Mullinax v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 2344,WINN-DIXIE,2344
• Citation: 458 S.E.2d 76,318 S.C. 431
• Parties: Belinda MULLINAX, Respondent, v.STORES, INC., Employer and Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., Carrier, Appellants. . Reheard
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 76

458 S.E.2d 76

318 S.C. 431

Belinda MULLINAX, Respondent, v. WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., Employer and Winn-Dixie Stores Inc., Carrier, Appellants.

No. 2344.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Reheard Oct. 6, 1994.

Decided May 8, 1995.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1995.

Certiorari Granted Feb. 23, 1996.

Appeal Dismissed May 17, 1996.

Jack D. Griffeth, of Love, Thornton, Arnold & Thomason, Greenville, for appellants.

Harry A. Chapman, Jr., and Michael Don Stokes, of Chapman, Harter & Groves, Greenville, for respondent.

ORDER

After rehearing the above case, it is ordered that the opinion heretofore filed be withdrawn and the attached opinion be substituted.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jasper M. Cureton

/s/ Carol Connor

For the reasons given in my dissent, I do not believe the earlier opinion of this court should be withdrawn.

/s/ C. Tolbert Goolsby, Jr.

CONNOR, Judge:

This matter is before us on a petition for rehearing. Our previous decision is reported in Mullinax v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., Op. No. 2176 (S.C.Ct.App. filed April 25, 1994) (Davis Adv.Sh. No. 10 at 29). The employer, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., applied to the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission in June 1991 to stop temporary total compensation benefits to Belinda Mullinax, who suffered a compensable injury in February 1991. The Commission, adopting the order of the single Commissioner, allowed Winn-Dixie to stop benefits. It further found Mullinax reached maximum medical improvement on June 3, 1991, and suffered a 20 percent permanent partial disability to her back. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the Commission, finding the Commission's order was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the circuit court, and remand to the Commission.

I. FACTS

Mullinax injured her back on February 8, 1991, while lifting up to sixty-pound bales of flour, sugar, and corn meal at Winn-Dixie. She first sought medical treatment for back pain, and subsequently for incontinence she claims resulted from the injury.

All parties stipulated Mullinax injured her back in the course of her employment, and Winn-Dixie admitted compensability for her back injury. Disagreement existed, however, concerning the extent of Mullinax's disability and the relationship her incontinence bore to the accident. Mullinax alleged she had not reached MMI and needed continued medical treatment for both her back and urinary problems. Winn-Dixie, on the other hand, argued further medical care would not reduce the period of disability to her back. It further asserted her incontinence was the result of a prior hysterectomy and "not work related nor related to any problem caused by treatment for her work-related injury."

Four significant doctors evaluated Mullinax prior to the hearing before the single Commissioner on October 15, 1991. First, she saw a neurosurgeon, Dr. S.R. Littlepage. He referred her to Dr. Thomas R. Scott, a neurologist, and Dr. Woodrow W. Long, Jr., a urologist. Also, her attorney sent her to Dr. George R. Bruce, an orthopaedic surgeon. The reports of these doctors were submitted without objection at the hearing. Additionally, the Commissioner took testimony from Mullinax, two of her friends, and Barbara Elizabeth Dawson, a nurse and employee of Crawford & Company, Winn-Dixie's insurance carrier.

After the hearing, the Commissioner ordered independent orthopaedic and urological evaluations by Dr. C. Glenn Trent, Jr., an orthopaedist, and Dr. J. David Rice, a urologist. The Commissioner specifically found in his order "that two (2) additional independent medical evaluations would be helpful for a determination of the issues before me." Thereafter, Doctors Trent and Rice examined Mullinax in November and December.

The Commissioner issued a final order granting Winn-Dixie's stop payment request on February 11, 1992. He held Mullinax reached MMI on June 3, 1991, and, therefore, needed no further medical care. He awarded Mullinax a twenty percent permanent partial disability rating to the back. Moreover, he specifically found Mullinax's incontinence unrelated to the accident.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for judicial review of the decisions of administrative agencies is contained in the Administrative Procedures Act. S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp.1994). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Id. In a workers' compensation case, the Commission alone is the ultimate factfinder. Where the medical evidence conflicts, the findings of fact of the Commission are conclusive. Hoxit v. Michelin Tire Corp., 304 S.C. 461, 405 S.E.2d 407 (1991). The test is whether the decision of the Commission is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached in order to justify its action. Miller v. State Roofing Co., 312 S.C. 452, 441 S.E.2d 323 (1994); Stokes v. First Nat'l Bank, 306 S.C. 46, 410 S.E.2d 248 (1991). The decision of the Commission may be reversed only if substantial rights of the claimant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings are clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).

