Muniz v. Marriott

• Citation: 773 F.Supp.2d 674
• Decision Date: 25 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. EP–09–CV–274–KC.,EP–09–CV–274–KC.
• Parties: Sylvia MUNIZ, Plaintiff,v.EL PASO MARRIOTT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

773 F.Supp.2d 674

Sylvia MUNIZ, Plaintiff,

v.EL PASO MARRIOTT, et al., Defendants.

No. EP–09–CV–274–KC.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

Feb. 25, 2011.

Connie J. Quintero, Scheer & Legate, PLLC, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff.Clara B. Burns, Gilbert Luis Sanchez, Kemp Smith LLP, El Paso, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER

KATHLEEN CARDONE, District Judge.

On this day, the Court considered “Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Motion”), ECF No. 33. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former employee of El Paso Marriott, Columbia Sussex Corporation d/b/a CSC/Columbia Sussex Corporation (“Defendant”). Proposed Undisputed Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 33–1. Plaintiff began working for Defendant in December 1999 as a room service server, and in 2004, Plaintiff became a room service supervisor where she supervised seven or eight employees. Id. In October 2008, Plaintiff became a food and beverage supervisor. Id. While a food and beverage supervisor, Plaintiff's manager was Mike Saldana (“Saldana”). Id. Plaintiff served under three general managers during her employment with Defendant. Id. ¶ 2. The first general manager was Carlos Sanchez, who was followed by Curtis Noe (“Noe”). Noe was succeeded by Orlando Carrasquillo (“Carrasquillo”), who became the general manager of the Marriott hotel in August 2008. Id.

Before Plaintiff became a food and beverage supervisor, Plaintiff claims that Saldana sexually harassed her. Id. ¶ 3. In December 2007, Saldana showed Plaintiff a picture of a naked man on his computer. Id. Plaintiff claims to have reported this incident to Noe, Carrasquillo, and potentially others. Id. At a scheduled meeting, Plaintiff informed Carrasquillo that Saldana showed her a pornographic image and that Saldana would “slamm [sic] his middle parts,” and “joke around.” Id. ¶¶ 4–5. In her deposition, Plaintiff alleged that at a banquet in June 2007 or 2008, Saldana obtained a burned bratwurst and told Plaintiff in Spanish, “Look, just the way you like them, big and black.” Id. ¶ 6.

Plaintiff wrote Carrasquillo a letter stating that she complained to him in August 2008, but that no remedial action had been taken to address Saldana's inappropriate behavior. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff stated in the letter that she had retained counsel and was seeking legal action. Id. After receiving the letter, Carrasquillo contacted Marriott's human resources department. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant claims that the Marriott then hired an independent consultant to interview relevant witnesses. Id.

Plaintiff claims to have suffered acts of retaliation after lodging complaints to Carrasquillo and the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Pl.'s Resp. to Proposed Undisputed Facts and Additional Disputed Issues of Material Facts ¶ ¶ 34–36, ECF No. 37–1. Plaintiff claims she began having conflicts with her co-workers and her supervisor, Saldana. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff claims Saldana made her work environment “a living hell” and that Saldana turned her co-workers and associates against her and undercut her authority. Id. ¶¶ 34–35. Plaintiff claims she was not permitted to train new associates, which was part of her job responsibility. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that an associate told her to be careful with her coworker Diana Lopez because Ms. Lopez was monitoring Plaintiff closely on behalf of Saldana and Carrasquillo “since [Plaintiff] did this thing with Mike.” Id.

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that, per Saldana's instructions, associates under her responsibility would ask “Louie” instead of Plaintiff for permission to leave work early; Louie is Saldana's brother who worked as a bartender in the Marriott. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff states that her car was vandalized in retaliation for filing her complaints of sexual harassment. Id. ¶ 37. On one occasion, Plaintiff claimed in her deposition that Saldana yelled at Plaintiff in front of other employees, causing Plaintiff to experience high blood pressure and seek medical treatment at a hospital. Id. ¶ 38.

Throughout the incidents described above, Saldana was Plaintiff's manager and exercised supervisory authority over Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 40. On April 26, 2010, Plaintiff gave two-weeks notice because, according to Plaintiff, Saldana “was known to be a very vindictive person,” Plaintiff believed “the retaliation against her in the workplace was not going to stop,” and Plaintiff feared for her and her family's safety. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. On May 6, 2010, Plaintiff resigned. Id.

On June 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in the 210th Judicial District of El Paso County, Texas. Notice of Removal, Pl.'s Original Pet. 1, ECF No. 1. On July 24, 2009, Defendant removed the case to this Court. Notice of Removal 1. On July 16, 2010, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 28. In that amended complaint, Plaintiff pleaded hostile work environment, retaliation, aiding or abetting discrimination, and sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or other related medical condition under Chapter Twenty–One of the Texas Labor Code. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ¶ 6. On November 15, 2010, Defendant filed the instant Motion.

II. DISCUSSIONA. Standard

Summary judgment is required “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir.2008). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir.2009) (quoting Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam)). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir.1996).

“[The] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Wallace v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046–47 (5th Cir.1996). To show the existence of a genuine dispute, the nonmoving party must support its position with citations to “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[,]” or show “that the materials cited by the movant do not establish the absence ... of a genuine dispute, or that [the moving party] cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court resolves factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party; however, factual controversies require more than “conclusory allegations,” “unsubstantiated assertions,” or “a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). Further, when reviewing the evidence, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and may not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. Man Roland, Inc. v. Kreitz Motor Express, Inc., 438 F.3d 476, 478–79 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). Thus, the ultimate inquiry in a summary judgment motion is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. Hostile Work Environment

In the Motion, Defendant first seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim. Defendant argues that the alleged harassment is not sufficiently severe to constitute a claim for hostile work environment because more severe facts have been held not to constitute hostile work environment by the Fifth Circuit. Mot. 3–7. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the alleged harassment altered conditions of her employment by creating an abusive working environment, which is enough to survive summary judgment. Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 21–26, ECF No. 37.

Chapter Twenty–One of the Texas Labor Code makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age. Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.051 (West 2011). Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by the Labor Code. Green v. Indus. Specialty Contractors, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 126, 131 (Tex.App.1999); Syndex Corp. v. Dean, 820 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.App.1991). The provisions of Chapter Twenty–One are modeled after Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act; therefore, courts properly look to federal precedent for guidance when interpreting the statute. NME Hosps., Inc. v. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex.1999); Culwell v. City of Fort Worth, 468 F.3d 868, 873 n. 3 (5th Cir.2006).

There are two distinct types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex.2010). This case involves sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment. To make a claim for hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege...