Muhammad v. Entzel
| Decision Date | 14 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-1343-SLD |
| Parties | KABA SHABAZZ MUHAMMAD, Petitioner, v. FREDERICK ENTZEL, Warden Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Before the Court is Petitioner Kaba Shabazz Muhammad's (f/k/a Taurus Zambrella) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). Muhammad seeks to pursue two challenges under § 2241 pursuant to the 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) savings clause: (1) he argues that he is actually innocent of his convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019); and (2) he argues that, in light of Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), he was erroneously sentenced as an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because his Mississippi burglary conviction was improperly used as a predicate offense. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DISMISSES IN PART Muhammad's Petition: Muhammad's Rehaif claim is dismissed, but the Court finds he is entitled to relief on his Mathis claim. Accordingly, Muhammad's criminal sentence is VACATED pending resentencing in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.
In November 2000, in United States v. Zambrella, 00-cr-197 (N.D. Ind.), a grand jury sitting in the Northern District of Indiana returned a multi-count indictment charging Muhammad with multiple firearms related offenses. A jury convicted Muhammad of two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Counts Two and Three), and one count of theft of firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) (Count Five). The sentencing court imposed an aggregate sentence of 293 months in prison, consisting of concurrent sentences of 293 months on each of Counts Two and Three and 120 months on Count Five.
The sentencing court found that Muhammad was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which increased his statutory imprisonment range from zero to ten years to fifteen years to life on his § 922(g)(1) convictions. Muhammad's armed career criminal status was based on his prior Illinois convictions for robbery (1978) and delivery of cocaine (1990), and prior Mississippi conviction under the state's simple burglary statute (1990). At sentencing, Muhammad argued that he was not an armed career criminal because his Illinois drug trafficking conviction was actually for simple possession of cocaine, not delivery. Upon examining certified state court documents, the sentencing court overruled Muhammad's objection and found he was an armed career criminal. Muhammad's final judgment was entered on February 14, 2002.
On direct appeal Muhammad raised two issues: (i) whether the sentencing court erred in denying his request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 328 U.S. 154 (1978); and (ii) whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the sentencing hearing in order to permit him to obtain additional documents relating to his Illinoisdrug trafficking conviction. Zambrella v. United States, 327 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. Id.
Muhammad timely filed his first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 2004. See Order Denying 2255 Motion, United States v. Zambrella, No. 2:00 CR 197 (N.D. Ind. Jul. 12, 2005); Order Denying Petitioner's Supplement to 2255 Motion, Zambrella, No. 2:00 CR 197, 2005 WL 2990504, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 8, 2005). Notably, Muhammad argued that he was improperly designated an armed career criminal because his burglary conviction did not qualify as "generic burglary" as that term is used in the ACCA and defined by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). "[Muhammad's] § 2255 motion focus[ed] almost solely on his belief that the [sentencing] court disregarded the holding of Taylor when it relied on the presentence report to determine that his burglary under Mississippi law was generic burglary meeting the ACCA definition." The problem with Muhammad's argument, the sentencing court said, was that, "first, it could have been raised on his direct appeal and so has been procedurally defaulted." Second, the court added, "it is . . . essentially an Apprendi/Blakely/Booker claim, and as noted [earlier in the same order], the rule from those decisions is not retroactively available on collateral attack." The sentencing court recognized that the state statute, Miss. Stat. Ann. § 97-17-13, was broader than generic burglary. However, because the charging indictment showed that Muhammad burgled a building, he could not show prejudice from his attorney's failure to object to the use of the facts in the PSR.
In Muhammad's supplemental briefing, as summarized by the district court, he argued that:
he is actually innocent (both legally and factually) of being an armed career criminal because at his sentencing, the Mississippi indictment was not put into evidence. In addition, he pleaded guilty in Mississippi to a charge of burglary, not to the indictment, and an "indictment can say many thing's in the underlying(Which) mostly come's from police reports." August 15, 2005 supplemental memorandum at 2[sic]. He reiterates that his attorney was ineffective at sentencing, and on direct appeal, for not making this argument.
Zambrella, 2005 WL 2990504, at *1. The district court denied this claim, finding that:
whether or not it is true that indictments can say anything, he pleaded guilty to one stating that he had burglarized a pawn shop, and Shepard specifically allows a court to rely on the facts alleged in an indictment to make a finding as to generic burglary. [Muhammad's] attorney was not ineffective for failing to pursue this issue at sentencing because, at the time (and which still may be true now) the law in this circuit allowed the court to rely on the uncontested facts in the PSR, which, in this case, summarized the facts from the Mississippi indictment.
Id. Muhammad appealed the denial of his § 2255 motion and the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the required docketing fee. Respondent's brief also summarizes Muhammad's other unsuccessful collateral attacks on his sentence and conviction.
On October 28, 2019, Muhammad filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). He raises two claims: First, he argues that he is actually innocent of his convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Second, he argues that, in light of Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), he was erroneously sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because his Mississippi burglary conviction was improperly used as a predicate offense. In Respondent's response (Doc. 6), he argues that Muhammad's Rehaif claim cannot proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Additionally, while Respondent concedes that Muhammad should not have been sentenced as an armed career criminal, Respondent argues that Muhammad is not entitled to relief because his claim was not previously foreclosed at the time of his direct appeal and initial § 2255 motion. While the Court agrees with Respondent and finds that Seventh Circuit precedent now forecloses Muhammad's Rehaif claim, the Court finds that Muhammad is entitledto relief on his Mathis claim and entitled to be resentenced without the armed career criminal enhancement.
Generally, federal prisoners who seek to collaterally attack their conviction or sentence must proceed by way of motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the so-called "federal prisoner's substitute for habeas corpus." Camacho v. English, 872 F.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012)). The exception to this rule is found in § 2255 itself: a federal prisoner may petition under § 2241 if the remedy under § 2255 "is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Under the "escape hatch" of § 2255(e), "[a] federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus only if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255 motion." In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998). The Seventh Circuit has developed a three-part test to determine whether 2255 was "inadequate or ineffective:
Worman v. Entzel, 953 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016); Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019)).
Muhammad argues that he is actually innocent of his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), it is unlawful for any person in one of nine relevant categories "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign...
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