Muckelroy v. Richardson Independent School Dist.
| Decision Date | 16 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-93-01809-CV,05-93-01809-CV |
| Citation | 884 S.W.2d 825 |
| Parties | 95 Ed. Law Rep. 435 Laura MUCKELROY, Appellant, v. RICHARDSON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Dr. Arzell Ball, and Jerry Miller, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Daniel R. Ortiz, Arlington, for appellant.
Robert E. Luna, Melinda D. Blackwell, Dallas, for appellees.
Before THOMAS, ROSENBERG and WHITTINGTON, JJ.
Laura Muckelroy sued Richardson Independent School District (RISD), Dr. Arzell Ball, Dr. Dan Lair, 1 and Jerry Miller for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress relating to the termination of her employment with RISD. The trial court granted summary judgment for RISD, Ball, and Miller. Muckelroy contends on appeal that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Laura Muckelroy worked for thirty years as a RISD teacher and administrator. In early 1988, RISD notified Muckelroy that it would soon consider her employment contract for renewal. On March 31, 1988, Muckelroy met with Ball, superintendent of RISD, Lair, executive director of staff personnel services at RISD, and Miller, area assistant superintendent of RISD, to discuss Muckelroy's employment contract.
At this meeting, Miller informed Muckelroy that he was going to recommend nonrenewal of Muckelroy's contract. Miller gave Muckelroy the option of resigning before he recommended nonrenewal. That day, Muckelroy submitted a letter of resignation expressing her intent to resign at the end of the 1988-1989 school year. Also on that day, Lair accepted Muckelroy's resignation on behalf of RISD. On February 24, 1989, Muckelroy wrote a letter to Ball requesting that she be allowed to revoke her letter of resignation. RISD denied Muckelroy's request.
Muckelroy appealed the district's decision to accept her resignation to the commissioner of education (the commissioner). In her petition for review, Muckelroy asserted that Lair did not have authority to accept her resignation. She further alleged that RISD officials coerced her into signing the letter of resignation and caused her to sign under duress. After a hearing at which both Muckelroy and RISD were represented by counsel, the commissioner found: (1) RISD could lawfully delegate the authority to accept resignations to Lair; (2) Muckelroy's resignation was properly accepted and could not be withdrawn after acceptance; and (3) Muckelroy was not coerced into tendering her resignation. Muckelroy appealed the commissioner's decision to the district court in Travis County. The district court affirmed the commissioner's decision by final judgment dated October 20, 1992. Muckelroy did not appeal the district court's final judgment.
In February 1991, while the action was pending before the commissioner, Muckelroy filed suit in the district court in Dallas County against RISD, alleging RISD breached its employment contract with her. The trial court abated the proceedings pending the outcome of the administrative proceeding. On November 12, 1992, 2 Muckelroy amended her original petition in the present action to add Ball, Lair, and Miller as defendants. She also added claims for tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 3
RISD, Ball, Lair, and Miller filed a joint motion for summary judgment. RISD moved for summary judgment on Muckelroy's contract claim based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. RISD moved for summary judgment on the tort claims on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The individual defendants moved for summary judgment on the contract claim based on res judicata, collateral estoppel, and official immunity, and on the tort claims based on statute of limitations grounds. The trial court granted a take-nothing summary judgment for appellees without specifying the legal basis for granting relief.
In her sole point of error, Muckelroy argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for appellees. Muckelroy's point of error contains eight subparts: (1) the statute of limitations does not bar Muckelroy's tort claims; (2) res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable; (3) official immunity does not protect Ball and Miller; (4) Muckelroy did not resign before she revoked her resignation; (5) RISD breached Muckelroy's employment contract by violating its own policies and procedures; (6) RISD is not immune from Muckelroy's breach-of-contract claim; (7) Muckelroy is entitled to recover attorney's fees on the contract claim; and (8) the commissioner of education lacked jurisdiction over Muckelroy's claims.
The function of a summary judgment is not to deprive a litigant of the right to a full hearing on the merits of any real issue but to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses. See Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952). In reviewing a summary-judgment record, this Court applies the following standards:
1. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. In deciding whether there is a disputed fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true.
3. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant, and any doubts are resolved in its favor.
Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). The purpose of the summary-judgment rule is not to provide either a trial by deposition or a trial by affidavit, but is to provide a method of summarily terminating a case when it clearly appears that only a question of law is involved and that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 626, 358 S.W.2d 557, 563 (1962). For the defendant, as movant, to prevail on a summary judgment, it must either disprove at least one element of the plaintiff's theory of recovery or plead and conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense, thereby rebutting the plaintiff's cause of action. International Union UAW Local 119 v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1991, writ denied). An issue is conclusively established if ordinary minds could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.1982).
A movant must expressly present the specific grounds for summary judgment in the summary judgment motion itself. McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.1993). Once a movant has established a right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present the trial court with evidence of any issues that would preclude summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979). A summary judgment for the defendant disposing of the entire case is only proper if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not succeed upon any theories pleaded. See Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex.1983) (per curiam).
When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. See Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1989).
Muckelroy first contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Ball and Miller on her tort claims on the basis of the statute of limitations. 4 See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986) (two-year limitations period).
Muckelroy acknowledges the two-year statute of limitations but argues that the discovery rule applies to her tort claims. She asserts that a fact issue exists about whether she, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, knew or should have known of Ball and Miller's wrongful conduct. Muckelroy argues she could not have discovered a cause of action against Ball and Miller until she appealed the commissioner's decision to the Travis County district court and took the depositions of Ball and Miller.
The two-year limitations period applies to tortious interference with contract claims. See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986); First Nat'l Bank v. Levine, 721 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex.1986). Likewise, the two-year statute applies to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986); Stevenson v. Koutzarov, 795 S.W.2d 313, 319 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (op. on reh'g).
For a suit to be timely under the two-year statute, it must be brought within two years after a cause of action accrues. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986). A cause of action accrues when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy. Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex.1977). The question of when a cause of action accrues is a question of law for the court. Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.1990).
The discovery rule provides an exception to the general rule of accrual. Moreno, 787 S.W.2d at 351; Robinson, 550 S.W.2d at 19. The discovery rule is a judicially constructed test used to determine when a plaintiff's cause of action accrues. Moreno, 787 S.W.2d at 351. When applied, the discovery rule tolls the running of the period of limitations until the time that the plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should discover the nature of her injury. Moreno, 787 S.W.2d at 351; Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex.1967).
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