Mukaida v. Hawaii
| Decision Date | 12 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-00419 SOM/LEK.,99-00419 SOM/LEK. |
| Citation | 159 F.Supp.2d 1211 |
| Parties | Edith Laraine MUKAIDA, Plaintiff, v. State of HAWAII; University of Hawaii; Norman Okamura; and Doe Defendants 1-20, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Emlyn H. Higa, Honolulu, HI, for plaintiff.
Gary K.H. Kam, Deputy Attorney General, Dean D. Choy, Evelyn H. Nowaki, Office of General Counsel, University of Hawaii, Carolyn Schnack, Bickerton Saunders & Dang, Honolulu, HI, for defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT STATE OF HAWAII'S AND DEFENDANT UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT NORMAN OKAMURA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Edith Laraine Mukaida ("Mukaida") had a sexual relationship with Defendant Norman Okamura ("Okamura") while they were both employed by Defendant University of Hawaii ("UH"). After that relationship ended, Mukaida claimed that she had been sexually harassed and that she was the victim of various torts by Okamura. Mukaida filed the present action against Okamura, both in his individual and official capacities, UH, and Defendant State of Hawaii (the "State"). Okamura, UH, and the State have filed separate motions for summary judgment.
The essence of the motions is that the alleged sexual harassment and other tortious acts by Okamura occurred during the course of a voluntary relationship between Okamura and Mukaida. Although Mukaida's opposition memoranda failed to identify any admissible evidence indicating that Okamura's actions were not consensual, the court has discovered several statements in her answers to interrogatories, submitted as exhibits, that raise a question of fact regarding whether some of Okamura's contacts were "unwelcome."1 Given the immense amount of evidence introduced, as well as Mukaida's admission at the hearing that she and Okamura had had a consensual physical relationship for some time, the few references in her answers to interrogatories regarding the "unwelcome" nature of Okamura's may ultimately be unpersuasive at trial. However, it is not this court's function to make credibility determinations on these motions. Accordingly, the court determines that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Mukaida, indicates that there is at least a factual dispute about whether some, but not all, of Okamura's alleged contacts were "unwelcome." The court therefore grants the motions in part and denies them in part as follows:
Count I (Battery) and Count II (Assault):
With respect to UH and the State, the court has previously dismissed Counts I (battery) and II (assault) of the First Amended Complaint (hereafter "Complaint") on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. Because these counts are not being asserted against Okamura in his official capacity, the only parts of Counts I and II that remain are the claims against Okamura in his individual capacity. The court denies the motions to the extent they seek summary judgment in favor of Okamura in his individual capacity, as there is an issue of fact about whether Okamura's actions were "unwelcome," and therefore nonconsensual.
Count III (Quid Pro Quo Harassment) and Count IV (Hostile Work Environment Discrimination):
Counts III and IV assert quid pro quo sexual harassment and a hostile work environment, respectively. Both counts are brought under both state and federal statutes. This court has previously dismissed, on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, the portions of Counts III and IV raising Mukaida's state law claims, brought under Chapter 378 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, against UH and the State. Because Okamura in his official capacity has the same Eleventh Amendment immunity as the State, the court now dismisses Mukaida's Chapter 378 claims in Counts III and IV to the extent they are being asserted against Okamura in his official capacity.
The court grants summary judgment in favor of UH, the State, and Okamura in his official capacity on the portion of Count III based on Title VII. Mukaida has failed to raise an issue of fact concerning whether she suffered any tangible employment action, which is a predicate for the claim of quid pro quo harassment alleged in Count III.
With respect to hostile work environment claims brought under Title VII in Count IV, summary judgment is granted in favor of UH, the State, and Okamura in his official capacity, as Mukaida unreasonably failed to take advantage of UH's sexual discrimination complaint policy.
With respect to Mukaida's Chapter 378 and Title VII claims against Okamura in his individual capacity, summary judgment is granted in favor of Okamura in his individual capacity because those provisions apply only to employers, not employees. Nothing in the record suggests that Okamura was Mukaida's employer. This leaves no part of Count III or Count IV for further adjudication.
