Seiler v. Econ. Life Ass'n of Clinton

• Citation: 74 N.W. 941,105 Iowa 87
• Parties: SEILER ET AL. v. ECONOMIC LIFE ASS'N OF CLINTON.
• Decision Date: 08 April 1898
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

105 Iowa 87

74 N.W. 941

SEILER ET AL.

v.ECONOMIC LIFE ASS'N OF CLINTON.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 8, 1898.

Appeal from district court, Clinton county; P. B. Wolfe, Judge.

Plaintiffs sue to recover insurance upon the life of one Joseph Seiler, deceased. Two actions were brought, each upon a different policy. The actions were consolidated in the trial court. Defendant made one answer to the two claims, as combined. There was a trial to jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Hayes & Schuyler, for appellant.

Calvin H. George, for appellees.

WATERMAN, J.

The undisputed facts in the case are that the defendant company issued to one Joseph Seiler the two policies in suit, numbered, respectively, 17,146 and 17,147. By these policies the life of said Seiler was insured for the benefit of the plaintiffs in the sum of $2,000; each policy being for the sum of $1,000. Both of these policies were issued upon a single application. This application was signed, “Joseph Seiler;” and a copy thereof, with the exception that the signature was omitted, and in its place appeared the word “Signed,” was attached to policy No. 17,146. No copy or purported copy of the application was attached to policy No. 17,147, but there was an indorsement thereon in these words: “For copy of application, see policy No. 17,146, issued to same party.” The policies were taken out on the 31st day of August, 1895; and, on the 7th day of October following, Seiler committed suicide. The policies contained no provision in relation to suicide, but there was this clause in the application, “I also warrant and agree that I will not die by my own act, whether sane or insane, during the period of three years following the date of issue of the policy for which application is hereby made.”

2. Defendant, in its answer, sets up, in one paragraph, that Seiler, while in a sound mental condition, took his own life. This was demurred to by plaintiffs, and the demurrer sustained, to which defendant excepted. No question is made as to the propriety of thus attacking by demurrer a paragraph in pleading. It was alleged by defendant in another paragraph of its answer that Seiler, with the intent to defraud defendant company, procured it to issue said policies; he at the time intending to take his own life, as in fact he shortly thereafter did. This matter was also assailed by a demurrer, which was overruled. Evidence was introduced upon this branch of the case, and this single issue of fact was submitted to the jury.

3. The appellant assigns 59 errors. We think the matters can be condensed under five heads: (1) Was the application a part of policy No. 17,147, to which neither a copy nor a purported copy was attached? (2) Was it a part of policy No. 17,146, to which was attached a copy that omitted the signature of the applicant? (3) Will the suicide of the assured operate to avoid, as against a beneficiary named therein, a policy which does not in terms except death in that manner from the risk assumed? (4) Did the trial court err in its instructions? (5) Had the appellant the right to open and close before the jury?

4. Taking up the questions in the order of stating them, we shall devote no time to the first, for it will be disposed of by what we have to say under the next head.

5. Attached to policy No. 17,146 was a copy of the application made by the assured, except, as already said, that the signature of the applicant was omitted, and in the space where his name appeared in the original was the word “Signed.” The trial court refused to permit the introduction in evidence of this application, when offered by defendant as part of the contract. This ruling, we take it, was based on the provisions of section 2, c. 211, Acts 18th Gen. Assem., the material portions of which we set out: “All insurance companies or associations shall, upon the issue or renewal of any policy, attach to such policy, or endorse thereon, a true copy of any application or representations of the assured, which, by the terms of such policy, are made a part thereof, or of the contract of insurance, or referred to therein, or which may in any manner affect the validity of such policy. The omission so to do shall not render the policy invalid, but if any company or association neglects to comply with the requirements of this section, it shall forever be precluded from pleading, alleging, or proving such application or representations, or any part thereof, or falsity thereof, or any parts thereof, in any action upon such policy. * * *” This section has been often construed. For a quite recent exposition of its meaning we refer to Goodwin v. Society (Iowa) 66 N. W. 157. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that all of the statements and representations made by the assured were in the copy that was attached to the policy, and that he could not have been prejudiced by the omission of his signature, for he must have known that he signed this original. But it seems to us that the purpose of the statute was to avoid, so far as possible, any dispute as to the assured's knowledge of the contract. The requirement is that a copy of the application shall be attached. We do not understand this to call for a fac simile, but it certainly demands at least a substantial reproduction of the instrument. The signature is an essential part of the application, and all that is essential in the original should appear in the copy. It will be noted that in the alleged copy it is not stated by whom the original is signed. In Wisconsin they have a statute which is the counterpart of the one under consideration; and in Dunbar v. Insurance Co., 72 Wis. 492, 40 N. W. 386, it was held that a copy of the signature of the applicant was essential, in order to make a copy of the application, within the meaning of the law. The case was, in its facts, like the case at bar, except that the blank for the signature in the copy contained nothing to indicate that any signature was appended. The court, in speaking on the subject, says: “We are of the opinion that the copy of the application attached to the policy, not having the copy of the name of the applicant appended thereto, cannot be said to be a copy of such application, within the meaning of the statute. The signature is the thing which gives force to the application, and, when signed with knowledge of its contents, is conclusive on the insured. * * * We think that the signature of the party to an instrument which receives its vitality solely from such signature is such a substantial part of it that a copy of it must contain such signature.” As having some bearing, we also cite Kyser v. Railway Co., 56 Iowa, 207, 9 N. W. 338. The trial court was right in holding that the application in this case was no part of the contract, and that the statements therein could not be given in evidence.

6. The defense of suicide was set up in two forms. In one, as we have said, it went to the jury. The paragraph of the answer to which the demurrer was sustained was as follows: “That the said Joseph Seiler on or about the 7th day of October, 1895, and while in sane mental condition, and able to understand the moral character and consequences of his act, committed suicide, and intentionally and purposely killed himself, by shooting. The question thus presented by the ruling on the demurrer is: If a policy of insurance on life, containing no stipulation as to suicide, is taken out in good faith by the assured, will it be avoided, as against a beneficiary named therein, by the fact that the assured thereafter, while sane, deliberately and purposely took his own life? The authorities are not many on the subject, and they are not seriously in conflict. While there are a number of cases in which something has been said upon this matter in the way of dicta, there is but one in which it has been expressly decided that the suicide of the assured,...