in front of the store, owned and maintained by the defendant, was about fourteen feet in height, on top of which was a large globe of glass fifteen inches high, weighing seven or eight pounds, and beneath it four smaller ones supported by brackets; that, as she was walking upon the street, the large globe fell from the top and struck her; that it was caused to fall by some defective condition not disclosed coupled with a moderate gust of wind; and that the entire apparatus was under the complete charge of the defendant. The defendant offered no witnesses as to the cause of the accident, but claimed to have developed on cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses that the standard was located on the curb of the sidewalk; that the globe on top sets into a frame with four screws to tighten it, and when an automobile backs up and shakes the standard it leaves the socket where it is and throws the top off; that on various occasions automobiles had backed against the standard; that on the day of the accident it was extremely windy; that, after the globe fell, the screws which had been holding it on the standard were still on the socket tightened thereto; that when the globe was placed upon the standard each screw was tightly fastened and after the globe fell of the bottom part of the glass was still in the socket, and it was not the giving away of the screws or the manner in which the globe was installed that caused it to fall.

In this situation, as to the claims of the parties the court instructed the jury with reference to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. After stating that the doctrine was applicable only where the conditions, as set forth in Stebel v. Connecticut Co., 90 Conn. 24, 26, 96 A. 171, existed, which were enumerated as stated in that case, the court went on to say: " So that in this case I charge you that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case against the defendant, if she has shown that she was injured by the falling of the electric light globe without fault of hers, on her part. In such a case there is a presumption or inference that the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant, and the duty is upon the defendant then to show that the accident did not happen through the defendant's negligence. *** So, as I have said, if you are satisfied that the plaintiff was injured in the manner she claims, and any evidence you have heard is not sufficiently strong to rebut the presumption that the defendant was negligent under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, your verdict should be for the plaintiff."

The appellant assigns error in this instruction as inadequately stating the doctrine in view of the claim of the parties, and especially as relating to the burden of proof. In Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn. 333, 337, 155 A. 219, 220, we stated: " The doctrine is ordinarily relied upon in cases of accidents resulting from defective machines, vehicles, or apparatus, where the evidence as to the true cause of the accident is accessible to the defendant but not to the plaintiff. It does not change the burden of proof, but its application satisfies the plaintiff's duty of producing evidence sufficient to go to the jury. The distinctive function of the rule is to permit an inference of negligence from proof of the injury and the physical agency inflicting it without proof of facts pointing to the responsible human cause. If the proof includes facts tending to show negligence, the doctrine becomes simply a specific application of the general principle that negligence can be proved by circumstantial evidence."

If upon the evidence, reasonable men might disagree as to whether or not the conditions upon which the application of the doctrine depends were present in the case, it must be submitted to the jury. If the jury finds that those conditions do exist, and no further relevant facts are proven, they may draw from them an inference of negligence upon the part of the defendant if they deem it reasonable, but are not compelled to do so. Whether or not they find that the conditions do exist, if, upon all the evidence, they find proven a definite cause or causes of the accident, it is then for them to determine whether, in view of such cause or causes, the defendant was negligent and the doctrine has no application. If they find that the conditions do exist, but no definite cause or causes of the accident are proven, it is for them then to determine whether, in view of the circumstances of...