Whitfield v. Daniel Const. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 September 1954
• Docket Number: No. 16907,16907
• Citation: 226 S.C. 37,83 S.E.2d 460
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Mrs. Ruth J. WHITFIELD, et al., Respondents, v. DANIEL CONSTRUCTION CO., et al., Appellants.

Page 460

83 S.E.2d 460

226 S.C. 37

Mrs. Ruth J. WHITFIELD, et al., Respondents, v. DANIEL CONSTRUCTION CO., et al., Appellants.

No. 16907.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Sept. 7, 1954.

Watkins, Vandifer & Freeman, Anderson, for appellants.

Moore & Stoddard, Spartanburg, Thomas A. Wofford, Greenville, for respondents.

J. ROBERT MARTIN, Jr., Acting Associate Justice.

This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court sustaining an award of the Industrial Commission, whereby respondents were awarded death benefits as provided by the South Carolina Compensation Act.

On one question is presented: Is there any testimony to support the award and the order of the Court?

Appellant's contention is that there is no evidence proving that the death of James C. Whitfield was the result of any accident or injury received by him in the employ of Daniel Construction Company, o as a result of the prescription for medicine prescribed by a physician employed by the Construction Company to treat him, and there is no testimony from which an inference can be drawn to that effect.

The rule of law applicable is now so well established as to hardly require citation. In the case of Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Co., 189 S.C. 188, 200 S.E. 727, 728, it is said: 'It is a familiar formula that findings of fact by a Board or Commission on a claim under a Workmen's Compensation Act are conclusive; and the Appellant Court will not review such findings except to determine whether there is any evidence to support the award. It may reverse an award if there is an absence of any evidence to support it, but it is not a trier of facts. If the facts proved are capable as a matter of law of sustaining the inferences of fact drawn from them by the board, its findings are conclusive in the absence of fraud, and neither this Court nor the Court of Common Pleas is at liberty to interfere with them. This is but an application to Workmen's Compensation cases of the fundamental principle universal in Courts of law, that whether there is any competent evidence is for the Court to determine, but whether the evidence is sufficient is a question for the jury; the function of the commission being in that respect that of a jury in actions of law.' This rule has been adhered to by this Court in numerous cases. Rice v. Brandon Corporation, 190 S.C. 229, 2 S.E.2d 740; Layton v. Hammond-Brown-Jennings Co., 190 S.C. 425, 3 S.E.2d 492; Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S.C. 66, 7 S.E.2d 712; Buckman v. International Agriculture Corp., 196 S.C. 153, 13 S.E.2d 133.

The factual situation of the instant case as shown by the record is: On August 9, 1951, James C. Whitfield, the deceased, 33 years of age was employed by the appellant, Daniel Construction Company, as a structural steel worker in the construction of a building near Anderson, South Carolina. On this date, in the early afternoon, the deceased suffered a superficial laceration of the scalp from an accident admittedly arising out of and in the course of his employment . He was sent by his employer to a physician of its choice who administered novocaine and repaired the laceration by taking several stitches in his scalp. Upon dismissing decedent, appellant's doctor gave him a prescription for six one and one-half grain Nembutal capsules with directions 'one when necessary for pain'. This prescription was given to relieve headaches and pain which might develop from the injury to the head.

After having the prescription filled the deceased returned to his work and performed his usual duties until stopping time at 5:30 P. M. Thereafter, he rode with a fellow employee from the job to Williamston, South Carolina, a distance of twenty-one miles. At Williamston the fellow workman who owned the truck got out and allowed the deceased to drive on alone towards his home at Woodruff, South Carolina, some fifty miles away.

The deceased was next seen approximately one hour later on the Augusta Road (some few miles east of Williamston), where he ran off of the highway into a field some 200 yards, causing minor damages to the truck, necessitating its being pulled into a nearby garage for repairs. Thereafter deceased left the garage and after proceeding some two miles crashed the truck into the guard rail of a bridge sustaining injuries which resulted in his death.

The single exception of appellants is premised on their contention that there is no evidence providing directly or by inference that the deceased's death was the result of the scalp injury received by him. It is the contention of the respondents that the Nembutal capsules prescribed by the employer's doctor impaired the mental and physical faculties of the deceased, thereby causing the wreck at the bridge producing the fatal injuries.

There is no question but that the injury to the deceased's head was an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and was a compensable injury. Every natural consequence which flowed from this injury, unless the result of an independent intervening cause, sufficient to break the chain of causation, is likewise compensable.

The great weight of authority holds that the aggravation of an injury by medical or surgical treatment necessitated by an original compensable injury is compensable, e. g., Luongo's Case, 313 Mass. 440, 47 N.E.2d 938; Western Oil Drilling Co. v. Snow, 185 Okl. 545, 94 P.2d 902; Fitzpatrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 7 Cal.2d 230, 60 P.2d 276; International Harvester Co. of America v. Scott, 163 Tenn. 516, 43 S.W.2d 1065, and new injuries resulting indirectly from the original injury or from medical or surgical treatment are likewise held compensable, e. g., McAvoy v. Roberts & Mander Stove Co., 173 Pa.Super. 516, 98 A.2d 231 (fall...