Municipal Court of Seattle ex rel. Tuberg v. Beighle, 47641-1

• Decision Date: 14 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 47641-1,47641-1
• Citation: 638 P.2d 1225,96 Wn.2d 753
• Parties: . TUBERG, Respondent, v. William Paul BEIGHLE, Petitioner. Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 753

96 Wn.2d 753

638 P.2d 1225

The MUNICIPAL COURT OF SEATTLE, on the Relation of Judd E.

TUBERG, Respondent, v. William Paul BEIGHLE, Petitioner.

No. 47641-1.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 14, 1982.

Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Susan Rae Sampson, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, for petitioner.

Fishel & Seligmann, Eugene D. Seligmann, Seattle, for respondent.

UTTER, Justice.

This case concerns the capacity of the Seattle Municipal Court judges to summarily dismiss a magistrate whom they appointed pursuant to RCW 35.20.205. We affirm the Court of Appeals requirement of a formal charge and hearing in the absence of an appropriate municipal court rule.

Respondent Judd E. Tuberg was appointed magistrate of the Seattle Municipal Court on May 5, 1975, pursuant to RCW 35.20.205 and Seattle Municipal Court Rule 14. On July 27, 1977, Tuberg was suspended from that position and on August 1, 1977, he was terminated as magistrate by the judges of the municipal court. This termination was not preceded by a specific charge, a notice of hearing, and a finding. (Stipulation of parties.) Tuberg was dismissed pursuant to Seattle Municipal Court Rule 13, which does not contain a specific procedure for removal of a magistrate. ¹ (Stipulation of parties.)

Tuberg filed this action in the nature of quo warranto on May 1, 1978, challenging his removal by the municipal court judges and his subsequent replacement by petitioner Beighle. The Superior Court granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment, finding that Tuberg's discharge was within the municipal court judges' authority. Tuberg's appeal to this court was transferred to the Court of Appeals on February 27, 1980. On January 12, 1981, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that, in the absence of an applicable rule or ordinance governing removal of magistrates, article 5, section 3 of the state constitution permits removal only for "misconduct or malfeasance in office, in such manner as may be provided by law." We granted petitioner Beighle review of the Court of Appeals decision. Municipal Court ex rel. Tuberg v. Beighle, 28 Wash.App. 141, 622 P.2d 405 (1981).

The sole issue we must decide is the appropriate method by which the municipal court may suspend or remove a magistrate appointed by it pursuant to RCW 35.20.205.

Initially petitioner Beighle contends that a magistrate is not a "judicial officer" within the meaning of article 5 of the Washington State Constitution. Petitioner's assertion is first contradicted by stipulation of the parties and the language of RCW 35.20.205, both in its reference to magistrates as "judicial officers" and in its discussion of their duties as "judicial in nature."

Nonetheless, petitioner Beighle argues that since a magistrate is not a "judge," a magistrate falls (if at all) within the terms of article 5, section 2, which requires impeachment of a judicial officer. This, of course, would produce a ludicrous result, and so petitioner concludes magistrates should be deemed outside the scope of article 5 altogether. While such a result would indeed be ludicrous, it would also be needless. As a judicial officer within the meaning of article 5, magistrates should be considered "judges of courts not of record," and subject to the terms of article 5, section 3, permitting removal "for misconduct or malfeasance in office, in such manner as may be provided by law."

Magistrates are appointed by the municipal court judges to assume duties "judicial in nature", RCW 35.20.205, and municipal court rule 14(b) requires a magistrate to "qualify for and be appointed as a judge pro tempore of the Seattle Municipal Court." Although part of a magistrate's function is undoubtedly ministerial, he or she also must serve many of the functions of a municipal court judge. A municipal court judge is a "judge of a court not of record," and is subject to removal pursuant to article 5, section 3. State ex rel. Carroll v. Simmons, 61 Wash.2d 146, 152, 377 P.2d 421 (1962). Magistrates are thus appropriately considered "judges of courts not of record" for purposes of treatment under article 5, and are subject to removal pursuant to section 3 of that article.

The authority to establish judicial power in inferior courts is given to the legislature by the state constitution. Const. art. 4, § 1.

