Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis

• Decision Date: 24 March 1992
• Docket Number: Nos. C6-91-1441,C9-91-1515 and C0-91-1516,s. C6-91-1441
• Citation: 482 N.W.2d 806
• Parties: Thomas Joseph MROZKA, et al., Appellants (C6-91-1441), Respondents (C9-91-1515, C0-91-1516), v. ARCHDIOCESE OF ST. PAUL AND MINNEAPOLIS, Respondent (C6-91-1441, C0-91-1516), Appellant (C9-91-1515). The CHURCH OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION IN COLUMBIA HEIGHTS, MINNESOTA, et al., Defendants, and Diocese of Winona, defendant and third-party plaintiff, Respondent (C6-91-1441, C9-91-1515), Appellant (C0-91-1516), v. Thomas ADAMSON, third-party defendant, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 806

482 N.W.2d 806

60 USLW 2680

Thomas Joseph MROZKA, et al., Appellants (C6-91-1441), Respondents (C9-91-1515, C0-91-1516), v. ARCHDIOCESE OF ST. PAUL AND MINNEAPOLIS, Respondent

(C6-91-1441, C0-91-1516), Appellant (C9-91-1515).

The CHURCH OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION IN COLUMBIA HEIGHTS,

MINNESOTA, et al., Defendants, and Diocese of Winona, defendant and third-party plaintiff, Respondent (C6-91-1441, C9-91-1515), Appellant (C0-91-1516), v. Thomas ADAMSON, third-party defendant, Respondent.

Nos. C6-91-1441, C9-91-1515 and C0-91-1516.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

March 24, 1992.

Review Denied May 24, 1992.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Whether an award of punitive damages against a religious organization is contrary to the public policy of the state is a legislative determination.

2. An award of punitive damages against a religious organization does not violate the United States or Minnesota Constitutions.

3. An award of punitive damages is allowed where evidence supports a finding that religious organizations repeatedly placed a known child molester in positions of authority over children.

4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it remitted punitive damages awards to amounts it believed would punish and deter in light of other settlements and judgments, negative publicity, and nature of religious organizations' assets.

5. A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress by parents of sexual abuse victim was properly dismissed where distress was not sufficiently severe.

Jeffrey R. Anderson, Mark A. Wendorf, Susan Ford Bedor, Reinhardt and Anderson, St. Paul, for Thomas Joseph Mrozka, et al.

Andrew J. Eisenzimmer, Meier, Kennedy & Quinn, John R. Hoffman, Daniel A George F. Restovich, Bruce K. Piotrowski, Patterson-Restovich-Lund Law Offices, Ltd., Rochester, for Diocese of Winona.

Haws, Murnane, Conlin, White, Brandt & Hoffman, St. Paul, John D. French, Patrick J. Schiltz, Theresa H. Keninger, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, for Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis.

Theodore J. Collins, Collins, Buckley, Sauntry & Haugh, St. Paul, for Thomas Adamson.

Considered and decided by KALITOWSKI, P.J., and RANDALL and MULALLY ^*, JJ.

OPINION

KALITOWSKI, Judge.

Following a jury trial, a victim of child sexual abuse was awarded compensatory and punitive damages against religious organizations. The trial court remitted the punitive damages award and the victim appeals. The religious organizations challenge the punitive damages awards as contrary to state public policy and unconstitutional. The victim's parents challenge the trial court's dismissal of their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm.

FACTS

The Diocese of Winona first learned that Father Thomas Adamson had sexually abused a boy in 1964. The Diocese learned of other sexual misconduct in 1966, 1973, and 1974. Adamson's superiors typically responded to these incidents by reprimanding Adamson, suggesting or insisting that he seek counselling, and transferring him to another parish. In December 1974, Bishop Loras Watters received a number of phone calls from two men who accused Adamson of sexually abusing their brother since the early 1960's. One brother said that Adamson had also abused him, and threatened to expose Adamson if he was not immediately removed. When confronted with the allegations, Adamson admitted sexually abusing the youth for a period of ten years.

To avoid public disclosure and scandal, Bishop Watters removed Adamson and transferred him to the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis. Bishop Watters told Archbishop Roach that Adamson was receiving treatment, but he did not disclose the type of treatment or Adamson's sexual history. In the years that followed, Bishop Watters repeatedly denied Adamson's requests to return to the Diocese. Archbishop Roach, with Bishop Watters' approval, appointed Adamson associate pastor of St. Thomas Aquinas Church in January 1976, and head pastor of Immaculate Conception Church in June 1979. Adamson began abusing Thomas Mrozka shortly after his arrival at Immaculate Conception.

