Moyers v. City of Memphis

• Decision Date: 13 May 1916
• Citation: 186 S.W. 105,135 Tenn. 263
• Parties: MOYERS ET AL. v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

186 S.W. 105

135 Tenn. 263

MOYERS ET AL. v. CITY OF MEMPHIS.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 13, 1916

Appeal from Chancery Court, Shelby County; I. H. Peres, Special Chancellor.

Action by Ida M. Moyers and others against the city of Memphis submitted to the Chancery Court on an agreed state of facts under Shannon's Code, § 5206, without formal pleadings. From the decree for complainants, the city appeals. Affirmed.

Neuhardt & Anderson, of Memphis, and C. F. Consaul, of Washington, D C., for appellant.

C. M Bryan, of Memphis, for appellees.

SWIGGART Special Judge.

This case was submitted to the chancery court of Shelby county on an agreed state of facts, under section 5206 of Shannon's Code, and without any formal pleadings. This section is as follows:

"The same parties who are entitled to enter into an agreement of submission to arbitration, may, in like manner, with or without action brought, agree upon a case containing the facts upon which the controversy depends, and submit the same to the circuit or chancery court of the county in which either of the parties resides, or in which a suit might have been brought to determine such controversy."

The necessary affidavit that the controversy was real, and the proceedings in good faith, and the bond required under the following sections of the Code were made, so that the chancery court had jurisdiction of the controversy.

The chancellor decided in favor of complainants, and the city of Memphis has appealed from the decree to this court.

The only issue involved is whether section 4 of the Act of Congress of March 4, 1915 (38 Stat. 962), is a valid and constitutional enactment. This act was passed by the Congress of the United States appropriating the money and authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the claimants, whose names are set out in the act, the several sums appropriated therein; the claims provided for being divers and numerous "war claims," most of which had been adjudicated and allowed by the Court of Claims, at various times in the past. It is the statute which is often referred to as the "Omnibus Bill." Section 4 of this act is as follows:

"That no part of the amount of any item appropriated in this bill in excess of 20 per centum thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or agents, attorney or attorneys, on account of services rendered, or advances made in connection with said claim.

It shall be unlawful for any agent or agents, attorney or attorneys, to exact, collect, withhold or receive any sum which in the aggregate exceeds 20 per centum of the amount of any item appropriated in this bill on account of services rendered or advances made in connection with said claim, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $1,000.00."

By the signed agreement, upon which the case is submitted to the court, it appears that in December, 1876, the city of Memphis employed Gilbert Moyers, an attorney of Washington, D. C., to prosecute a certain claim against the United States for the occupation and use of certain real estate in Memphis, formerly known as part of the "Navy Yards," which property belonged to the city; that Gilbert Moyers, after several years' delay, succeeded in having this claim submitted to the Court of Claims for its adjudication, and soon thereafter died. Complainants are practicing attorneys of the city of Washington, being the daughter and sonin-law of Gilbert Moyers, and also administrators of his estate. After the death of Gilbert Moyers the city of Memphis employed complainants to continue the prosecution of this claim as attorneys for the city, and agreed with them that they should have 50 per cent. of the amount collected on this claim as their compensation or fee. Complainants took proof in the case, prepared and filed briefs, and argued the case before the Court of Claims, and finally obtained an adjudication in favor of the city for the sum of $21,192.88, in the year 1905. This judgment was certified by the Court of Claims to the Senate about December, 1905. No appropriation was made to pay this claim until the passage of the act of 1915, heretofore mentioned, when provision was made for its payment, along with many other claims of like character, by said act of Congress.

After this act was passed, and the money appropriated to pay the claim, in view of section 4 of the act quoted above, the complainants collected on their fee only 20 per cent. of the amount of the claim, and the city collected 80 per cent. thereof; that is, a treasury warrant was issued in favor of the city for $16,954.31, and another warrant was issued to complainants for $4,238.57, being 20 per cent., the amount provided for by the statute. Said latter warrant was accepted by complainants, with the express reservation of their right to demand payment of the full 50 per cent. of the claim, and without waiving their right to do so. The sum remaining unpaid on account of this fee originally agreed on between the parties is $6,357.86. The sole ground for refusing to pay this amount now claimed by complainants was the provision in said statute limiting the amount of the fees of attorneys to 20 per cent. of the claim. It is stated in the agreement of the parties:

"That if said enactment limiting counsel fees to 20 per centum of collection is valid, then complainants are entitled to take nothing by this suit; that if said enactment in its effect upon the rights of complainants herein is unconstitutional, then complainants are entitled to a decree in said sum of $6,357.86."

The claim in question was referred to the Court of Claims under the act of Congress of 1887 (Act March 3, 1887, c. 359, 24 Stat. 505), commonly called the "Tucker Act." It was further agreed by complainants, at the time they were employed to prosecute said claim, that they were to hold the city free from any claim against it by the estate of Gilbert Moyers, deceased, on account of any services rendered by him during his lifetime.

It is not claimed by the city that complainants did not perform the services which they undertook in a proper and successful manner; and no effort is made to defeat the claim now presented on the ground that the fee contracted for was excessive, or unreasonable, or extortionate. No such question is raised by the city.

The only question, therefore, is whether the city can lawfully pay, and the complainants lawfully receive, the additional 30 per cent. of said claim, under section 4 of the appropriation act heretofore quoted.

Complainants alleged that said act, attempting to limit counsel fees in the matter of claims included therein, so far as said limitation would operate to deny to them the fee agreed on, by contract, and whereunder their services had been fully rendered prior to said act, in a proper manner before said Court of Claims, is unconstitutional and void, as being in contravention of the terms of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that its provisions attempt to deprive complainants of their liberty to enforce a valid contract under which the consideration had passed from them to the other contracting parties, and also in that its provisions attempt to deprive them of their property rights without due process of law.

The latter part of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that:

No person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides:

"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764, the court, having under consideration the constitutionality of Act June 1, 1898, c. 370, 30 Stat. 424, concerning carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and their employés, said:

"The first inquiry is whether the part of the tenth section of the act of 1898, upon which the first count of indictment was based, is repugnant to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, declaring that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. In our opinion that section, in the particular mentioned, is an invasion of the personal liberty, as well as of the right of property, guaranteed by that amendment. Such liberty and right embraces the right to make contracts for the purchase of the labor of others and equally the right to make contracts for the sale of one's own labor; each right, however, being subject to the fundamental condition that no contract, whatever its subject-matter, can be sustained which the law, upon reasonable grounds, forbids as inconsistent with the public interests or as hurtful to the public order or as detrimental to the common good."

It was further said, by the court in that case, quoting from Cooley on Torts, p. 278, that:

"It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice. With his reasons neither the public nor third persons have any legal concern. It is also his right to have business relations with any one with whom he can make contracts, and if he is wrongfully deprived of this right by others he is entitled to redress."

The court cited Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937, 3...