Muhammad Ali v. Connally
| Decision Date | 28 April 1967 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 67-H-333. |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD ALI et al. v. John B. CONNALLY, Governor of Texas et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Hayden C. Covington, New York City, and Quinnan H. Hodges, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs.
Fred Drogula, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Washington, D. C.
Morton L. Susman, U. S. Atty., Carl Walker, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for all Federal defendants.
Crawford Martin, Atty. Gen. of Texas and Hawthorne Phillips, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Texas, Austin, Tex., for all defendants other than Federal.
Memorandum and Order of Dismissal:
I
In connection with the Plaintiff's Petition for Injunctive Relief against the Defendants in this case, it is fundamental that the Selective Service Act Title 50, Section 451 et seq. is and has been adjudicated constitutional and finds its basis in the emergency and war powers of Congress. It is also axiomatic as demonstrated by numerous Supreme Court decisions on the subject, that the scope of the Act does not provide for judicial review in the ordinary sense. The Orders of the Selective Service Board, after having run the gamut of statutorily authorized examination and re-examination, must be deemed final although they may be erroneous. The Act does not provide for or authorize injunctive relief against the final order of the authorized and duly constituted Selective Service Board. Feldman v. Local Board No. 22, D.C., 239 F.Supp. 102; Watkins v. Rupert, 2 Cir., 224 F.2d 47, 48. The legal remedy for any wrongful action by the Board is not pre-induction injunctive order. The remedy provided for any allegedly aggrieved selectee can arise only after the final step toward military induction. This means simply that the selectee if he refuses the final step toward military induction must face the criminal sanctions and prosecution authorized by law therefor and his remedy lies in whatever defense he claims as against the action of the Selective Service Board. The second remedy available to the selectee is that of habeas corpus in the event that he does take the final step toward military induction while reserving the claim that the actions of the responsible administrative authorities are illegal, unconstitutional and void.
The foregoing principles are illustrated in and established by the following authorities: Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed. 132; Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 64 S.Ct. 346, 88 L.Ed. 305; Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 543, 64 S.Ct. 737, 88 L.Ed. 917; Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 115, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567; Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 377, 75 S.Ct. 392, 99 L.Ed. 428.
II.
It is to be noted in this particular case that the essential legal contentions brought forth here in behalf of the Petitioner Muhammad Ali are substantially and in legal contemplation the same as those advanced before the United States District Court in Kentucky. The claim for relief in the latter Court was rejected, and the ruling of said district court was affirmed alike by the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in Cincinnati and finally by the United States Supreme Court. On the basis of the record brought forth to date, this is and must constitute a finding of fact. In light of the absence of jurisdiction by this Court to judicially review the final order of the Selective Service Board or Boards by way of the extra-ordinary remedy which the Petitioner Muhammad Ali here advances, the decision of the United States Supreme Court affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit and that of the United States District Court in Kentucky must be deemed res adjudicata and conclusive for the purposes of the issues that were therein litigated either expressly or by necessary implication.
Constitutional issues should not be considered and determined unless and until they are directly and inescapably presented.
In respect to the Texas administrative agencies and governmental authorities, this is not an issue which is either relevant or ripe for disposition. The classification of Petitioner Muhammad Ali was made and finalized in Kentucky and pursuant to the full federal judicial review granted said classification.
Nor does this Court feel at liberty to review the constitutionality of the Kentucky Selective Service System and its application in this case in light of the full federal judicial review granted to its selective service classification of Petitioner Muhammad Ali.
III.
Instant case does, however, contain the unusual feature of Petitioner Muhammad Ali's eleventh hour transfer of legal residence from Kentucky to Texas. His reasons for this are his own; they are indeed open to conjecture but are not matters of necessary inquiry here. What may still be open to inquiry is whether he has received proper and legal consideration of his now strongly urged claim for ministerial exemption from military service.
The limits to this inquiry here and now are necessarily controlled by the emergency federal statute under which this Court has accepted jurisdiction and the extensive administro-judicial consideration heretofore extended to Petitioner Muhammad Ali.
The Court must presume, in light of the history of this case, that the now urged claim of ministerial exemption was either raised before and rejected by the Kentucky State agency or waived by Petitioner at the critical stages of that or those state proceedings.
The Court must equally presume that the jurisdiction that attached to person and subject matter incident to the administro-judicial proceedings timely arising out of Kentucky was not destroyed by the subsequent transfer of state residency. The presumption likewise obtains that the transferee Selective Service Board in Texas is bound under general considerations of full faith and credit to the final state agency determination in Kentucky as sanctioned and affirmed by the federal judicial review to which it was subjected.
IV.
The criteria that govern the ministerial exemption from military service are succinctly stated in the 5th Circuit case of Wood v. United States (March 3, 1967) 373 F.2d 894, wherein Circuit Judge Brown spoke for a unanimous Court:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Simmons v. United States
...2 Cir., 1966, 369 F.2d 359, 360 (per curiam). See also United States v. Henderson, 7 Cir., 1950, 180 F. 2d 711; Muhammad Ali v. Connally, S.D. Tex., 1967, 266 F.Supp. 345. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 38 S.Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed. 349 (1918); United States v. Bolton, 2 Cir., 1951, 192......
-
Clay v. United States
...step toward military induction while claiming that his induction was illegal, unconstitutional and void. Muhammad Ali v. Connally, D.C., S.D.Tex., April 28, 1967, 266 F.Supp. 345. The registrant appealed from the District Court decision. He also filed application to stay and for interim inj......
-
Steiner v. OFFICER IN COMMAND, AFE & I. CTR., HOUSTON, TEX.
...legal or equitable intervention now. See: Moskowitz v. Kindt, 3 Cir., 394 F.2d 648, citing this Court's opinion in Muhammad Ali v. Connally, 266 F. Supp. 345 (1967). Petitioner additionally challenges the validity of his order of induction on the grounds that the local board was improperly ......
-
Kolden v. SELECTIVE SERV. LOCAL BD. NO. 4, BELTRAMI CO., MINN.
...F.Supp. 660 (N.D. Ga.1967); Moskowitz v. Kindt, 273 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.Pa.1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1968); Muhammed Ali v. Connally, 266 F.Supp. 345 (S.D.Texas 1967); United States v. Lybrand, 279 F.Supp. 74 Thus, we hold simply that appellant does not fall within the statutory-exe......