It cannot be disputed that the constitution gives the legislature power to provide how and by whom magistrates may be removed. State ex rel. Davis v. Johns, 139 Wash. 525, 248 P. 423 (1926); State ex rel. McReavy v. Burke, 8 Wash. 412, 36 P. 281 (1894). Legislatures may provide for removal of public officers without contravening the provisions of article 5, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution. Id. That section states:

All officers not liable to impeachment shall be subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance in office, in such manner as may be provided by law.

If removal is not "provided by law" (an act of the legislature), then article 5, section 3 governs the method of removal. Section 3's requirement of a showing of "misconduct or malfeasance ... as ... provided by law" clearly "impl(ies) ... a charge, a hearing, and a finding" when no legislative act otherwise provides for removal. State ex rel. Evans v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 375, 380, 159 P. 84 (1916).

Unlike in Evans, here the legislature intended that removal of magistrates be by the municipal court. While the legislature made no explicit provision for removal of magistrates by the municipal court, neither party questions that the power of removal resides with that court. Through RCW 35.20.205, the legislature stated the judges of the municipal court "may employ judicial officers to assist in the administration of justice," whose duties "shall be fixed by court rule as adopted by the municipal court judges or fixed by ordinance of the city." The municipal court is given broad authority by RCW 35.20.205 to decide whether to employ magistrates and to adopt rules governing their responsibilities and conditions of employ. Municipal Court ex rel. Tuberg v. Beighle, supra, 28 Wash.App. at 145, 622 P.2d 405. We must decide in what manner the municipal court's power may be exercised.

There are at least four possible varieties of "process" by which the municipal court may dismiss a magistrate.

The first position is that supported by petitioner Beighle. Petitioner claims that since the municipal court is given broad discretionary powers with respect to magistrates and since there is no question that the municipal court has power to dismiss respondent, it may do so in summary fashion through operation of rule 13. That rule provides municipal court judges "shall receive and investigate ... all complaints ... pertaining to ... employees (of the court), and shall take such action as they deem necessary or proper with respect thereto."

The second position is respondent's on appeal. ² Respondent apparently agrees with petitioner that dismissal may be summary. He states, however, that such dismissal must be by a rule which specifically addresses such dismissal. Since the parties have stipulated that rule 13 does not specify a procedure for removal, respondent argues rule 13 is inadequate. In the absence of an explicit rule governing dismissal, respondent agrees with the Court of Appeals that his "summary removal without a formal charge and hearing was in violation of article 5, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution." Municipal Court ex rel. Tuberg v. Beighle, supra at 145, 622 P.2d 405.

The third position belongs to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals disagrees with petitioner and respondent that dismissal may be summary. It states:

Consistent with article 5, section 3, rules may be adopted to provide that a failure to meet these responsibilities would make a judicial officer "subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance in office."

28 Wash.App. at 145, 622 P.2d 405. Since no such municipal court rule exists, removal was not otherwise "provided by law" and the Court of Appeals required a formal charge and hearing pursuant to article 5, section 3.

The fourth position may be termed the petitioner's interpretation of the Court of Appeals holding. That position would require a magistrate to be given the basis of removal, in the form of specified charges, notice, a meaningful opportunity to respond, and a finding on specified charges. This requirement of process would obtain whether or not it was articulated in a municipal court rule.

As to the fourth position, there is no basis for uniformly requiring notice and hearing for dismissal of magistrates. Both respondent and the Court of Appeals would require such process only in the absence of an appropriate municipal court rule. Neither would require that such process be contained in the municipal court rule.

The Court of Appeals does place restrictions on the nature of the "appropriate" municipal court rule, however. It infers these restrictions from the terms of RCW 35.20.205 itself. Since the statute does not explicitly give the municipal court power of summary removal, the appellate court reasonably inferred that the nature of the municipal court's power to remove magistrates must be derived from its rule making power. Since the municipal court has the statutory power to define the responsibility of a magistrate, the Court of Appeals concluded that removal should be based on inability to fulfill those responsibilities. It thus required the municipal court to promulgate rules articulating these responsibilities and the basis for removal of magistrates. The Court of Appeals conclusion seems quite plausible.

The respondent's position, on the other hand, is untenable. He concedes that summary removal is permissible but there must be a rule explicitly providing process for such removal. We must ask of respondent to what kind of process does he refer. Summary removal, after all, is...