Multi Denominational Ministry v. Gonzales

• Decision Date: 02 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. C-06-4264 VRW.,C-06-4264 VRW.
• Citation: 474 F.Supp.2d 1133
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: MULTI DENOMINATIONAL MINISTRY OF CANNABIS AND RASTAFARI, INC, et al, Plaintiffs, v. Alberto GONZALES, et al, Defendants.

474 F.Supp.2d 1133

MULTI DENOMINATIONAL MINISTRY OF CANNABIS AND RASTAFARI, INC, et al, Plaintiffs, v. Alberto GONZALES, et al, Defendants.

No. C-06-4264 VRW.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

February 2, 2007.

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Multi Denominational Ministry of Cannabis and Rastafari Inc. By Rev. Tom Brown, Upper Lake, CA, pro se.

Linda Senti, Upper Lake, CA, pro se.

Tom Brown, Upper Lake, CA, pro se.

Craig Tierney, Upper Lake, CA, pro se.

Steve Scott, Nice, CA, pro se.

Tom Wahl, Nice, CA, pro se.

Erica Womachka, Upper Lake, CA, pro se.

Julie A. Arbuckle, U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney's Office, San Francisco, CA, Jack Charles Woodside, Attorney General's Office, Terence J. Cassidy, Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant, Sacramento, CA, Anita L. Grant, Lakeport, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER

WALKER, Chief Judge.

On July 12, 2006, plaintiffs sued in pro per seeking, inter alia, declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent defendants from interfering with the exercise of their religion, which involves the use of marijuana. Doc # 1. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Doc ## 21, 34, 24. For reasons that follow, the court GRANTS defendants' motions to dismiss.

I

A

"On a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480,1484 (9th Cir.1995)). Accordingly, the facts upon which the court rules are those drawn from plaintiffs' complaint (Doc # 1), taking their allegations as true.

In August 2002, agents from the federal DEA and sheriff deputies from Lake County confiscated 288 marijuana plants from plaintiffs' property in Upper Lake, California. Doc # 1, ¶ 19(c). Linda Senti, along with her husband Charles Lepp (who is not a party to the current suit) brought an action in this court, see Lepp et al v. DEA et al, C-02-5901 VRW, alleging violations of their constitutional rights arising out of this search and seizure. The court granted federal and municipal defendants' motions to dismiss on November 29, 2004. Doc # 58, 02-5901.

In August 2004, DEA agents, with the assistance of deputies from the Lake County sheriff's department, confiscated an additional 32,500 marijuana plants from the property. Doc # 1, ¶ 17(f). In response, on February 8, 2005, Senti, Lepp and James Harris brought suit pro per in this court, see Lepp et al v. Ashcroft et al, C-05-566 VRW, asserting seven causes of action against federal and municipal defendants stemming from the August 2004 search. Doc # 46, 05-566. Plaintiffs sought compensation for the property seized and a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from seizing plaintiffs' marijuana in the future. Id. Soon thereafter, the court granted motions to dismiss filed by federal and municipal defendants pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Id at 22.

In February 2005, DEA agents confiscated from the same property an additional 11,500 marijuana plants. Doc # 1, ¶ 17(h). Due to the allegedly illegal activities taking place on plaintiffs' property, the federal government filed forfeiture proceedings against the property; these proceedings are currently pending in the Northern District of California before Judge Patel. Doc # 1, 05-897 — MHP.

Plaintiffs incorporated Multi Denominational Ministry of Cannabis and Rastafari ("MDMCR") on April 17, 2006. Doc # 3. Three months later, plaintiffs filed the present suit, alleging violation of (1) the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, (2) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), (3) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 USC § 2000cc ("RLUIPA") and (4) Proposition 215, California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996. Doc # 1 at 24-27. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit federal, state and local authorities from confiscating marijuana plants grown on their property. Id.

Presently before the court are motions to dismiss from federal, municipal and state defendants. Doc ## 21, 34, 24.

B.

FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss essentially "test whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint." Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1988). FRCP 8(a), which states that a plaintiffs pleadings must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," provides the standard for judging whether such a cognizable claim exists. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir.2001). This standard is a liberal one that does not require a plaintiff to set forth all the factual details of the claim; rather, all that the standard requires is that a plaintiff give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds for making that claim. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intell & Coord Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). To this end, a plaintiff's complaint should set forth "either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all the material elements of the claim." Wittstock v. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir.2003).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). See also Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. All material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 980 n10 (9th Cir1999). The court may also consider documents attached to the complaint in connection with a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). The court may not, however, consider other documents outside the pleadings. Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir.2001).

II

The court first addresses the procedural defects asserted by defendants, starting with the argument that sovereign immunity precludes plaintiffs' constitutional claim against federal and state defendants.

A

The party asserting federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving the facts necessary for such jurisdiction. See Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. Bunzel, 820 F.2d 1459, 1462 (9th Cir.1987). See also Cornelius v. Moxon, 301 F.Supp. 783, 785-86 (D.N.D.1969) (party seeking relief is required either to plead the basis of federal jurisdiction or facts that would give rise to such jurisdiction).

A suit against federal employees in their official capacities is considered a suit against the United States and thus subject to the defense of sovereign immunity. Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58, 83 S.Ct. 1052, 10 L.Ed.2d 191 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). Accordingly, such suits cannot be maintained unless Congress has explicitly waived the sovereign immunity of the United States. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996). Absent an explicit waiver, a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claim against the United States. See Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir.2004) ("Any claim for which sovereign immunity has not been waived must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.") (citing Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455 (9th Cir.1985)). Likewise, absent a state's consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials in their official capacity. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).

Federal officers may be sued in their personal capacities for violating an individual's constitutional rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). If an officer is sued in his personal capacity, as opposed to his official capacity, the suit is not against the United States, and thus money damages can be received. Id at 395, 91 S.Ct. 1999. Additionally, under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, a party may obtain prospective relief against a state official provided the official is sued in his personal capacity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).

In the present case, plaintiffs bring suit against officers of California and the United States in their official capacities. Doc # 1, ¶¶ 4-6. Accordingly, for this court to have jurisdiction over these claims, plaintiffs must plead a proper statute that waives the sovereign immunity. See Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir.1969) ("If facts giving the court jurisdiction are set forth in the complaint, the provision conferring jurisdiction need not be specifically pleaded") (citation omitted).

As for legal theories of relief, plaintiffs' complaint is difficult to decipher. The complaint refers to the First, Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendment. The court construes plaintiffs' invocation of these amendments as asserting claims for relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), for deprivation of their constitutional rights under color of federal law. But even so construed, plaintiffs' constitutional claim must...