Muhammad v. Casino

• Decision Date: 28 September 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. CIV–09–968–D.
• Citation: 742 F.Supp.2d 1268
• Parties: Veronica MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff,v.COMANCHE NATION CASINO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

742 F.Supp.2d 1268

Veronica MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff,

v.COMANCHE NATION CASINO, Defendant.

Case No. CIV–09–968–D.

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

Sept. 28, 2010.

Jeremy D. Looper, Jason B. Reynolds, Griffin Reynolds & Associates, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff.James M. Burson, William R. Norman, Jr., Klint A. Cowan, Hobbs Straus Dean & Walker LLP, Oklahoma City, OK, James G. Wilcoxen, Wilcoxen & Wilcoxen, Muskogee, OK, for Defendant.

ORDER

TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI, District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Veronica Muhammad's Motion to Remand to State Court [Doc. No. 11].¹ Defendant Comanche Nation Casino, which is a business enterprise of the Comanche Nation, has responded in opposition to the Motion and filed a supplemental brief, to which Plaintiff has replied. Also, Defendant recently filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority regarding a judgment favorable to its position obtained by the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and the Chickasaw Nation. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, Case No. CIV–10–50–W, Order, 2010 WL 2802159 (W.D.Okla. June 22, 2010). Plaintiff's Motion is thus at issue.

Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action in the District Court of Comanche County, Oklahoma, on July 24, 2009, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when she slipped and fell on Defendant's business premises. Her state court pleading alleged that the casino was owned and maintained by the Comanche Nation, which “is a tribal entity registered in the State of Oklahoma under the Compact so that this [state] court has jurisdiction over the persons and subject matter.” See Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 [Doc. No. 1–1], Petition, ¶ 2. The referenced compact is the Tribal Gaming Compact Between the Comanche Nation and the State of Oklahoma. See id., Ex. 3 [Doc. No. 1–3]. Plaintiff based her jurisdictional allegations on recent decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court holding that state district courts have jurisdiction over similar tort actions. See Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enter., LLC, 212 P.3d 447 (Okla.2009); see also Griffith v. Choctaw Casino, 230 P.3d 488 (Okla.2009); Dye v. Choctaw Casino, 230 P.3d 507 (Okla.2009).

Defendant removed the case to this Court by invoking “28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 and 1446.” See Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 1] at 1. Explaining the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331 and the propriety of removal under § 1441(b), Defendant identified the following “federal question” raised by Plaintiff's action: “whether the State court has jurisdiction over a tort action arising in Indian country against the Nation.” See id. (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 217–18, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959)); see also id. ¶¶ 8, 18. Defendant stated that this issue is controlled by federal law, particularly the following sources: the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which divests states of authority over Indian tribes, see Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Oklahoma's Enabling Act, which conditioned statehood on a disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian tribes and tribal land, see Act of June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. 267–78; ² federal legislation commonly known as Public Law 280, which established prerequisites to a state's acquisition of jurisdiction over civil actions against Indians arising in Indian country, see 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25 U.S.C. § 1321– 26; 28 U.S.C. § 1360; ³ and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2701– 21, which authorizes states to acquire limited civil jurisdiction over Indian country through a tribal-state compact that authorizes such jurisdiction as necessary to enforce laws “that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of [gaming] activity.” See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i). Defendant contended both that IGRA does not authorize a state to acquire jurisdiction of tort actions against a tribe and that the Compact at issue in this case does not authorize state courts to exercise such jurisdiction. This last argument, although contrary to the above-cited decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, was supported in the Notice of Removal by affidavits of Governor Brad Henry and State Treasurer Scott Meacham, who negotiated and approved the Compact on behalf of the state. See Notice of Removal, Exs. 7–8 [Doc. Nos. 1–7 and 1–8].

Defendant also asserted that removal was appropriate under § 1441(b) based on the doctrine of complete preemption. Defendant supported this assertion with two contentions: first, that “the Indian Commerce Clause, Public Law 280, and federal common law completely preempt determination of the State's acquisition of civil jurisdiction over Indian country,” see id. ¶ 19 (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661, 677, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974)); and second, that IGRA completely preempts Plaintiff's state tort action because such an action would subject the tribe to state court jurisdiction without its consent, in violation of the Compact, and would interfere with the tribe's governance of its gaming facilities in violation of IGRA and the Compact.

Plaintiff seeks a remand of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). She asserts that, contrary to Defendant's allegations in the Notice of Removal, this civil action does not arise under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and is not removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Specifically, Plaintiff contends her state court petition presents no substantial federal question but only a question regarding the Compact “as created by the State of Oklahoma and codified in its statutes.” See Pl.'s Mot. Remand [Doc. No. 11] at 7; see also Okla. Stat. tit. 3A, § 281. Without expressly so stating, Plaintiff relies on the familiar principle that a federal claim must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint to establish federal jurisdiction. She contends her pleading asserts only a state law tort claim, not a claim arising under federal law, and that the doctrine of complete preemption is inapplicable under the circumstances. Plaintiff concedes that her tort claim implicates IGRA, specifically, 25 U.S.C. § 2710. See Pl.'s Mot. Remand [Doc. No. 11] at 8, 14. She argues, however, that IGRA authorizes states to acquire civil jurisdiction pursuant to a valid state-tribal gaming compact and that the Compact at issue has this effect. In her view, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has finally decided the IGRA and compact-interpretation issues, and “federal district courts do not have the authority to review matters that have been decided by the state courts.” See Pl.'s Mot. Remand [Doc. No. 11] at 9 (quoting Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923)).⁴

Standard of Decision

Defendant, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing the existence of original subject matter jurisdiction. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir.2001); see also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir.1995). The jurisdictional statute invoked by Defendant, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, authorizes federal district courts to hear civil actions “arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” The removal statute cited by Defendant, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, authorizes a state court defendant to remove a case “when a federal court would have had jurisdiction if the case had been filed there originally.” See Topeka Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir.2005); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987).

To establish federal-question jurisdiction, the federal question giving rise to jurisdiction must be “presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425; see also Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830, 122 S.Ct. 1889, 153 L.Ed.2d 13 (2002); Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Corp., 440 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.2006). Under this “well-pleaded complaint” rule, a suit “arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based on federal law.” Turgeau v. Administrative Review Board, 446 F.3d 1052, 1060 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation omitted). “The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425. However, “ ‘a plaintiff may not defeat removal by failing to plead federal questions that are essential elements of his claim.’ ” Turgeau, 446 F.3d at 1060–61 (quoting Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir.1996)); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983).

“A case ‘aris[es] under’ federal law within the meaning of § 1331 ..., if ‘a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.’ ” Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 689–90, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27–28, 103 S.Ct. 2841); Nicodemus, 440 F.3d at 1232. The decision to provide a federal forum for resolving significant federal issues embedded in state-law claims rests on policy considerations that have prevented the Supreme Court “from stating a single, precise, all-embracing test.” See Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005) (internal quotation omitted). However, the Supreme Court has provided the following guidance:

[W]e [have not] treated “federal issue” as a password opening federal courts to any state action embracing a point of federal law. Instead, the...