Muniz v. State
| Decision Date | 21 December 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 1415,1415 |
| Citation | 575 S.W.2d 408 |
| Parties | Ramsey Ramiro MUNIZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
This is a disbarment action. The State of Texas, acting through the Grievance Committee for District 11-A, instituted this disbarment suit against Ramsey Ramiro Muniz in the District Court of Nueces County. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Grievance Committee disbarring Muniz, and enjoining him from the future practice of law. Muniz appeals.
On April 11, 1977, the Grievance Committee filed a formal complaint against defendant Muniz, (an attorney licensed in the State of Texas), seeking mandatory disbarment pursuant to Article 320a-1 § 6, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. (1973). The Grievance Committee alleged that the defendant had been convicted of the following three federal felony offenses all involving moral turpitude: 1) unlawfully conspiring to import marijuana; 2) conspiring to possess with intent to distribute marijuana; and 3) jumping bond. Certified copies of the federal court judgments and commitment orders for these three convictions were attached to the petition. In accordance with these allegations, the Grievance Committee prayed that the defendant be disbarred. Defendant Muniz filed a general denial.
On March 23, 1978, the Grievance Committee filed a motion for summary judgment stating there were no genuine issues of fact to be decided. The motion alleged that the trial court was required to enter a judgment disbarring the defendant because the summary judgment proof established as a matter of law that defendant had been convicted of three felony offenses involving moral turpitude. At the hearing on plaintiff's motion, the trial court had before it the pleadings of both plaintiff and defendant; plaintiff's motion and supporting certified copies of the judgment and commitment orders; plaintiff's request for admissions, and the trial court's order deeming certain facts admitted. Defendant did not reply in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The summary judgment proof established the following facts, among others:
1) Muniz was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas pursuant to his plea of guilty entered on March 2, 1977, of willfully, knowingly and unlawfully conspiring, confederating and agreeing with others to import marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 963 (1973). He was committed for a total of 15 years, 5 years imprisonment and 10 years parole. (Cause No. SA-76-CR-176).
2) He was also convicted pursuant to his plea of guilty entered on March 18, 1977, of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute approximately 1,100 pounds of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 846, 2 (1973) and committed to custody for a total of 5 years to run concurrently with the above sentence. (Cause No. 76-C-245).
3) Muniz was further convicted in the United States District Court pursuant to his plea of guilty entered on March 18, 1977 of bond jumping in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3150 (1973). He was committed for a total of 5 years to run concurrently with the above sentences.
4) Muniz did not appeal from the above listed convictions and the sentences imposed were not probated.
5) Muniz was an attorney duly licensed in the State of Texas and a resident of Nueces County, Texas.
On July 20, 1978, the trial court entered a judgment which granted the Grievance Committee's motion for summary judgment and disbarred Muniz from the practice of law based on the three federal felony convictions involving moral turpitude. In addition, the trial court entered a permanent injunction which, in essence, enjoined defendant from future participation in certain legal work. Defendant brings forward two points of error on appeal complaining of the trial court's action in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and in entering the permanent injunction.
In passing upon the points raised on this appeal, we shall be guided by the rules concerning summary judgments established by our State Supreme Court and Rule 166-A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation, 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.Sup.1970); Great American Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.Sup.1965); State Bar of Texas v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n. r. e.).
Muniz was disbarred pursuant to Section 6 of the Texas State Bar Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 320a-1 (1973) which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Muniz contends that "(t)he trial court erred in granting Motion for Summary Judgment disbarring duly licensed attorney upon proof of convictions in federal court prosecutions for: (1) conspiring to import marijuana, (2) conspiring to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, and (3) bond jumping." Muniz' major argument, under this point is that none of the enumerated felonies for which he was convicted are felonies involving moral turpitude.
The precise question of whether any of the crimes for which Muniz was convicted are felonies involving moral turpitude for the purpose of mandatory disbarment has not been addressed previously by the Texas courts. Other jurisdictions, however, considering similar questions, have established some general guidelines.
