Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1437,90-1437
• Citation: 575 N.E.2d 828,61 Ohio St.3d 585
• Parties: MURPHY, Appellant, v. CARROLLTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY; Mayfield et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 585

61 Ohio St.3d 585

575 N.E.2d 828

MURPHY, Appellant, v. CARROLLTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY; Mayfield et al., Appellees.

No. 90-1437.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 8, 1990.

Decided Aug. 28, 1991.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

Where a dependent person claiming death benefits under the workers' compensatio n laws produces sufficient evidence to allow reasonable minds to conclude that there was more than one proximate cause of death, a jury instruction on dual ca usation should be given.

On October 23, 1964 William S. Murphy was injured in the course of and arising out of his employment with Carrollton Manufacturing Company. As a result of the injury, he was eventually declared permanently and totally disabled by the Industrial Commission of Ohio and received benefits from July 26, 1970 until his death. The injury occurred when Murphy was knocked to the floor by falling stock of flat pasteboard cartons. Upon trying to stand up, Murphy fell down again, striking his back against a wooden skid. Murphy sought medical attention, but was treated conservatively at first. Initially hospitalized in February of 1965, he was diagnosed with lumbosacral strain and was placed in traction. That summer he was placed in a body cast. Subsequently, Murphy returned to work, but continued to experience back pain. This was the beginning of a series of hospitalizations and medical procedures spanning the remaining years of his life.

In March of 1966, Murphy was admitted to the hospital and diagnosed as having a possible herniated disc and/or a perineural cyst. A laminectomy and spinal fusion were performed on March 18, 1966. Subsequently, Murphy continued to work intermittently, often leaving early due to pain. He completely stopped working in January, 1968. Murphy continued to experience back pain, and was admitted to the hospital again in March of 1968. He was diagnosed as having a sacral cyst, and underwent a posterolateral spinal fusion on March 8, 1968. This procedure did not completely alleviate Murphy's condition. Therefore, he was again admitted to the hospital in May, 1969, and submitted to an anterior spinal fusion.

During this entire time, due to his back pain and the surgical procedures required to correct his condition, Murphy was taking a variety of prescription drugs. On October 30, 1971 Murphy was admitted to a hospital and diagnosed as having gastric ulcers which necessitated surgical repair. The treating physicians opined that the cause of the ulcers was the large amounts of medication Murphy was taking for his back pain. Murphy's medical history also shows the following hospitalizations: in March 1974 for gastritis, acute and chronic esophagitis, and back pain; in October 1978 for back pain, osteoarthritis, fibrosis and emphysema; and in February 1981 for weight loss, back pain, anorexia and nausea with persistent vomiting. Once again, a treating physician believed the stomach difficulties were related to the heavy doses of medication taken for back pain. In March 1981, Murphy fell and fractured his hip. Lastly, Murphy was hospitalized on May 11, 1983 with progressive renal failure, pulmonary hypertension and congestive heart failure. Murphy died on May 22, 1983. The certificate of death listed the cause of death as acute renal failure, acute myocardial infarction and shock, and respiratory failure.

Geraldine W. Murphy, appellant herein, filed an application for workers' compensation death benefits, alleging that her husband had died as a result of the injury he sustained while at work on October 23, 1964. The district hearing officer denied the claim, and the board of review affirmed the decision. The Industrial Commission refused further review. Thereafter, appellant filed a complaint in the common pleas court seeking the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund. After a jury trial, the court entered judgment in accord with the jury's verdict and denied the claim for death benefits.

Upon appeal, appellant argued that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury on the issue of proximate cause. Specifically, appellant asserted error in the trial court's refusal to instruct that there may be more than one proximate cause of death. ¹ The appellate court apparently agreed with appellant's legal theory, stating that "[i]f the appellant's evidence had demonstrated there was more than one proximate cause, the court would have been required to give that charge." However, the court of appeals determined that "the evidence presented by the appellant in this case indicated there was only a single cause." Hence, because it found that the evidence did not support an instruction on dual causation, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.

