Munion v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 27 August 2014
• Parties: Cherise MUNION, respondent, v. TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN CITY OF NEW YORK, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

120 A.D.3d 779

991 N.Y.S.2d 460

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05964

Cherise MUNION, respondent,

v.TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN CITY OF NEW YORK, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Aug. 27, 2014.

Braverman Greenspun, P.C. (Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, N.Y. [Evan H. Krinick, Cheryl F. Korman, and Merril S. Biscone], of counsel), for appellant.

Burns & Harris, New York, N.Y. (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., MARK C. DILLON, ROBERT J. MILLER, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Siegal, J.), entered November 15, 2013, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

On March 31, 2011, the plaintiff, an employee of nonparty TemPositions, was working as a coat checker at the Faculty House of Columbia University. After arriving at the Faculty House, while walking to the coatroom, she tripped and fell over the floor saddle located between the coat room corridor and a reception area. Shortly after the accident, the plaintiff began receiving workers' compensation benefits under a TemPositions policy. The plaintiff commenced this action against the trustees of Columbia University (hereinafter the defendant). The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that it was the plaintiff's special employer pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29(6), and that the alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law and, thus, not actionable. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendant appeals.

“[T]he receipt of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy that a worker may obtain against an employer for losses suffered as a result of an injury sustained in the course of employment” (Charles v. Broad St. Dev., LLC, 95 A.D.3d 814, 816, 947 N.Y.S.2d 518 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeWorkers' Compensation Law §§ 11, 29[6] ). “ ‘A person may be deemed to have more than one employer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law, a general employer and a special employer’ ” (Alfonso v. Pacific Classon Realty, LLC, 101 A.D.3d 768, 769, 956 N.Y.S.2d 111, quoting Slikas v. Cyclone Realty, LLC, 78 A.D.3d 144, 150, 908 N.Y.S.2d 117). “A special employee is ‘one who is transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service of another,’ and limited liability inures to the benefit of both the general and special employer” (Fung v. Japan Airlines Co., Ltd., 9 N.Y.3d 351, 359, 850 N.Y.S.2d 359, 880 N.E.2d 845, quoting Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 578 N.Y.S.2d 106, 585 N.E.2d 355).

“[A] person's categorization as a special employee is usually a question of fact” (Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 N.Y.2d at 557, 578 N.Y.S.2d 106, 585 N.E.2d 355). However, “the determination of special employment status may be made as a matter of law where the particular, undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact” (id. at 557–558, 578 N.Y.S.2d 106, 585 N.E.2d 355). “Many factors are weighed in deciding whether a special employment relationship exists, and generally no single one is decisive ... Principal factors include who has the right to control the employee's work, who is responsible for the payment of wages and the furnishing of equipment, who has the right to discharge the employee, and whether the work being performed was in furtherance of the special employer's or the general employer's business ... The most significant factor is who controls and directs the manner, details, and ultimate result of the employee's work” (Schramm v. Cold Spring Harbor Lab., 17 A.D.3d 661, 662, 793 N.Y.S.2d 530; see Gonzalez v. Woodbourne Arboretum, Inc., 100 A.D.3d 694, 698, 954 N.Y.S.2d 113; Digirolomo v. Goldstein, 96 A.D.3d 992, 993–994, 947 N.Y.S.2d 164).

“The receipt of Workers' Compensation benefits from a general employer precludes an employee from commencing a negligence action against a special employer” (Pena v. Automatic Data Processing,...