The Archdiocese first learned of sexual misconduct by Adamson in November 1980, when Adamson admitted to attempting to touch a parish boy. Although Archbishop Roach ordered Adamson to be psychologically evaluated, he allowed Adamson to return to his parish pending the evaluation. Adamson agreed to be monitored closely, cease all youth contact, and resign if his misconduct became known. In late December, Archbishop Roach instructed Adamson to resign amid concern that Adamson spent too much time with boys, including Mrozka, and threats by an abused boy's father to go to the police. Also, Bishop Watters had written Archbishop Roach that the latest incident was a "reoccurrence of a longstanding problem." Adamson underwent 19 days of inpatient treatment as a result of this incident. Although Adamson's doctor did not advocate him for a pastorate, both Diocese and Archdiocese officials testified that they understood Adamson could return to his priestly duties. Archbishop Roach appointed Adamson to an associate pastorship and instructed him to avoid youth contact and continue his therapy.

During the ensuing year, the Archdiocese learned that Adamson was having contact with youth, including Mrozka. The violations were, for the most part, ignored. In February 1983, the Archdiocese learned that police had investigated and dismissed charges against Adamson for alleged child sexual abuse. When Archbishop Roach confronted Adamson about violating their agreement, Adamson stated that he had misunderstood the agreement's terms. Roach allowed Adamson to return to his parish, reduced their agreement to writing, and warned that any future violation would result in his immediate removal. In July 1984, Archbishop Roach removed Adamson after Adamson admitted to having sexually abused a boy for a number of years while at St. Thomas Aquinas parish.

Mrozka sued the Archdiocese and Diocese (collectively, the "Church"), alleging that they negligently allowed Adamson to sexually abuse him when he was a minor. His parents sued the Archdiocese alleging, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Church admitted negligence. The jury awarded Mrozka $855,000 in compensatory damages and $2,700,000 in total punitive damages. The trial court remitted the punitive damages award to approximately $187,000.

Mrozka appeals the trial court's remittitur. His parents appeal the dismissal of their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on directed verdict. The Church challenges the award of punitive damages as being violative of state public policy, unconstitutional, and contrary to the evidence.

ISSUES

I. Does an award of punitive damages against a religious organization violate state public policy?

II. Is an award of punitive damages against a religious organization unconstitutional?

III. Was the award of punitive damages supported by the evidence?

IV. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting remittitur?

V. Did the trial court err when it granted a directed verdict on the parents' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress?

ANALYSIS

I.

The Church, relying on City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), argues that awarding punitive damages against a religious organization is contrary to public policy. In City of Newport, the U.S. Supreme Court held that punitive damages could be awarded against municipal employees, but not against the municipality itself. Id. 453 U.S. at 271, 101 S.Ct. at 2762. The Church contends that the same public policy considerations addressed in City of Newport, including the concern that the punishment is not a deterrent because it is inflicted on innocent persons rather than the wrongdoers, apply to religious organizations. See id. 453 U.S. at 266-70, 101 S.Ct. at 2759-61.

We find the municipal exception from punitive damages in City of Newport distinguishable from the Church's proposed exemption for religious organizations. In City of Newport the Court found it necessary to determine congressional intent because of its assumption that Congress would have specifically addressed municipal immunity if it meant to alter the longstanding common law rule exempting municipalities from punitive damages awards. Id. 453 U.S. at 263-66, 101 S.Ct. at 2758-59. Similarly, the Supreme Court also has looked to congressional intent in holding that punitive damages are not allowed in certain actions against labor unions because of the essentially remedial nature of the National Labor Relations Act. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2121, 2128, 60 L.Ed.2d 698 (1979).

Here, legislative intent is not at issue. There is no common law rule exempting religious or non-profit organizations from punitive damages awards. Punitive damages have been sought against non-profit corporations in Minnesota, although disallowed on other grounds. See, e.g., Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 297, 309-11 (Minn.1980); Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 440-42, 234 N.W.2d 775, 789-90 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902, 96 S.Ct. 1093, 47 L.Ed.2d 307 (1976). Furthermore, punitive damages have been allowed against religious organizations in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bredberg v. Long, 778 F.2d 1285, 1290 (8th Cir.1985); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or.App. 203, 251-53, 644 P.2d 577, 607-08 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 103 S.Ct. 1196, 75 L.Ed.2d 439 (1983).

If the legislature intended to exempt religious organizations from Minn.Stat. § 549.20 (1986), it could have specifically done so, as it did with municipalities in Minn.Stat. § 466.04, subd. 1(b) (1990). The public policy of the state is for the legislature to determine, not the court. Mattson v. Flynn, 216 Minn. 354, 363, 13 N.W.2d 11, 16 (1944). T...