This case is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Zwick Law Offices Co., L.P.A., Arthur C. Graves and Leander P. Zwick III, Canton, for appellant.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., Michale L. Squillace and Cheryl J. Nester, Columbus, for appellees Industrial Com'n of Ohio, and Adm'r, Bureau of Workers' Compensation.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, Justice.

Appellant's complaint demanded that she be entitled to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund and receive death benefits due to her husband's death. We have stated that in order for dependents of deceased workers to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund and collect death benefits, " * * * the proof offered must show such injury was a proximate cause of death * * *." Aiken v. Indus. Comm. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 113, 28 O.O. 50, 53 N.E.2d 1018, at the syllabus. Moreover, we have adhered to the proposition that when " * * * considering the issue of proximate cause in the workers' compensation context, * * * the definition of and principles governing * * * the determination of 'proximate cause' in the field of torts are applicable." Oswald v. Connor (1985), 16 Ohio St.3d 38, 42, 16 OBR 520, 523, 476 N.E.2d 658, 662, citing Aiken, supra.

It is a well-established principle of tort law that an injury may have more than one proximate cause. See Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 266-268, Section 41; 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 432, Section 433; 1B Larson, Law of Workers' Compensation (1991) 7-612 to 7-941, Section 41.64; 1 Ohio Jury Instructions (1988) 183, Section 11.10 ("There may be more than one proximate cause."). Ohio case law also supports this fundamental tenet of tort law: "In Ohio, when two factors combine to produce damage or illness, each is a proximate cause." Norris v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 66, 67, 548 N.E.2d 304, 305.

Hence, the issue presented for this court's determination is whether appellant presented sufficient evidence to be entitled to a jury instruction on dual causation. The appellate court opined that " * * * the evidence presented by the appellant in this case indicated there was only a single cause." We disagree.

At trial, appellant produced expert opinion testimony by two doctors as to the decedent's cause of death. Dr. Pliny A. Price testified as follows:

"Q: * * * Now, doctor, * * * do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and probability as to whether or not the injury he [decedent] sustained on October 23, 1964 directly and proximately hastened his death on May 20th [sic], 1983 by a substantial period of time? * * *

" * * *

"A: My opinion is that the injury described in October of 1964 and subsequent events which followed as revealed by all of the medical records of hospitalizations, et cetera, that this patient's death was hastened by a substantial margin by the injury of October 23rd, '64, and the events that followed.

"Q: And, doctor, could you give us a basis for your opinion?

"A: In my opinion the way the thing stacks up is this, that the injury in which the patient sustained a fractured coccyx and a lumbar sprain, et cetera, and contused hip, created a situation that put stress on the patient. Prior to this he was able to adjust to his job and taking care of his family, and that was solid as far as he was concerned. With the advent of new problems, new stresses, the patient began to give way under this, and this eventually developed into a vicious cycle with pain, medications, increase of nervous tension and in turn nervous tension increasing the muscle spasms and stress on the lower back, and the stress on the stomach and lower bowel to the extent that he developed peptic ulcers, evidently both in the stomach and duodenum. So that later there was hemorrhage from these. This was a sustained stress that developed new facets as it went along and got deeper and deeper before the patient finally with his depression had obviously given up ever going back to work or taking care of his family. And according to the death certificate the patient died from renal failure with myocardial infarction, and certainly these types of major stresses did exert considerable influence on worsening his cardiac and renal conditions and did hasten his death in my opinion by several years."

The second doctor to provide expert medical opinion for appellant was Dr. Alan E. Kravitz. After appellant's counsel established that Dr. Kravitz had reviewed the decedent's medical records and other pertinent hospitalization documents, the witness related his opinion as follows:

"A: And, Doctor, what is your opinion?

"Q: I believe the injury of October 23rd, 1964 directly and proximately caused his death.

"Q: And, Doctor, would you give us the basis of your opinion?

"A: For the purposes of the attorneys and more for the purposes of the jury, I am going to describe a sequence of events that are inexorably chained...