Moral turpitude has been defined as anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals. In re Pontarelli, 393 Ill. 310, 66 N.E.2d 83, 85 (1946); In re Disbarment of Coffey, 123 Cal. 522, 56 P. 448 (1899); In re O'Connell, 184 Cal. 584, 194 P. 1011 (1920); Smith v. State, 490 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n. r. e.). It has also been defined to be an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general. Braverman v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473 (1956); In re O'Connell, 184 Cal. 584, 194 P. 1011 (1920); John's Vending Corp. v. Secretary of Revenue, Etc., 3 Pa.Cmwlth. 658, 284 A.2d 834, 837 (1971). The term implies something immoral in itself, regardless of whether it is punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude. Cf. In re O'Connell, 184 Cal. 584, 194 P. 1011 (1970). Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. In re Hicks, 20 P.2d 896 (Okl.Sup.1933); Smith v. State, 490 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n. r. e.).
Generally, in determining whether a crime committed by an attorney involves moral turpitude, consideration must be given to the fact that the illegal act was committed by an attorney as compared to a layman. An attorney must be held to a more strict standard than the layman because of the position of public trust which he enjoys. As such, his standard of conduct must be high. A lawyer assumes a position of responsibility to the law itself, and any serious disregard of the law by him or her is much more grave than that by the layman who may breach the law innocently or otherwise. A lawyer has always been regarded as an officer of the court. He is charged with obedience to the laws of this State and of the United States. Cincinnati Bar Association v. Shott, 10 Ohio St.2d 117, 226 N.E.2d 724, 733 (1967); In re Clark's License Suspension, 52 Cal.2d 322, 340 P.2d 613 (1959); In re Anderson, 195 N.W.2d 345, 348 (N.D.1972); Matter of Fosaaen, 234 N.W.2d 867, 869 (N.D.1975); People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954, 955 (1971). An attorney is also charged with the responsibility to maintain due respect for the judicial system and its rules of law. State v. Hendrickson, 139 Neb. 522, 298 N.W. 148 (1941). The question of whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude is to be determined by a consideration of the nature of the offense as it bears on the attorney's moral fitness to continue in the practice of law. Braverman v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473, 481 (1956); In re Rothrock, 16 Cal.2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940). As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274, 2 S.Ct. 569, 576, 27 L.Ed. 552 (1882):
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v. Mandel
...322, 73 N.W. 92 (1897); Tenn.S.C.R. 9 § 14.3; Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 320a-1 § 16(b) (Vernon 1973, 1982 Cum.Supp.); Muniz v. State, 575 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.Civ.App.1978); Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-37 (1953, 1977 Repl.Vol.); In re Pearce, 103 Utah 522, 136 P.2d 969 (1943); Vt.S.C.A.O. 9 § 12(c);......
-
State Bar of Tex. v. Heard
...933 (1939) (in bank); see In re Leonard, 64 Ill.2d 398, 1 Ill.Dec. 62, 356 N.E.2d 62 (1976). In Muniz v. State, 575 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) the court correctly The question of whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude is to be determin......
-
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Stern
...done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals.' " Id. at 320, 507 A.2d at 1220, quoting Muniz v. State, 575 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex.Civ.App.1978).9 We do not agree with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel that a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), which prohibits an attorney f......
-
Matter of Kerr, M-37-80.
...than a local offense, is immaterial. See, e. g., In re Hopfl, 48 N.Y.2d 859, 400 N.E.2d 292, 424 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1979); Muniz v. State, 575 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.Civ.App.1978). Nor is the statutory provision any less operative by reason of her Alford plea. Although she thereby did not technically a......
-
Civil Litigation
...“Moral turpitude has been defined as anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals.” [ Muniz v. State , 575 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e. ).] Crimes involving moral turpitude are those that involve dishonesty, fraud,......