Mottola v. Cirello
| Docket Number | 2000-278-M.P.,2000-250-M.P.,2000-251-M.P. |
| Decision Date | 04 February 2002 |
| Citation | 789 A.2d 421 |
| Parties | Rudolph MOTTOLA v. Mark E. CIRELLO et al. Frank St. Jean et al v. Deanna Chirico et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
William Filippo, Providence; Manuel A. Suarez, Wilton, CT; Robert M. Ferrieri; Paul A. Anderson; Providence; Christopher L. Russo, Cranston, for Plaintiff.
John F. Kelleher, Rebecca Tedford Partington, Amy Vignali Coleman, Kenneth P. Borden, Providence, for Defendant.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
This case came before the Supreme Court on December 12, 2001, on petitions for writ of certiorari by both parties to review sua sponte orders of the Superior Court. These orders directed defense counsel, in connection with the substitution of the state as the party defendant pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-31-12(b), to withdraw his appearance and further ordered the Attorney General to enter an appearance on behalf of the State of Rhode Island. We also granted certiorari on behalf of the plaintiff to review a sua sponte order that declared that plaintiff was no longer entitled to prejudgment interest on any damage award, and that the award was subject to the statutory cap on damages enjoyed by the state pursuant to § 9-31-1. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On June 18, 1997, Rudolph Mottolla (plaintiff or Mottolla) was operating a motor vehicle and, while stopped, was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Mark E. Cirello (Cirello or employee), who, at the time of the collision, was employed by the State of Rhode Island (the state), a co-defendant in this case. The plaintiff filed a personal injury action on June 10, 1998, alleging negligence by both the employee and the state as respondeat superior. Prior to the collision, the state had entered into a contract of insurance with Royal Sun & Alliance Insurance Company (Royal or insurer) that provided for liability coverage for the state's fleet vehicles, including the vehicle involved in this collision. Included in the contract of insurance is a provision requiring the state to cooperate in the defense of any claims and accord the carrier discretion to investigate and settle claims as it sees fit.
The record discloses that when served with the complaint, the Attorney General forwarded the claim to Royal for defense and coverage. Royal proceeded to retain the firm of Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney (Higgins or defense counsel) to answer and defend the suit. Higgins answered the complaint on behalf of both Cirello and the state and subsequently moved, pursuant to § 9-31-12(b), to dismiss the claim against Cirello and to substitute the state as the party defendant. The trial justice granted the motion, dismissed Mottola's claim against the employee, and ordered the substitution of the state as the party defendant. However, she also declared sua sponte, that plaintiff was no longer entitled to statutory interest on any potential judgment and that the statutory cap on damages pursuant to § 9-31-1 applied to any judgment plaintiff may recover. Finally, the trial justice ordered that "the Attorney General * * *[shall] enter his appearance forthwith [and that] [c]ounsel for the defendant shall withdraw simultaneously." This Court granted certiorari in order to review these interlocutory rulings.
"Questions of * * * statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo by this Court." Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I.2001) (citing Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Bowen Court Associates, 763 A.2d 1005, 1007 (R.I. 2001)). "In matters of statutory interpretation our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature." Webster, 774 A.2d at 75 (citing Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I.1994)). Further, "when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996).
State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 n. 1 (R.I.1998).
The trial justice, relying upon § 9-31-12(b), granted Cirello's motions to dismiss the claim against him and to substitute the state as the party defendant. Section 931-12 provides:
The language of this statute is clear and unambiguous, and, upon certification of the predicate facts that the employee-tortfeasor was acting within the scope of his or her employment and that the claim is not fraudulent, malicious or the result of willful misconduct, the suit "shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the state." In accordance with our well established principle of statutory construction, the words of the statute shall be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Accent Store Design, Inc., 674 A.2d at 1226. Therefore, once the state stipulated that Cirello was acting within the scope of his employment and that the suit was not improperly motivated, the court appropriately substituted the state as the party defendant. Although this section does not mandate that the action be dismissed against Cirello, a substitution effectively removes the employee from the case. Thus, we are satisfied that a dismissal of the claim against Cirello was appropriate in these circumstances. However, the statute does not address the questions of prejudgment interest or the applicability of a statutory cap on damages.
Finally, we conclude that the hearing justice had no authority to dictate who shall represent the state in this action or in any other litigation. Although we recognize that § 9-31-6 provides that in an action "against the state of Rhode Island, the [A]ttorney [G]eneral, or any assistant attorney general authorized by him or her, shall represent the state in the action[,]" we are not satisfied that this statute precludes the state from entering into a contract of insurance that includes a provision that the carrier will provide a defense to claims made pursuant to the policy.
The Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island holds a constitutional office with specific and significant responsibilities to the people of Rhode Island. Pursuant to article 9, section 12, of the Rhode Island Constitution, the duties and powers of the Attorney General remained the same under the Constitution as existed at the time the Constitution was adopted, "or as from time to time may be prescribed by law." This Court has held that the Attorney General is independent from other branches of government, including the judiciary. In re House of Representatives (Special Prosecutor), 575 A.2d 176, 179 (R.I.1990). Further, G.L. 1956 § 42-9-6 provides:
"Except as otherwise in the general laws provided, the attorney general, whenever requested, shall act as the legal advisor of the individual legislators of the general assembly, of all state boards, divisions, departments, and commissions and the officers thereof, of all commissioners appointed by the general assembly, of all the general officers of the state, and of the director of administration, in all matters pertaining to their official duties, and shall institute and prosecute, whenever necessary, all suits and proceedings which they may be authorized to commence, and shall appear for and defend the above-named individual legislators, boards, divisions, departments, commissions, commissioners, and officers, in all suits and proceedings which may be brought against them in their official capacity." (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, with respect to tort claims made against a state employee, § 9-31-8 provides that "upon a written request of an employee or former employee of the state," the Attorney General shall defend any action brought pursuant to the provisions of chapter 31 of title 9. (Emphasis added.) This mandate is not, however, absolute. In § 9-31-9, the General Assembly has recognized that the Attorney General's participation in a case may create a conflict of interest, the employee may refuse to cooperate in his or her defense, or it may simply not be in the best interest of the state for the Attorney General to defend the action. In the event that the Attorney General, in the exclusive exercise of his or her statutory authority, determines that it is not in the best interest of the state or the employee to undertake the...
To continue reading
Request your trial