Count V (Retaliation) and Count VI (Denial of Equal Employment Opportunities):
Based on Haw.Rev.Stat. § 304-6, the court previously granted summary judgment to the State on the portions of Counts V (retaliation) and VI (denial of equal employment opportunities) relating to acts or omissions allegedly occurring on or after July 1, 1998.
Because Mukaida has failed to raise an issue of fact concerning whether she suffered an adverse employment action or whether she suffered disparate treatment, the court now grants summary judgment in favor of the State to the extent Counts V and VI allege such wrongs based on acts or omissions allegedly occurring before July 1, 1998. For the same reasons, summary judgment is granted in favor of UH on Counts V and VI of the Complaint.
Summary judgment is granted in favor of Okamura in his individual capacity on Counts V and VI because those counts are premised on Title VII, which applies only to employers, not employees.
Because Counts V and VI are not being asserted against Okamura in his official capacity, no part of Counts V or VI remains for further adjudication.
Count VII (Section 1983) and Count VIII (Section 1985):
Counts VII and VIII seek relief under sections 1983 and 1985, respectively. This court, on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, has previously dismissed the portions of Counts VII and VIII seeking relief from the State for alleged past wrongdoing. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the State on Mukaida's prospective injunctive relief claims based on Haw. Rev.Stat. § 304-6.
To the extent Mukaida brought section 1983 and 1985 claims against UH based on alleged acts or omissions before July 1, 1998, those claims were also dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. To the extent Mukaida brings section 1983 and 1985 claims based on alleged acts or omissions on or after July 1, 1998, summary judgment is now granted in favor of UH because UH continues to have Eleventh Amendment immunity.
As the court reads Counts VII and VIII, Mukaida's section 1983 and 1985 claims seek relief for alleged violations of Title VII under color of law. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Okamura in his individual capacity based on qualified immunity. To the extent Mukaida seeks prospective injunctive relief against UH, summary judgment is granted in favor of UH, as Mukaida has failed to demonstrate that UH is now violating Title VII under color of law. Moreover, Mukaida has failed to demonstrate any agreement that could form the basis of a conspiracy claim under section 1985.
Because these claims are not being asserted against Okamura in his official capacity, no part of Count VII or VIII remains for further adjudication.
Counts IX and X (Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress):
Based on the Eleventh Amendment, the court has previously dismissed the portions of Counts IX and X that alleged that the State had intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress on Mukaida. On the same basis, the court has previously dismissed such claims against UH, to the extent those claims related to alleged acts or omissions before July 1, 1998. The court now dismisses Mukaida's emotional distress claims, based on the Eleventh Amendment, to the extent the claims are asserted against UH for alleged acts or omissions on or after July 1, 1998. The court also dismisses emotional distress claims asserted against Okamura in his official capacity, as those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
This leaves for adjudication Mukaida's emotional distress claims against Okamura in his individual capacity. Because Mukaida's emotional distress claims are based on the same conduct underlying the rest of the Complaint, and because Mukaida's assault and battery claims remain against Okamura in his individual capacity, summary judgment is denied to the extent Okamura in his individual capacity seeks summary judgment on Counts IX and X of the Complaint.
Count XI (Negligent Retention), Count XII (Negligent Supervision), Count XIII (Negligent Training), and Count XV (Negligent Failure to Remedy Sexual Harassment):
Counts XI, XII, XIII, and XV are negligence claims. This court has previously dismissed these claims on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, to the extent the claims were asserted against the State, as well as against UH for alleged acts and omissions before July 1, 1998. The court now dismisses these claims on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds to the extent they are alleged against UH for alleged acts or omissions on or after July 1, 1998.
Because Mukaida is not asserting these claims against Okamura in either his individual or official capacity, there are no claims remaining for adjudication in Counts XI, XII, XIII, and XV of the Complaint.
Count XIV (Aiding and Abetting Discriminatory Practices):
Count XIV appears to assert a claim under state law for aiding and abetting discriminatory practices. This court has previously dismissed, on Eleventh Amendment immunity...
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