Munt v. State
| Decision Date | 21 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | A18-0202 |
| Citation | 920 N.W.2d 410 |
| Parties | Joel Marvin MUNT, Appellant v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Joel Marvin Munt, Stillwater, Minnesota, pro se.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Susan B. DeVos, Assistant Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota, for respondent.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
In this case we are asked to determine whether the district court erred when the court denied appellant Joel Marvin Munt’s motion to correct his sentences under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. In support of his motion, Munt relied on Minnesota Statutes §§ 611.02, 609.04, and 609.035 (2016). Because Munt’s arguments regarding sections 611.02 and 609.04 are outside the scope of Rule 27.03, and his arguments regarding section 609.035 fail on their merits, we affirm.
Munt challenges the sentences he received for murdering his ex-wife, Svetlana, and kidnapping their three children.1 Munt committed the crimes while Svetlana, who had custody of the children, was waiting for a scheduled supervised visit between Munt and their children. Svetlana and the children were sitting in a Chevrolet Cavalier that was parked near the domestic-abuse shelter where the visit was to take place. When Munt arrived, he drove his Chevrolet Suburban into the driver’s side of Svetlana’s car, smashing it against a tree, and injuring all three children. Munt got out of his vehicle and shot Svetlana in the head four times with a pistol.
In the aftermath of the collision and shooting, several witnesses came to the scene to provide help. T.B., who was walking his dog nearby, arrived first after he heard the crash and gunshots. As T.B. approached the scene, Munt pointed his gun at T.B. and threatened to kill him. T.B. then fled and called 911 on his cell phone. Minutes later, M.D. and C.D. arrived at the scene in a Yukon Denali. The two approached the Cavalier, trying to help the children, when Munt walked up, pointed his gun at them, and threated to kill them if they did not leave the children alone. Munt then took the keys to M.D. and C.D.’s Denali, put the three children inside, and drove off. Shortly thereafter, a sheriff’s deputy stopped Munt and arrested him.
Following an investigation, a grand jury indicted Munt on 17 counts. Six counts in the indictment related to the murder of Svetlana;2 one count related to T.B.;3 four counts related to M.D. and C.D.;4 and six counts related to the children.5
The jury found Munt guilty of all counts and the district court imposed sentences on 10 of the counts. For Svetlana’s death, Munt was sentenced on Count 1, first-degree premeditated murder, to life in prison without the possibility of release. For threatening to kill T.B., Munt was sentenced on Count 9, second-degree assault, to a consecutive 36-month sentence. For stealing M.D. and C.D.’s car at gunpoint, Munt was sentenced on Counts 7 and 8, one count of first-degree aggravated robbery for M.D. and one for C.D., to two consecutive 57-month sentences. And for the crimes relating to his three children, Munt was given two sets of sentences: for injuring the children in the car crash, Munt was sentenced on Counts 15, 16, and 17, one count of criminal vehicular operation causing injury for each child, to three concurrent 365-day sentences; and for driving away with the children in the Denali, Munt was sentenced on Counts 12, 13, and 14, one count of kidnapping for each child, to three consecutive 36-month sentences.
After his trial, Munt filed a direct appeal, and we affirmed his convictions. See State v. Munt , 831 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 2013). Two years later, Munt filed a petition for postconviction relief. The postconviction court denied his petition, and we affirmed. See Munt v. State , 880 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 2016). On July 7, 2017, Munt filed the present motion to correct his sentences with the district court. The district court entered a one-sentence order denying Munt’s motion without a hearing. State v. Munt , No. 07-CR-10-1430, Order at 1 (Blue Earth Cty. Dist. Ct. filed Jan. 9, 2018). This appeal follows.
This case comes to us after the district court denied Munt’s motion to correct his sentences. Relying on Minnesota Statutes sections 611.02, 609.04 and 609.035, Munt argues that the district court committed reversible error. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to correct a sentence for an abuse of discretion, Evans v. State , 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2016). And, to the extent that Munt’s claims involve the interpretation of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure or Minnesota Statutes, our review is de novo, Reynolds v. State , 888 N.W.2d 125, 129–30 (Minn. 2016).
