Mudge v. Macomb County

• Decision Date: 05 May 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 140863
• Citation: 210 Mich.App. 436,534 N.W.2d 539
• Parties: Tanya J. MUDGE and Jonathon Brown, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MACOMB COUNTY, Macomb County Sheriff's Department, and William Hackel, Macomb County Sheriff, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 539

534 N.W.2d 539

210 Mich.App. 436

Tanya J. MUDGE and Jonathon Brown, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MACOMB COUNTY, Macomb County Sheriff's Department, and William Hackel, Macomb County Sheriff, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 140863.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 14, 1994, at Lansing.

Decided May 5, 1995, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication July 12, 1995.

Lawrence A. Baumgartner and James M. Hacker, Mount Clemens, for plaintiffs.

O'Leary, O'Leary, Jacobs, Mattson & Perry, P.C. by John P. Jacobs, Southfield, and George E. Brumbaugh, Mount Clemens, for defendants.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and REILLY and HOOD, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this putative class action lawsuit, plaintiffs, Tanya J. Mudge and Jonathon Brown, alleged that defendants, Macomb County, Macomb County Sheriff's Department, and William Hackel, the Macomb County Sheriff, violated the Prisoner Reimbursement to the County Act (PRCA), M.C.L. § 801.81 et seq.; M.S.A. § 28.1770(1) et seq., by obtaining and implementing ex parte orders seizing plaintiffs' bond monies for reimbursement of the expense of plaintiffs' incarceration in the Macomb County jail. Plaintiffs further alleged that they were entitled to monetary damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for defendants' violation of their federal civil rights. Defendants moved for summary disposition on various grounds. The trial court denied defendants' motion, but, on rehearing, granted the motion and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs appeal as of right.

I

The PRCA authorizes a county, in its discretion, to seek reimbursement for incarceration expenses of not more than $30 a day from jail prisoners by filing a civil action in either the district or the circuit court within six months of a prisoner's release from the county jail. M.C.L. §§ 801.83(1)(a), 801.87(1); M.S.A. §§ 28.1770(3)(1)(a), 28.1770(7)(1). ¹ Before exercising this authority, a county must investigate the financial status of the prisoner or former prisoner from whom reimbursement is sought and, to this end, the county must develop and use a form for determining the financial status of prisoners. M.C.L. § 801.83(1)(b), (2); M.S.A. § 28.1770(3)(1)(b), (2). Before entering any order on behalf of a county in an action against a prisoner or former prisoner for reimbursement, a court must take into consideration any legal or moral obligations of the defendant to support a spouse, minor children, or other dependents. M.C.L. § 801.87(3); M.S.A. § 28.1770(7)(3). Once the court determines that reimbursement is appropriate, it may enter a "money judgment" against the defendant and may order that the defendant's property is liable for reimbursement. M.C.L. § 801.87(4); M.S.A. § 28.1770(7)(4). Only when "necessary to protect the county's right to obtain reimbursement" may a county attorney "seek issuance of an ex parte restraining order to restrain the defendant from disposing of the property pending a hearing on an order to show cause why the particular property should not be applied to reimbursement." M.C.L. § 801.88(2); M.S.A. § 28.1770(8)(2). A prisoner's sentencing judge and the county sheriff must furnish all information and assistance possible to a county attorney seeking reimbursement. M.C.L. § 801.91; M.S.A. § 28.1770(11).

The Legislature's stated purpose in enacting the PRCA was "to provide certain powers and duties of county officials; and to provide for the reimbursement of certain expenses incurred by counties in regard to prisoners sentenced to county jail." 1984 P.A. 118. Because the statute was intended to protect the public from financial loss, it is an exercise of police power delegated to county officials. See People v. Murphy, 364 Mich. 363, 368, 110 N.W.2d 805 (1961). Municipal corporations derive all police power from legislative act. Const. 1963, art. 7, § 1; People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 41 N.W. 275 (1889). Accordingly, a municipal corporation can exercise only the police power that is granted to it in express terms, that is necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to those express powers, or that is indispensable to accomplish the objects and purposes of the corporation. Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984).

