Mottram v. State
Decision Date | 21 August 1967 |
Citation | 232 A.2d 809 |
Parties | Robert H. MOTTRAM v. STATE of Maine et al. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Casper Tevanian, Portland, for appellant.
John W. Benoit, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for appellee.
Julius B. Levine, Waterville, filed brief, Amicus Curiae.
Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and TAPLEY, MARDEN and DUFRESNE, JJ.
On appeal from the denial by a single Justice sitting in the Superior Court of Robert H. Mottram's petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was convicted of the crime of grand larceny at the September term of the Cumberland County Superior Court in 1960 and sentenced to State Prison. On November 15, 1963 he was released from the penal institution on parole granted by the State Probation and Parole Board (the Board). On January 21, 1965 the State Director of Probation and Parole issued a warrant for the arrest and return of Mottram to Maine State Prison upon proper written authority from a member of the Board. Arrested on February 12, 1965 and returned to prison, Mottram was given a hearing before the Board at the prison on February 26, 1965, and the Board determined that he had violated the terms and conditions of his parole and ordered the same revoked, fixing his new eligibility date for parole hearing and remanding him to the institution to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Petitioner claims that it was error for the single Justice to deny his petition for the writ of habeas corpus and argues in support of his contention that the Board's action in revoking his parole and remanding him to the prison for service of the unexpired portion of his sentence was illegal. He first challenges the Board's authority to act on the ground that the warrant of arrest was without seal and did not contain specific allegations of the claimed parole violation. He next contends that he was not accorded a hearing according to law, in that he was not given a formal list of charges of violation of parole prior to hearing, nor was he given the opportunity at the hearing to present witnesses on his behalf or to have counsel representation.
After dismissing the first point as being without merit, the single Justice made the following findings:
It was further candidly admitted by the State Director that a parolee accused of parole violation is not given a written list of the charges upon which the Board is expected to act in determining whether parole has been violated, but that usually he is advised orally at the time of his arrest of the reasons therefor; further that the hearing by the Board consists in a member of the Board reading the respective charges against the parolee and inquiring of him in each instance whether he is guilty of the conduct charged against him and whether in his opinion he believes that he has violated his parole. It has been the policy of the Board to give the parolee full opportunity to explain and excuse his conduct but the Board has not permitted at the institutional hearing witnesses on behalf of the parolee nor representation by counsel.
The issue arises by reason of the provisions of 34 M.R.S.A. § 1675 which reads as follows:
'Violation of parole.
When a parolee violates a condition of his parole or violates the law, a member of the board may authorize the director in writing to issue a warrant for his arrest. A probation-parole officer, or any other law enforcement officer within the State authorized to make arrests, may arrest the parolee on the warrant and return him to the institution from which he was paroled. At its next meeting at that institution, the board shall hold a hearing. The parolee is entitled to appear and be heard. If the board, after hearing, finds that the parolee has violated his parole or the law, it shall revoke his parole, set the length of time he shall serve of the unexpired portion of his sentence before he can again be eligible for hearing by the board, and remand him to the institution from which he was released; * * *
1. Forfeits deductions. Upon revocation of parole by the board the prisoner or inmate forfeites any deductions for good behavior earned while on parole.' (Emphasis supplied)
In final analysis, the issue is, what type of hearing did the Legislature have in mind in parole violation proceedings and what rights did it grant the parolee when it legislated that he is entitled to appear and be heard.
Initially, let us consider the status of the parolee while on parole. Although released from the institution where his sentence demanded his detention, the paroled prisoner remains under the custody of the warden or superintendent, and is serving the unexpired portion of his sentence, less deductions for good behavior, but is under the immediate supervision of and subject to the rules and regulations of the board or any special conditions of parole imposed by the board. 34 M.R.S.A. § 1671.
A parolee has no constitutional right to a hearing on revocation of parole, and such a revocation without notice and hearing does not constitute a denial of constitutional due process. Martin v. State Board of Parole, 1966, 350 Mass. 210, 213 N.E.2d 925; Jones v. Rivers, 4th Cir., 1964, 338 F.2d 862 at page 874; Curtis v. Bennett, 1964, 256 Iowa 1164, 131 N.W.2d 1; Ex parte Anderson, 191 Or. 409, 229 P.2d 633, 230 P.2d 770, 29 A.L.R.2d 1051 (Cf. Anno. at pages 1074 et seq.); Ex parte Tabor, 173 Kan. 686, 250 P.2d 793; Hyser v. Reed, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 318 F.2d 225 (1963).
Parole however is a legislative program of rehabilitation and restoration of persons convicted of crime to useful membership in society. The purpose of the law is to offer the institutionalized convict the opportunity to make good on his own outside the prison walls but under the immediate supervision of the probation-parole officer to whom the parolee must report and whose guidance he may seek at all times. It is the duty of the probation-parole officer not only to keep informed of the conduct and condition of each person placed under his supervision but he is directed to use suitable methods to encourage him to improve his conduct and condition. 34 M.R.S.A. § 1502(4). To the extent that the parolee must strictly observe all the conditions of his parole and remain within the area of permitted enlargement of the prison walls consistent with effective supervision, he is not a totally free man. The Legislature, in adopting the parole system and providing a rehabilitation program for prisoners undoubtedly took into consideration that at this level the prisoner's guilt had been established, presumably after full compliance with all the constitutional requirements of due process, and that in setting up the mechanics for parole revocation it could rest the same upon the absolute discretion of the Parole Board or it could circumscribe the retaking of a paroled prisoner by such procedural requirements as it deemed necessary in its own uncontrolled wisdom. In short, our lawmakers knew that parolees, if they violated their parole, were not entitled to the same procedural safeguards constitutionally necessary in the case of persons accused of crime.
As stated in State v. Fazzano, 1963, 96 R.I. 472, 194 A.2d 680, at page 684:
See also, commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Cain, (1942) 345 Pa. 581, 28 A.2d 897, 143 A.L.R. 1473; Hiatt v. Compagna, U.S.C.A., 5th Cir., (1949), 178 F.2d 42.
We agree with the great weight of judicial authority that the grant, revocation and reinstatement of parole are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parole Board subject to...
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