Mueller v. Wells (In re Estate of Barnes)

• Decision Date: 28 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 91488–5.,91488–5.
• Citation: 185 Wash.2d 1,367 P.3d 580
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Matter of the Estate of Eva Johanna Rova Barnes, Deceased. Vicki Rova MUELLER, Karen Bow, Marsha Rova, and John Rova, Petitioners, v. Michelle WELLS and Dennis Wells, Respondents.

185 Wash.2d 1

367 P.3d 580

In the Matter of the Estate of Eva Johanna Rova Barnes, Deceased.Vicki Rova MUELLER, Karen Bow, Marsha Rova, and John Rova, Petitioners,

v.Michelle WELLS and Dennis Wells, Respondents.

No. 91488–5.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 28, 2016.

Howard Mark Goodfriend, Smith Goodfriend PS, Seattle, WA, Kevin Walter Cure, John Frank Mitchell, Sanchez Mitchell Eastman & Cure PSC, Bremerton, WA, for Petitioners.

Kenneth Wendell Masters, Masters Law Group PLLC, Bainbridge Island, WA, David P. Horton, Templeton Horton Weibel PLLC, Silverdale, WA, for Respondents.

Kevin Walter Cure, Sanchez, Mitchell, Eastman & Cure, PSC, Bremerton, WA, for Other Parties.

YU, J.

¶ 1 This case involves a will contest and whether the will proponents presented sufficient evidence to rebut a presumption of undue influence. The trial court invalidated the will at issue, finding that it was the product of undue influence. The trial court's factual findings were not challenged on appeal, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court failed to make findings of direct evidence to support its conclusion of undue influence, relying solely on the presumption of undue influence to invalidate the will.

¶ 2 The proper inquiry here is whether the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact support its conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals erred by reweighing evidence that sufficiently supported the trial court's conclusions. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment invalidating the will as a product of undue influence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 The following summary of facts is based on the trial court's extensive and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1162–89. Eva Johanna Rova Barnes was born on July 17, 1916, in Bellingham, Washington. She died at her home in Poulsbo, Washington, on June 27, 2011, just a few weeks before her 95th birthday. Barnes' will was admitted to probate on July 1, 2011. Respondent Michelle Wells was appointed personal representative with nonintervention powers but was later removed by the court and replaced by her husband, Dennis Wells. Barnes' estate includes an acreage of land located on Rova Road that was homesteaded by her parents. The property contains her residence and a rental property in which the petitioners (the Rovas)¹ shared a one-half interest. Barnes' probated will completely disinherited the Rovas in favor of Wells and her husband. Wells became acquainted with Barnes as Barnes' rural mail carrier, and the two became friends after Barnes' husband and daughter passed away. After Barnes suffered a fall in her home, Wells became her caretaker.

¶ 4 The Rovas challenged the validity of Barnes' will for lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by Wells. After a five-day bench trial, the trial court issued 83 findings of fact and 23 conclusions of law, finding that while Barnes had testamentary capacity when she executed the will in contest, the will was invalid as a result of Wells' undue influence. The trial court found that Barnes' increasing dependence on Wells coincided with Barnes' estrangement from her family and that Wells made numerous false statements that "fanned the flame" of Barnes' unfounded anger and mistrust of the Rovas. Id. at 1180–81 (Finding of Fact (FF) 73). Wells became the only person close to Barnes on a consistent basis, eventually replacing Barnes' niece as her attorney-in-fact and assuming the role of caretaker after Barnes fell in her home. Isolated from her family and friends, physically and mentally impaired,² and totally dependent on Wells, it is indisputable that Barnes was highly vulnerable to undue influence.³

¶ 5 Throughout her relationship with Barnes, Wells and her husband were struggling financially.⁴ After Wells became more involved in her life, Barnes began writing checks to Wells and Wells' family members for various services and expenses. Just days before Barnes passed away, Wells paid her own mortgage with a check issued from Barnes' personal bank account. Barnes was in or close to being in a coma when Wells wrote this check. The check posted on the same day that Barnes passed away.

¶ 6 On appeal, Wells did not challenge the trial court's findings of fact but assigned error to the conclusions that the Rovas had established a presumption of undue influence that Wells failed to rebut, and that Barnes' will was invalid because it was a product of Wells' undue influence. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that Wells had sufficiently rebutted the presumption of undue influence.

