Sherez v. State of Hawai'I Dept. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 01 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | Civil. No. 04-00390JMS. |
| Citation | 396 F.Supp.2d 1138 |
| Parties | Robert SHEREZ, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF HAWAI'I DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; Patricia Hamamoto, Superintendent of Hawaii Schools; Meredeth Maeda, Principal, Castle High School; Sara Gronner or Gronna, Vice Principal of Castle High School, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Andre S. Wooten, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff.
James Earl Halvorson, Nelson Y. Nabeta, Department of the Attorney, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
On August 24, 2004, Plaintiff Robert Sherez ("Sherez") filed his First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") against the State of Hawaii Department of Education ("DOE"), Patricia Hamamoto, Meredeth Maeda, and Sarah Gronna, alleging nine state and federal law claims. Hamamoto is sued in her official capacity only, while Maeda and Gronna are sued in their official and individual capacities. Sherez alleges that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race and sex. His Complaint asserts the following counts against all defendants:
I. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub.L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq;
II. Deliberate indifference under Title IX; III. Intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") under Hawaii state law;
IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
V. 42 U.S.C. § 1985;
VI. 42 U.S.C. § 1986;
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
IX. Chapters 368 and 378 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS"); and
X. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 86 Stat. 109, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.1
Sherez seeks: 1) a judicial declaration that the defendants violated state and federal law; 2) an injunction prohibiting defendants' "illegal practice of racial discrimination and harassment" in hiring teachers; 3) "compensatory, special, statutory, liquidated, exemplary, and punitive damages and other monetary relief in the amount of $10,000,000.00"; and 4) attorney's fees and costs.
On May 26, 2005, the DOE and Gronna, in her official capacity ("state defendants"), moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to Sherez's state law claims (Counts II and IX) and his §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, and 1983 claims (Counts IV, V, VI, and VII). The state defendants claim that the Eleventh Amendment bars these claims against state agencies and state officers. The court agrees with respect to the claims against the DOE and the damage claims against Gronna in her official capacity. The court therefore grants judgment on the pleadings in favor of the DOE on the following claims: IIED, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and HRS §§ 368 and 378 (Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII, and IX). The court also grants judgment on the pleadings in favor of Gronna in her official capacity on Sherez's IIED and HRS §§ 368 and 378 claims (Counts III and IX) and on Sherez's §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims (Counts IV, V, VI, and VII) for damages. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal claims against state officials for prospective relief; therefore, the court denies Gronna's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Sherez's §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims (Counts IV, V, VI, and VII) insofar as Sherez seeks prospective relief under these statutes.
On June 3, 2005, Gronna, in her individual capacity, moved for an order granting judgment on the pleadings as to Sherez's Title IX, Title VII and state law claims (Counts I, II, II, IX, and X). Gronna argues that she cannot be sued in her individual capacity under Title IX, Title VII or HRS chapters 368 and 378 and that Sherez's Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim for IIED. The court agrees that Gronna cannot be sued in her individual capacity under Title IX or Title VII and grants judgment on the pleadings in her favor as to those claims (Counts I, II, and X). The court also agrees that Sherez has failed to state a claim for IIED and dismisses that claim (Count III) against her as well. However, the court concludes that HRS § 378 provides a cause of action against Gronna in her individual capacity and therefore the court denies her motion for judgment on the pleadings as to this claim (Count IX). Because several of Sherez's federal law claims against the state defendants and Gronna survive this order, the court retains supplemental jurisdiction over the HRS chapter 378 claim (Count IX).
The motions came before this court for hearing on August 15, 2005.
Sherez is a special education teacher and tutor for Castle High School and has been a DOE employee since 1986. He alleges that either the DOE or its agents have repeatedly denied him tutoring jobs on account of his sex and race beginning in the fall of 2003. The complaint alleges that in the fall of 2003, Gronna created a policy prohibiting male teachers from tutoring female students at Castle High School. As a result of this policy, Sherez filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission ("HCRC") that same Fall. He alleges that after filing these complaints, the defendants retaliated against him by refusing to hire him as a special education teacher, and by either reducing or eliminating his tutoring assignments.
Sherez also makes a number of conclusory allegations of racial discrimination against non-Asian Americans or Caucasians. In five out of his nine causes of action, Sherez specifically states that the defendants have discriminated against him because of his race or are involved in a racist conspiracy.2 However, Sherez alleges no facts to support any of his racial discrimination claims. In fact, during the August 15, 2005 hearing, Sherez's counsel clearly and unequivocally admitted that he was neither alleging nor pursuing any racial discrimination claims.
Sherez also argues that the defendants' alleged refusal to hire him or to give him tutoring jobs constitutes IIED. In support of this claim, he alleges that he has suffered "public ridicule and embarrassment" because his colleagues know that he has the qualification and experience necessary to receive tutoring jobs but that he does not receive work because the defendants are retaliating against him.
Rule 12(c) allows parties to move for judgment on the pleadings prior to trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The court should grant a 12(c) motion if, accepting as true all material allegations contained in the non-moving party's pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir.1992). Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir.1989). However, if the district court goes beyond the pleadings to resolve an issue, the court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Id.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states cannot be sued in federal court, whether by their own citizens or citizens of another state. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 275, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment also bars federal court actions against state agencies or instrumentalities. Shaw v. State of Cal. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir.1986). Similarly, a suit for damages against state officials, in their official capacity, constitutes a suit against the state itself and therefore is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).
States, state agencies, and state officials may, however, be held to answer in federal court in two limited circumstances: where the state waives its sovereign immunity, and where Congress expressly abrogates state sovereign immunity with respect to a particular federal cause of action. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1991) (); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) ().
Courts have not been entirely consistent on what state acts will constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. This inconsistency stems from confusion as to whether the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional (i.e. whether an Eleventh Amendment defense may be raised at any time during a proceeding or whether a state must assert immunity as an affirmative defense in order to avoid waiver). See, e.g., California Franchise Tax Bd. v. Jackson, 184 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir.1999) (); ITSI TV Prods. v. Agric. Associations, 3 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (9th Cir.1993) (). Regardless, state defendants have made a timely assertion of their Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The courts have been more consistent on the issue of Congressional abrogation of immunity. A federal statute providing a private cause of...
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