Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. Department of Labor and Industries
| Decision Date | 25 August 1977 |
| Docket Number | A,No. 44441,No. 587,587,44441 |
| Citation | 88 Wn.2d 925,568 P.2d 775 |
| Parties | , 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2477 The MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN SEATTLE, Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Respondent, and Amalgamated Transit Union, Localppellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester, John T. Petrie, Seattle, for petitioner.
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Richard L. Kirkby, Charles F. Murphy, Olympia, Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis, Holman & Fletcher, J. Markham Marshall, Seattle, for respondent.
The King County Superior Court reversed a decision of the director of the Department of Labor and Industries 1 certifying the appellant union as bargaining representative of 63 Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro Transit) employees. The director had affirmed the findings and order of the associate chief labor mediator, who had heard the evidence on the application for certification, pursuant to Laws of 1967, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 108, §§ 6, 7, and 8, pp. 1886-88.
The Superior Court's decision was grounded on its finding that the director and the mediator had failed to follow the department's established precedents in deciding the question whether the employees were entitled to union representation. The correctness of his decision that the unit was appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, made pursuant to RCW 41.56.060, was not questioned.
The court found that the director had, in passing upon previous applications for certification, adopted criteria for determining whether the members of a proposed bargaining unit were "employees" within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(2) and that the department had not followed those criteria in this instance. Consistent application of criteria, the court concluded, is mandated by RCW 41.56.010, which provides:
The intent and purpose of this chapter is to promote the continued improvement of the relationship between public employers and their employees by providing a uniform basis for implementing the right of public employees to join labor organizations of their own choosing and to be represented by such organizations in matters concerning their employment relations with public employers.
(Italics ours.)
The court did not deal with, and apparently did not consider, the question whether the criteria adopted by the director were consistent with the statutory provision defining "employee" for purposes of collective bargaining. One of the contentions which the appellant advances in its attack upon the court's decision is that the workers which it seeks to represent are employees within the plain meaning of the statutory language. If this is the case, the director's decision was correct regardless of the reasoning or the criteria which he employed in reaching that decision.
The pertinent section of RCW 41.56.030 provides:
(2) "Public employee" means any employee of a public employer except any person (a) elected by popular vote, or (b) appointed to office pursuant to statute . . . , or (c) whose duties as deputy, administrative assistant or secretary necessarily imply a confidential relationship to the executive head or body of the applicable bargaining unit, or any person elected by popular vote or appointed to office pursuant to statute, ordinance or resolution for a specified term of office by the executive head or body of the public employer.
(Italics ours.)
It is conceded that the head of the bargaining unit is the director of Metro Transit, and it is not suggested that the employees represented by the appellant union in this proceeding are employed by any other elected or appointed officer. None of the positions involved carries the title "deputy", "administrative assistant", or "secretary".
Unless the positions involved fall within one of these categories, the persons holding them are not excluded from the definition of "public employee" under the act. Furthermore, even if they fit one or more of the categories named in the statute, the persons holding them are nevertheless public employees if their duties do not necessarily imply a confidential relationship with the director of Metro Transit.
From the record before us, it appears that the director of the Department of Labor and Industries has never attempted to define the terms "deputy", "administrative assistant", and "secretary". When asked to decide whether an employee whose job does not carry one of those descriptions is excluded under the act, he has looked to see whether the employee was a "supervisor", as defined by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1971). 2
The National Labor Relations Act expressly excludes "supervisor" from its definition of the term "employee". 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1971). It does not exclude deputy, administrative assistant, or secretary. RCW 41.56, the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, on the other hand, expressly excludes these categories of employees but makes no mention of supervisors. It contains no legislative suggestion that the director or the courts should be guided by decisions under the National Labor Relations Act, in interpreting its provisions. 3
We think the legislative intent is adequately expressed in the language used in the statute. If a statute is unambiguous, there is no need to look to administrative action as an aid to interpretation. Fecht v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 86 Wash.2d 109, 542 P.2d 780 (1975). In accord: Farm Supply Distribs., Inc. v. State Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 83 Wash.2d 446, 518 P.2d 1237 (1974).
We will presume that the legislature, when it adopted this act to govern collective bargaining by public employees, was aware of existing federal legislation governing private industrial labor relations. It is obvious that it did not find a sufficient similarity between those two types of employees to warrant the adoption of the federal criteria for determining which employees should be permitted to engage in collective bargaining. 4
In its definition of supervisor, the National Labor Relations Act manifests a concern with the authority which a supervisor exercises over other employees and the possible conflict of interest with management. The Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act differs in that the concern which it displays is not with the relationship between the employee and other employees, but with the relationship between the employee and the head of the bargaining unit or other official described in the act. It was obviously the legislative judgment that the officials charged with the statutory duty of performing the public service in question should be able to control and to hire and fire at will those employees who are intimately associated with them in carrying out those duties. Because of the confidential relationship, it was evidently the thought that the duties of the office could not be performed properly if the official's relations with these employees were restricted by the necessity of collective bargaining. The importance of the confidential relationship is obvious, for in its absence even the designated employees are not denied the right to engage in collective bargaining.
We find it unnecessary to describe the duties of the employees involved in this proceeding. Suffice it to say that the positions are at the lowest level of supervision in the transit system, that they have daily contact with bus drivers, but no personal contact with the director of Metro Transit. None of their duties necessarily implies or even suggests that a confidential relationship exists between these employees and the head of the unit. It was upon this ground that the director of the Department of Labor and Industries found that they were "public employees" within the meaning of the act and certified the union as their representative. Assuming that any of these positions could be classified as "deputy" as was suggested for the first time in oral argument, they were still not within the statutory exclusion.
The Superior Court...
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