Mucsi v. GRAOCH ASSOCIATES LTD. PARTNERSHIP

Decision Date27 September 2001
Docket NumberNo. 70153-9.,70153-9.
Citation31 P.3d 684,144 Wn.2d 847,144 Wash.2d 847
PartiesTibor MUCSI and Andre Kruppa, husband and wife, and their marital community, Petitioners, v. GRAOCH ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP # 12, a Washington corporation, dba Keeler's Corner Apartment Homes, Respondent.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Alan F. Hall, Edmonds, for Petitioners.

Barrett & Worden, PS, M. Colleen Barrett, Gregory S. Worden, Seattle, for Respondent.

CHAMBERS, J.

Tibor Mucsi seeks review of an unpublished Court of Appeals decision affirming dismissal of his negligence complaint against Graoch Associates Limited Partnership #11, the owner of an apartment complex in which Mucsi resided. Mucsi sued Graoch after he slipped and fell on ice outside the apartment complex clubhouse. Although the main entrance to the clubhouse had been cleared of accumulated ice and snow, the side exit used by Mucsi that day had not. At the close of evidence, Graoch moved the trial court to dismiss Mucsi's case. The trial court granted the motion based upon Mucsi's failure to present sufficient evidence that Graoch had breached its duty. Therefore, the issue before this Court is whether Mucsi presented sufficient evidence to establish the landowner breached its duty. We hold the evidence was sufficient and reverse and remand for a trial.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Keeler's Corner Apartment Homes is a large apartment complex in Snohomish County that is owned by Graoch Associates Limited Partnership #11. On Friday, January 26, 1996, the area experienced snowfall, which according to the manager of the apartment complex, was sufficient to close a local mall. Minor snowfall occurred on Saturday, as well.

On the afternoon of Sunday, January 29, 1996, Tibor Mucsi, his wife, sister and brother-in-law walked through the entrance of the Keeler's Corner clubhouse. At that time, Mucsi and his wife were tenants of Keeler's Corner and were taking their guests to the clubhouse to view the facility. Though it was snowing outside, Mucsi noticed there was no accumulated snow or ice on the sidewalk in front of the clubhouse entrance. After approximately 20 minutes, the group walked out of the clubhouse through a side exit rather than using the front door they had entered. Mucsi and his wife often used the clubhouse and were accustomed to using the side exit when leaving the facility. Both had seen others use the side exit, as well. There was no indication the side exit was to be used only for emergencies and no one had ever told Mucsi or his wife not to use the side exit. Before Mucsi opened the door, which was made of glass, he could see the area outside the side exit was covered with snow and ice. He had also seen footprints in the snow and noticed snow had been swept to the side by the door, indicating others had used the side exit in spite of the snow. The snow and ice had covered the ground in that area for at least three days. Although Mucsi's wife and their guests exited the clubhouse without incident, Mucsi slipped and fell, hitting his head on a wall and landing on his arm. Mucsi sustained injury to his neck and arm; he is an artist and claims serious injuries.

In June 1997, Mucsi filed a complaint for damages, contending the landowner negligently failed to make safe the side exit of the clubhouse. At trial, Patricia Bateman, the resident manager at Keeler's Corner, testified it was her and another's duty to see that ice was removed and the common areas made safe. She further testified by the afternoon of Mucsi's fall, the maintenance crew at Keeler's Corner had prioritized its efforts, focusing its snow removal efforts on main walkways. Snow and ice had been removed from only the sidewalks, the stairs and the front entrance of the clubhouse. There was no inspection or removal of snow from the side exit, despite sufficient time to do so. In fact, Bateman testified she had considered the side exits at the clubhouse to be emergency exits and, therefore, had no reason to expect tenants would use the exits. On the other hand, Mucsi introduced evidence that while one could not enter through the side doors, there was an exit sign over the side exit and tenants routinely used the exit. No effort was made to temporarily close the side exits pending snow removal. At the close of evidence, Graoch moved for judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted this motion, concluding Mucsi produced no evidence showing Graoch breached any duty of care owed to him. Specifically, the trial court stated:

So we come to whether or not, under the circumstances of this storm, and under the circumstances of how much clearing had been done, whether or not this ramp should have been cleared.