The Supreme Court most recently applied the substantial evidence test in Grayson v. Carter Rhoad Furniture, 317 S.C. 306, 454 S.E.2d 320 (1995), aff'g as modified, 312 S.C. 250, 439 S.E.2d 859 (Ct.App.1993). Grayson, a furniture mover, injured his back while moving a sofa. He continued to work for a few weeks, then had to stop for several weeks. His orthopaedist conditionally released him to return to work, with the caveat "be somewhat careful with lifting." Carter Rhoad petitioned to stop temporary total disability benefits. The Commission stopped benefits. The circuit court reversed, finding no substantial evidence to support the Commission's action. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court and held Grayson could not return to work "without restriction" ¹ because as a furniture mover, his job required heavy lifting. Additionally, the court found evidence Grayson actually returned to work, albeit in pain, was not evidence he had admitted he could work without restriction. Therefore, the Court held the record contained no evidence his period of temporary total disability had ever ended. ²

III. ISSUE

From the outset, we recognize the evidence is conflicting concerning whether Mullinax reached maximum medical healing to her back and, therefore, we do not attempt to resolve that issue. There is, however, no evidence to support the Commission's finding that Mullinax's incontinence was not related to the accident; the only evidence before the Commission demonstrates that either the injury itself or treatment for the injury aggravated the incontinence. ³

IV. LAW

Our courts have clearly held the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury, absent an independent intervening cause, are compensable. Whitfield v. Daniel Constr. Co., 226 S.C. 37, 83 S.E.2d 460 (1954). Moreover, the great weight of authority holds the aggravation of the primary injury by medical or surgical treatment is compensable. Id. at 41, 83 S.E.2d at 462; Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 13.21(a) (1994). Additionally, new injuries resulting indirectly from treatment for the original injury are also compensable. Id. Likewise, a work-related accident which aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing condition, infirmity, or disease is also compensable. Brown v. R.L. Jordan Oil Co., 291 S.C. 272, 353 S.E.2d 280 (1987); Sturkie v. Ballenger Corp., 268 S.C. 536, 235 S.E.2d 120 (1977); Glover v. Columbia Hospital of Richland County, 236 S.C. 410, 114 S.E.2d 565 (1960) (a quiescent weakened, but not disabling condition accidentally aggravated accelerated, or activated, with resulting disability, is compensable); Arthur B. Custy, The Law of Workmen's Compensation in South Carolina § 9.1 (1977). A condition is compensable unless it is due solely to the natural progression of a pre-existing condition. Id. It is no defense that the accident, standing alone, would not have caused the claimant's condition, because the employer takes the employee as it finds him or her. Brown v. R.L. Jordan, 291 S.C. at 275, 353 S.E.2d at 282. According to Professor Custy:

[A]ggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable where disability is continued for a longer time, even though no disability would normally have resulted from the injury alone, or even if the aggravation would have caused no injury to an employee who was not afflicted with the condition.

Arthur B. Custy, The Law of Workmen's Compensation in South Carolina § 9.1 (1977); accord Green v. Bennettsville, 197 S.C. 313, 15 S.E.2d 334 (1941).

Finally, circumstantial evidence may be used to prove causation. Glover v. Rhett Jackson Co., 274 S.C. 644, 267 S.E.2d 77 (1980). "The causal sequence ... may be more indirect or complex, but as long as the causal connection is in fact present the compensability of the subsequent condition is beyond question." Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 13.11(b) (1994). Where the evidence is susceptible of but one reasonable inference, the question is one of law for the court rather than one of fact for the Commission. Glover v. Rhett Jackson Co.

V. ANALYSIS

Mullinax basically had six different doctors evaluate and/or treat her back and urinary problems. Of these six doctors, four addressed the urinary problem. Dr. Littlepage first noted on March 5, 1991 that Mullinax "had problems with her bladder" and was in a "stage of 'bladder retraining' " from a prior hysterectomy. Noting Mullinax's bladder was not "tacked up" at the time of the...