Munt argues that his sentences are illegal and has captioned his motion as one to correct those sentences. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9 authorizes a court "at any time [to] correct a sentence not authorized by law." A sentence is unauthorized if it is "contrary to law or applicable statutes." State v. Schnagl , 859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015). But the language of Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, "is limited to sentences, and the court’s authority under the rule is restricted to modifying a sentence." State v. Coles , 862 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn. 2015).
Rule 27 motions are not subject to the two-year procedural bar in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2016). See Reynolds , 888 N.W.2d at 133 ().6 But if the motion "implicates more than simply [the] sentence," the motion is properly treated as a petition for postconviction relief and the limitations period in the post-conviction statute applies. Coles , 862 N.W.2d at 482 ; see also Wayne v. State , 870 N.W.2d 389, 391–92 (Minn. 2015) (). We therefore must first consider whether Munt’s claims are within the scope of Rule 27.03.7
We turn first to Munt’s arguments regarding Minn. Stat. § 609.04 and Minn. Stat. § 611.02. Both of these statutes set forth requirements that relate to convictions. Under section 609.04, a defendant "may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both." (Emphasis added). Section 611.02 sets out the presumption of innocence and provides that "when an offense has been proved against the defendant, and there exists a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees the defendant is guilty, the defendant shall be convicted only of the lowest." (Emphasis added). Because these two statutes relate to convictions and not sentences, claims under these statutes are not properly brought under Rule 27.03, subdivision 9. See Coles , 862 N.W.2d at 482 ().8
Given that Munt’s claimed violations of Minn. Stat. § 609.04 and Minn. Stat. § 611.02 cannot be asserted under Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, these claims must be considered within the confines of the postconviction statute. See Coles , 862 N.W.2d at 480, 482. As such, these claims are subject to the limitations period in that statute. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1)–(2) (). The two-year limitations period expired well before Munt filed his motion, and he makes no argument that any of the exceptions in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (b) apply. Because Munt’s claims regarding sections 609.04 and 611.02 are time-barred, the district court did not err in denying relief to Munt on these claims.
We turn next to Munt’s arguments regarding Minn. Stat. § 609.035. Under that statute, "if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses." By its plain terms, section 609.035 limits the imposition of punishment. See City of Bloomington v. Kossow , 269 Minn. 467, 131 N.W.2d 206, 208 (1964) () (emphasis added). Because Munt’s arguments regarding section 609.035 implicate only his sentences, these arguments are within the scope of Rule 27.03, subdivision 9. We therefore turn to the merits of these arguments.9
Munt claims that he was sentenced in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.035. That statute applies when "a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense." We have said that it is "no easy task" to formulate "a workable test for determining the scope of application of the protections contemplated by [ section 609.035 ]." State v. Johnson , 273 Minn. 394, 141 N.W.2d 517, 524 (1966). Relying on the 1963 legislative advisory committee comments to Minn. Stat. § 609.035, we determined that "conduct" refers to a "single behavioral incident."10 141 N.W.2d at 524. We then set out a test to determine when a person’s actions constitute a single behavioral incident: "[A]part from the factors of time and place, the essential ingredient of any test is whether the segment of conduct involved was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective." Id. at 525 (emphasis removed). Put differently, acts that lack a unity of time and place or are motivated by different criminal objectives do not constitute a single behavioral incident, and therefore, are not "conduct," for purposes of section 609.035. State v. Bauer , 792 N.W.2d 825, 827–30 (Minn. 2011). Similarly, acts...
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...as part of a separate behavioral incident. State v. Johnson , 273 Minn. 394, 141 N.W.2d 517, 524–25 (1966) ; see also Munt v. State , 920 N.W.2d 410, 416–17 (Minn. 2018) ("[A]cts that lack a unity of time and place or are motivated by different criminal objectives do not constitute a single......
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...First, section 609.035 concerns multiple sentences, while section 609.04 concerns multiple convictions. See, e.g., Munt v. State, 920 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Minn. 2018) (concluding that, unlike claims pursuant to section 609.035, postconviction claims based on section 609.04 are not properly brou......
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...respect to a single victim, so the prohibition on multiple punishments does not apply if there are multiple victims. Munt v. State , 920 N.W.2d 410, 418-19 (Minn. 2018). The parties agree that the convictions and sentences here arise out of a single behavioral incident; the sole dispute is ......
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