As I indicated before, it was an exit, it was not an entrance. And although people used it to leave, and apparently—well, on that particular day there were very few people coming into the place, let alone leaving, there is no indication that the defendant should have been on notice, given the fact that there was so much snow around and that so many sidewalks were cleared, and people couldn't be reasonably expected to be walking through the snow, when they had cleared sidewalks to go.
There being no indication that the defendant should have known that somebody was using that ramp, they were not put on notice that people were going to voluntarily expose themselves to that danger, and therefore did not breach their duty of care.[2]

Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Mucsi's complaint with prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed and we granted review.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the owner of an apartment complex, who had actual or constructive knowledge of accumulated snow and ice hazards in common areas, had a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries sustained by a tenant due to a slip and fall in a common area.

2. Whether a tenant's awareness of accumulated snow and ice in a common area necessarily precludes landowner liability.

3. Whether the record supports a reasonable inference that the landowner's duty was breached.

ANALYSIS
1. Landowner's Duty to Invitees

To establish negligence, a plaintiff must prove four basic elements: (1) the existence of a duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) resulting injury, and (4) proximate cause. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc., 129 Wash.2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728 (1996). The existence of legal duty is a question of law. Id.

The common law classification of persons entering upon real property determines the scope of the duty of care owed by the owner or occupier of that property. Degal, 129 Wash.2d at 49, 914 P.2d 728. A residential tenant is an invitee. McMann v. Benton County, Angeles Park Communities, Ltd., 88 Wash.App. 737, 741, 946 P.2d 1183 (1997). Here, Mucsi's invitee status is uncontested.

2. Landowner's Duty to Safely Maintain Premises

A landowner has an affirmative duty to maintain common areas in a reasonably safe condition. Iwai v. State, 129 Wash.2d 84, 91, 915 P.2d 1089 (1996). "The general rule in the United States is that where an owner divides his premises and rents certain parts to various tenants, while reserving other parts such as entrances and walkways for the common use of all tenants, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care and maintain these common areas in a safe condition." Geise v. Lee, 84 Wash.2d 866, 868, 529 P.2d 1054 (1975).

[A tenant] "`enters upon an implied representation or assurance that the land has been prepared and made ready and safe for his reception. He is therefore entitled to expect that the possessor will exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry, or for his use for the purposes of the invitation. He is entitled to expect such care not only in the original construction of the premises, and any activities of the possessor or his employees which may affect their condition, but also in inspection to discover their actual condition and any latent defects, followed by such repair, safeguards, or warning as may be reasonably necessary for his protection under the circumstances.'"

Degel, 129 Wash.2d at 53,914 P.2d 728 (emphasis added) (quoting Jarr v. Seeco Constr. Co., 35 Wash.App. 324, 327, 666 P.2d 392 (1983) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. b (1965))). Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a landowner is subject to liability for harm caused to his tenants by a condition on the land, if the landowner (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to tenants; (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it; and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect the tenant against danger. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965). "Reasonable care requires the landowner to inspect for dangerous conditions, `followed by such repair, safeguards, or warning as may be reasonably necessary for [a tenant's] protection under the circumstances.'" Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y, 124 Wash.2d 121, 139, 875 P.2d 621 (1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, cmt. b. (1965)).

3. Accumulated Snow and Ice in Common Areas

An accumulation of snow or ice is analyzed under the general rules of a landowner's duty to invitees. Maynard v. Sisters of Providence, 72 Wash.App. 878, 882, 866 P.2d 1272 (1994). This duty extends to the removal of snow and ice and is based upon the tenant's expectation that the premises have been made safe for the tenant's use. Degel, 129 Wash.2d at 53, 914 P.2d 728. Prior to 1975, however, this was not the case in the state of Washington.

a. Historical Overview: Massachusetts Rule vs. Connecticut Rule

In the 1975 decision of Geise, this Court addressed whether a landowner had a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing safe common areas, free from dangerous accumulations of snow and ice. 84 Wash.2d at 868...

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