Mullen v. Woodmen of the World

• Decision Date: 23 October 1909
• Parties: MAE MULLEN, Plaintiff Appellant, ELIZABETH LEER, Intervener, v. WOODMEN OF THE WORLD, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

122 N.W. 903

144 Iowa 228

MAE MULLEN, Plaintiff Appellant, ELIZABETH LEER, Intervener, v. WOODMEN OF THE WORLD, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 23, 1909

Appeal from Woodbury District Court.--HON. F. R. GAYNOR, Judge.

SUIT on a certificate of life insurance. The plaintiff and defendant appeal from a judgment in favor of the intervener. The defendant will be designated as appellant.--Affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

A. H Burnett and Shull, Farnsworth & Sammis, for appellant Woodmen of the World.

H. A Evans, J. L. Kennedy and Joseph Shoup, for appellant Mullen.

Ferris & Iddings, for appellee.

OPINION

SHERWIN, J.

The appellant, a fraternal beneficiary association organized under the laws of the State of Nebraska, issued to Alphes Comens a certificate providing for the payment of $ 1,000 should the insured die after the certificate had been in force more than one year, and for the payment of $ 500 if he died within one year. The plaintiff, Mae Mullen, was named in the certificate as beneficiary, the insured representing to the officers of the defendant that she was related to him as cousin. Mr. Comens died within a year from the date of the certificate, and this suit was thereafter brought by the plaintiff to recover on the certificate. The appellee Elizabeth Leer, intervened as the administratrix of the estate of Comens, and asked that the amount due on the certificate be awarded to her. The defendant answered, denying any liability whatever under the certificate, alleging that it was void for the reason that the insured had misrepresented the relationship of the beneficiary named. Upon the trial of the case it was shown that the beneficiary named in the certificate was not related to the insured in any manner whatever. The court dismissed the plaintiff's petition, and found the intervener, as administratrix, entitled to the amount due under the certificate. No copy of the application was attached to the certificate, as required by section 1826 of the Code, but the application contained a stipulation waiving the attaching of a copy thereof.

The appellant contends that the insured could waive the requirement of the statute, and that, on account of the waiver in the application, it was entitled to introduce the application in evidence and prove the statements therein contained to be untrue. Section 1826 requires that a true copy of any application or representation of the member which by the terms of the certificate are made a part thereof, shall be attached to the certificate, and says: "The omission so to do shall not render the certificate invalid, but if any such association neglects to comply with the requirements of this section it shall not plead or prove the falsity of any such certificate or representation, or any part thereof, in any action upon such certificate." If this requirement was intended to confer upon the insured a mere personal right or privilege, it could probably be waived by him. But we are of the opinion that the legislative intent was to announce a public policy which should govern all cases, notwithstanding any attempted waiver on the part of the insured. It was evidently enacted for the purpose of avoiding, as far as possible, any dispute as to the assured's knowledge of the contract by which his beneficiaries would be bound. Seiler v. Life Association, 105 Iowa 87, 74 N.W. 941. The statute in positive language says that a failure to attach a copy of...