de Moya v. de Pena
Decision Date | 22 January 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 62-616,62-616 |
Citation | 148 So.2d 735 |
Parties | Munuel Antonio de NOYA, Appellant, v. Athenia Leonard de PENA, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nestor Morales, Miami, for appellant.
Ammerman & Landy, Miami, for appellee.
Before HORTON, BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.
This is an interlocutory appeal in a paternity suit from an order denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, as amended, and denying defendant's motion to dissolve a restraining order issued against him.
In her complaint appellee alleged that she is a single woman and a resident of the State of Florida; that the appellant is the admitted father of her child who was born in Dade County, Florida, on October 29, 1960; that she is without funds to support or maintain her child; that the appellant is a resident of the Dominican Republic who is temporarily in the United States but has declared his intention to depart therefrom.
Wherefore, she prayed that the appellant be restrained from leaving the jurisdiction of the court conditioned upon his posting a bond; that appellant be declared the father of her child and that appellant be required to pay certain expenses and contribute to the support and maintenance of her child.
A restraining order was issued against appellant and he moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, as amended, and to dissolve the restraining order. At the hearing on the motion, the appellant stated that the child resided in the Dominican Republic and therefore the trial court was without jurisdiction of the cause. The appellee's attorney stated that the child was only temporarily in the Dominican Republic and would be returned to the state of Florida.
The chancellor denied both motions and appellant appeals from that order.
The basic question before us is whether the trial court had jurisdiction and thus correctly refused to dismiss the complaint.
Section 742.011, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., reads as follows:
'Any unmarried woman who shall be pregnant or delivered of a bastard child, may bring proceedings in the circuit court, in chancery, to determine the paternity of such child.'
Section 742.021, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., states:
Appellee's complaint conforms to the venue requirements in that she alleges that she is a resident of Dade County, Florida. Her complaint states that appellant is the father of her child and attached thereto are various documents, including a letter...
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...742.021, and 742.031, Florida Statutes (1973); Bishop v. State ex rel. Garnette, 136 Fla. 268, 186 So. 413 (1939); De Moya v. de Pena, 148 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Belin v. Sanchez, 101 So.2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). Where an individual affirmatively seeks to assume the responsibilities ......
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