Stiftel v. Malarkey
| Decision Date | 28 December 1977 |
| Citation | 384 A.2d 9 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
| Parties | Albert J. STIFTEL, Andrew D. Christie, George R. Wright, Robert C. O'Hara, Vincent A. Bifferato, Clarence W. Taylor, Joseph T. Walsh, Claud L. Tease, William G. Bush, III, Bernard Balick and Joseph J. Longobardi, Plaintiffs below, Appellants, v. John E. MALARKEY, Donald Dryden, the State of Delaware and Mary Jornlin, Defendants below, Appellees. |
Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery.
Victor F. Battaglia of Biggs & Battaglia, Wilmington, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Regina M. Small, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for defendants-appellees.
Before TUNNELL, QUILLEN and STOREY, Justices Ad Litem. *
TUNNELL, Justice Ad Litem, for the majority:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Chancery, 1 denying plaintiffs, who are all our Superior Court judges, the injunctive and monetary relief they seek against the State. Plaintiffs claim that since June 30, 1975, under the provisions of Senate Bill No. 395, Senate Amendment No. 3 (), they have been and are entitled to certain cost of living upward adjustments to their salaries, corresponding with the percentage increases in the cost of living index maintained by the federal government for the Philadelphia region.
The operative provision of subsection (a) of that new section is in these words:
"All employees of the State shall be paid a salary supplement. . . ."
The threshold question, then, is whether plaintiffs are "employees" within the meaning of that statute. Subsection (c) of that same section, worded as it then was, defined the word "employee," for the purposes of that section, thus:
"(c) For purposes of this section, an 'employee' is defined as one who works the regularly scheduled full-time hours of the employing agency or at least 30 or more hours per week or 130 hours per month (with allowable interruptions) throughout the year and is compensated with a regular State pay check."
Plaintiffs, through their counsel, urge that this statutory definition includes them. A stipulation filed with the Register establishes that plaintiffs satisfy the stated work minimums, are paid by regular state pay checks and are not getting the supplements to which application of the formula would appear to entitle them. The State, however, through the Attorney General's office, contends that judges are excluded from these benefits because they are "public officers," not "employees." While one cannot be certain, in the absence of litigation, whether some persons are or are not "officers", the parties agree that plaintiffs are officers. Having considered the matter, we are compelled to conclude that while it is true that not all the State's employees are officers, yet, for the purposes of Section 1 of this statute at least, all its officers, including plaintiffs, are employees.
A statute can define its terms as the lawmakers see fit in order to make clear what is intended. Fox v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780 (1935); Mt. Pleasant Cab Company v. Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Board, 73 R.I. 7, 53 A.2d 485 (1947); Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Parr, 227 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1975); IBM v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 355 A.2d 236 (1974); and 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.), § 20.08, at 59 and § 27.02, at 310. This is no more than a basic principle of draftsmanship applicable to any form of writing.
Unlike the several cases cited by the State, in which the statute contained no definition at all, or where the meaning was delineated merely by saying that a certain word of broad meaning shall be read to "include" specific groups or concepts within its parameters, the statute here reviewed undertakes to "define" who is referred to as an "employee." The State urges that from general language usage, which it contends is clear and uniform, we should recognize that officers are a group distinct from employees, so that the statutory definition is meant, not to define, but merely to limit the scope of, the word "employee." Thus, the State, in effect, would supplement the statutory definition and emasculate the meaning of the word "defined" by asking us to read the statute as if these underlined words had been injected into it:
". . . an employee is defined as one who, being an employee, works . . .."
If we were to accept the State's interpretation of this definition, we should be forced to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the General Assembly's statement that it was defining "employee," it used circular language and in fact failed to define it at all. The statute seems to us to be clear, leaving no room for judicial interpretation.
In deference to those who press the contrary view, however, we now also examine those indicia which might be relevant if the legislation were ambiguous.
First, we look at the legislative history, to see whether the legislators were advised that "employees" did not or could not include officers. There we see that Secretary of Finance Malarkey, the draftsman of the Bill, drew it at the direction of the Governor's Task Force, which he chaired. After it was introduced in the General Assembly, he explained the bill and answered questions on the floor of each house about its meaning and effect, being the only person to do so. Nowhere does it appear that it was ever suggested that public officers were not included. Indeed, the opposite appears.
In the lower house, Mr. Malarkey was questioned by the members. He was asked, for example, what the total annual cost of the C.O.L.A. bill would be if the cost of living index were to rise 10% Within one year, and he answered. There was much discussion of the prospective costs. Mr. Dryden, the State's Budget Director at the time, testified at the trial below that he is the person who made, or supervised the making of, the calculations which were passed on to the Governor's Task Force and then to the General Assembly, estimating these costs, and that adjustments to all of the salaries of all the State's officers, 2 including the judiciary, were included in those calculations.
Representative Riddings had this exchange with the Secretary:
In the Senate the questioning of Mr. Malarkey was very extensive. Among the more pertinent passages are these exchanges with Senators Manning and Berndt:
In light of the stipulation mentioned above and this and other discussions, showing that division heads and cabinet secretaries including Mr. Malarkey himself were said to be within the coverage of the bill, and that legislators are excluded only by reason of the work requirements in the definition, there is no basis for a conclusion that the General Assembly intended to exclude any appointed officials who come within its definition. Even to attempt such an exercise in mind reading would accord less respect to the General Assembly than is its due.
Another indication of the meaning of "employees" appears in this very statute, though not in the section to which the statutory definition applies:
"Section 2(c) The pay plan for employees of the Judicial Branch other than the State Judiciary shall be increased by 8%." (Italics added).
And in 50 Del.L., c. 51, § 6, dealing with the Family Court, this language appears:
"Judges and all other employees of the Court are employees of the State . . . ." (Italics added).
At oral argument, counsel could think of no distinction pertinent to the status of employees and officers which would set judges of the Family Court apart from the judges of the Superior Court. Nor can we in that sense. If the judges of the Family Court are employees, it would appear that plaintiffs are equally so. See also the following Delaware statutes, in which the matter is variously dealt with: 29 Del.C § 6340(a), implicitly including public officers within "employees," for otherwise the Budget Director could not make up a complete State budget; 29 Del.C., Chapter 55, by definition including within the employee class all public officers other than judges, who were already covered by Chap. 56; 29 Del.C. § 5853, by definition including certain designated officers and excluding others from the scope of "employees"; and 29 Del.C. § 5701(1), a statute somewhat like the one here under review, in which "employee" is defined as including officers of the State and any...
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