Here, defendants clearly acted ultra vires of the PRCA by (1) obtaining ex parte orders from plaintiffs' sentencing judge in their respective criminal cases instead of filing a separate civil action; (2) obtaining and implementing ex parte orders seizing plaintiffs' bond monies where there was no evidence that such ex parte orders were necessary; (3) failing to investigate plaintiffs' financial status before seeking reimbursement; ² and (4) seizing bond monies posted in plaintiffs' respective criminal cases without ascertaining whether such bond monies were in fact posted by plaintiffs or by others. ³

Because defendants failed to file a separate civil action as expressly required by the PRCA, plaintiffs were deprived of procedural due process of law, which at a minimum demands that a party be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); Ridenour v. Bay Co., 366 Mich. 225, 240, 114 N.W.2d 172 (1962). Absent the filing of a complaint and summons in accordance with the court rules, the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction was erroneous. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (finding that judge of state court of general jurisdiction did not exceed his jurisdiction in issuing ex parte order on same day as mother's informal presentation of affidavit requesting authorization to sterilize minor daughter).

Subject-matter jurisdiction is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over a class of cases, not the particular case before it. Joy v. Two-Bit Corp., 287 Mich. 244, 253-254, 283 N.W. 45 (1938); Altman v. Nelson, 197 Mich.App. 467, 472, 495 N.W.2d 826 (1992). The PRCA expressly confers on the circuit court subject-matter jurisdiction of cases brought under its provisions. M.C.L. § 801.88(1); M.S.A. § 28.1770(8)(1). Therefore, notwithstanding the absence of the filing of formal complaints and summonses, the circuit court was vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate these underlying matters brought pursuant to the PRCA. Stump, supra. Thus, the action taken by the circuit judge in entering the ex parte orders, although an erroneous exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, was not void. Bowie v. Arder, 441 Mich. 23, 56, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992); Altman, supra at 477, 495 N.W.2d 826. In light of defendants' ultra vires acts, resulting in plaintiffs being deprived of procedural due process of law, and the circuit court's erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, we exercise our authority pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(7) to vacate the circuit court's ex parte orders and to order defendant Macomb County to return the representative plaintiffs' bond monies and any money recovered as a result of collection actions, along with interest.

II

In their counterclaim, defendants assert that, even if the period of limitation had run under the PRCA, they are entitled to recoupment from plaintiffs via alternative setoff theories of indemnity, breach of contract, quantum meruit, suit for debt, or the PRCA. We disagree.

A county, as a political subdivision of the state, possesses only those powers delegated to it by constitution or statute. Const. 1963 art. 7, § 1; Wright v. Bartz, 339 Mich. 55, 62 N.W.2d 458 (1954). By statute, each county is required to maintain a jail at its own cost and expense. M.C.L. § 45.16; M.S.A. § 5.291. Before enactment of the PRCA, a county was liable for all expenses of safekeeping and maintaining inmates in its county jail, except medical care expenses for which it could seek reimbursement from the prisoner or the prisoner's insurer. M.C.L. §§ 801.4, 801.5a; M.S.A. §§ 28.1724, 28.1725(1). Concomitant with enactment of the PRCA, the Legislature amended M.C.L. § 801.5; M.S.A. § 28.1725, which authorized counties to acquire by contract or private donation all necessary supplies for maintenance of county jails, to include a provision reflecting the county's ability to seek reimbursement for all charges and expenses of incarceration from a prisoner pursuant to the PRCA. M.C.L. § 801.5(4); M.S.A. § 28.1725(4). Thus, it is apparent that the Legislature has not authorized a county to seek reimbursement from inmates via common-law remedies, such as breach of contract or quantum meruit. Accord People v. Krieger, 202 Mich.App. 245, 249, 507 N.W.2d 749 (1993); People v. Gonyo, 173 Mich.App. 716, 719, 434 N.W.2d 223 (1988). Moreover, a statute that creates a liability and provides a remedy specifically adapted to its enforcement impliedly excludes less appropriate common-law remedies. Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 553, n. 15; 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971). Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature intended the PRCA to constitute a county's exclusive remedy for seeking reimbursement of incarceration expenses from an inmate of that county's jail.

Because the ex parte orders in this case have been vacated, and because the statutory period for seeking reimbursement under the PRCA has lapsed with respect to the representative plaintiffs, defendants' opportunity to secure reimbursement (or recoupment by counterclaim) from these plaintiffs is lost.

III

Our finding that defendants acted ultra vires of the PRCA does not end the matter. Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleged that defendants had deprived them of their property without due process of law in violation of federal law, and they sought monetary damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of those federal rights. Thus, we must also address whether defendants' motion for summary disposition was granted properly with respect to these claims.

A. Violation of PRCA as...