In re Estate of Barnes, noted at 186 Wash.App. 1004, 2015 WL 786791, at *5, review granted, 183 Wash.2d 1025, 355 P.3d 1154 (2015). The Court of Appeals also found that the trial court did not make any findings of fact of " ‘positive evidence,’ " but had "wholly relied on the presumption" to find that there was undue influence sufficient to invalidate the will. 2015 WL 786791, at *5.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 When reviewing a will contest, the appellate court's function is to determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. In re Estate of Kleinlein, 59 Wash.2d 111, 113, 366 P.2d 186 (1961) ; see also Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wash.2d 570, 575, 343 P.2d 183 (1959). We defer to the trial court's determinations of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Kleinlein, 59 Wash.2d at 113, 366 P.2d 186. Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. In re Estate of Haviland, 162 Wash.App. 548, 563, 255 P.3d 854 (2011) (citing State v. Hill, 123 Wash.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994) ).

¶ 8 The trial court's extensive findings of fact in this case are not disputed. Thus, the only question is if the unchallenged facts support the trial court's conclusions of law. Whether the facts rise to the level of undue influence that is sufficient to invalidate a will is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 The right to testamentary disposition of one's property is a fundamental right protected by law. Dean v. Jordan, 194 Wash. 661, 668, 79 P.2d 331 (1938). A will that is executed according to all legal formalities is presumed valid. RCW 11.24.030. Nevertheless, a will executed by a person with testamentary capacity may be invalidated if "undue influence" existed at the time of the testamentary act.

In re Estate of Lint, 135 Wash.2d 518, 535, 957 P.2d 755 (1998) (citing Dean, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P.2d 331 ). "Undue influence" that is sufficient to void a will must be " something more than mere influence but, rather, influence ‘which, at the time of the testamentary act, controlled the volition of the testator, interfered with his free will, and prevented an exercise of his judgment and choice.’ " Id. (quoting In re Estate of Bottger, 14 Wash.2d 676, 700, 129 P.2d 518 (1942) ).

¶ 10 The applicable legal framework for determining whether a will is the result of undue influence was established in our seminal case Dean, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P.2d 331. For nearly eight decades, Dean has remained the governing case on undue influence, and it continues to be controlling precedent. The present case does not require us to disturb settled law. The trial court properly invalidated the will in contest for undue influence under the Dean framework.

A. Establishing the Presumption of Undue Influence

¶ 11 When challenging the validity of a will, the will contestant bears the burden of proving the will's illegality by "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence.⁵ Dean, 194 Wash. at 669, 671, 79 P.2d 331. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish suspicious facts that raise a presumption of undue influence. In re Estate of Martinson, 29 Wash.2d 912, 914–15, 190 P.2d 96 (1948). If the presumption is raised, the will proponent must produce evidence to rebut the presumption. Dean, 194 Wash. at 672, 79 P.2d 331. The absence of rebuttal evidence may be sufficient to set aside a will, but the contestant retains the ultimate burden of proof. Id.

¶ 12 The court in Dean identified certain suspicious facts and circumstances that could raise a presumption of undue influence:

The most important of such facts are (1) that the beneficiary occupied a fiduciary or confidential relation to the testator; (2) that the beneficiary actively participated in the preparation or procurement of the will; and (3) that the beneficiary received an unusually or unnaturally large part of the estate. Added to these may be other considerations, such as the age or condition of health and mental vigor of the testator, the nature or degree of relationship between the testator and the beneficiary, the opportunity for exerting an undue influence, and the naturalness or unnaturalness of the will.

Id. Whether the existence of the so-called Dean factors raises a presumption of undue influence is a highly fact-specific determination that requires careful scrutiny of the totality of the circumstances. Id.

¶ 13 The trial court properly held that the facts raised a presumption of undue influence based on the presence of all the Dean factors and other considerations. We reaffirm the Dean factors and find that the undisputed facts in this case substantially support the trial court's conclusion of undue influence.

1. Opportunity—existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship

¶ 14 The first Dean factor establishes that a confidential or fiduciary relationship may give rise to a presumption of undue influence. The crux of these relationships is a level of trust that leads the testator to believe that the beneficiary is acting in his or her best interests, creating an opportunity for the beneficiary to exert undue influence. Kitsap Bank v. Denley, 177 Wash.App. 559, 571, 312 P.3d 711 (2013).

¶ 15 The trial court's findings of fact were sufficient to meet this Dean factor. A fiduciary relationship inheres in...